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SUMMARY 
 
In South Africa compliance with competition law has become a major concern for firms 
that achieve and maintain certain levels of success and growth in the market, as their 
actions are often a source of complaints and litigation by rivals and competition 
authorities.  With substantial financial penalties often levied against them for a variety of 
conduct deemed to constitute an abuse of their market position, dominant firms must 
constantly be aware of the likely impact of their business strategies and actions on both 
rivals and consumers.  What were once thought to be normal and economically sound 
business practices and decisions, such as cutting prices to attract customers, have now 
acquired new meanings, with devastating consequences for dominant firms.  So, are 
dominant firms under attack from competition law?  In this study I aim to determine this.   
 
I track the historical development of competition law in three jurisdictions: South Africa, 
America, and the EU, with the aim of identifying traces, if any, of hostility towards 
dominant firms in the origins of competition law.  I further investigate whether the 
formulation and enforcement of certain aspects of existing abuse of dominance 
provisions manifest as hostility towards dominant firms.  While acknowledging the 
important role that competition law enforcement plays in promoting competition and 
enhancing consumer welfare, I conclude that significant unjustified economic and legal 
prejudice is suffered by dominant firms as a result of the way in which certain abuse of 
dominance provisions have been formulated and applied.  I also offer appropriate 
recommendations.  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
I conceived the idea of writing this thesis some time in 2007.  At that time, I was working 
as a researcher at the Competition Tribunal.  During my time there, my duties included 
assisting members of the Tribunal with research on cases before them, attending 
hearings, and helping to draft the Tribunal’s decisions.  In pleadings and oral arguments 
during hearings, particularly in abuse of dominance cases, I was struck by the lengths to 
which complainants went to prove that the defendant was dominant in the relevant 
market.  Equally, defendants would also devote considerable time and effort contesting 
claims that they were in fact dominant in that market.   
 
A review of the abuse of dominance provisions in the Competition Act1 reveals that this 
enforcement approach, to the extent that it may be undesirable, cannot be the sole fault 
of litigants.  Abuse of dominance provisions themselves provide the basis for litigants to 
approach proceedings in a manner that renders the identity of the defendant (a firm 
enjoying the position of dominance in the market) an indispensable element of the 
concept of infringement.2  But why is the identity or market position or status of the 
defendant such an issue of great importance in abuse of dominance cases?  Why has 
                                               
1  89 of 1998. 
2  Section 8 of our Competition Act prohibits a dominant firm from engaging in a number of practices that 
it considers an ‘abuse of dominance’.  Because the provision provides a description of its intended target, 
ie dominant firms, it is essential that the complainant must show that the defendant meets the description 
of a firm against which the provision was specifically designed.   
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competition law not developed a neutral infringement concept for unilateral conduct 
which places its primary emphasis on the quality of the conduct of a firm rather than its 
market size?  I found it strange that primary importance was not accorded to the 
existence of the conduct complained of and whether that conduct was contrary to 
competition rules.  These questions troubled me in the early days of my introduction to 
competition law and abuse of dominance enforcement.  However, I soon discovered 
that these concerns are shared by competition law commentators and practitioners in 
other jurisdictions.3 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The main object of abuse of dominance law is to protect the market from distortions 
stemming from or associated with market power.  Thus, in abuse of dominance cases, 
market power or dominance is a central element of the concept of infringement.4  In 
other jurisdictions, the mere presence of a dominant undertaking in a market is treated 
as an indication that the degree of competition in that market has been compromised.5  
In South African law it has also been observed that competition law is primarily 
                                               
3  Kathryn McMahon ‘Interoperability: "Indispensability" and "Special Responsibility" in High Technology 
Markets’ (2007) 9 Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 123-72 at 162 and Office of Fair 
Trading The Cost of Inappropriate Interventions/Non Interventions Under Article 82 (September 2006) 
Economic Discussion Paper OFT 864 at 15 accessed at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/GiancarloSpagnolo_report.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
4  Thomas Eilmansberger ‘How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search 
of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law 
Review 129-78 at 142. 
5  Cases C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission at par 91; 322/81 Michelin v Commission 
at par 70; T‑210/01 General Electric v Commission at par 549; C-95/04P British Airways v Commission at 
par 66; and T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA and Others v Commission at pars 38 and 206. 
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‘concerned with giving “special attention” to dominant firms, by regulating and 
controlling their market power’.6   
 
This fascination with market power and dominance may result in attention being 
deflected away from the real issues: assessing the anticompetitive nature of the 
allegedly abusive conduct by the dominant firm.  This may lead to a situation where 
mere proof of dominance is in effect sufficient to establish infringement of the Act.7  This 
may unwittingly have the effect of discouraging firms from striving to achieve the level of 
commercial success that leads to dominance.8   
 
This can be seen to suggest that the philosophy underpinning abuse of dominance law 
and its enforcement is one of hostility towards the acquisition and maintenance of 
dominance in the market.9  It may appear as though competition law in general, and 
abuse of dominance provisions in particular, are intended to punish efficient firms for 
becoming dominant.  Similar observations have been made about competition law in 
                                               
6  Carina Smit ‘The Rationale for Competition Policy: A South African Perspective’ (paper presented at the 
biennial ESSA Conference, 7-9 September 2005, Elangeni Holiday Inn Hotel, Durban, South Africa) at 8 
accessed at http://econex.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/econex_researcharticle_10.pdf (date of last 
use: 6 July 2016). 
7   Rafael Allendesalazar ‘Can We Finally Say Farewell to the “Special Responsibility” of Dominant 
Companies?’ (paper presented at the 12th Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Robert 
Schuman Centre 8-9 June 2007, EUI, Florence) at 4 accessed at  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007(pdf)/200709-COMPed-Allendesalazar.pdf (date of 
last use: 6 July 2016); Miguel de la Mano ‘The Dominance Concept: New Wine in Old Bottles’ (March 
2007) FTC/DOJ Hearings on Single-Firm Conduct, Washington DC accessed at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/dominance-concept-new-wine-old-bottles (date of last use: 6 July 2016); and 
Dieter De Smet ‘The Diametrically Opposed Principles of US and EU Antitrust Policy’ (2008) 29 European 
Competition Law Review 356-62 at 362.   
8  Robert H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (Basic Books Inc 1978) at 57. 
9  Robert L. Bradley, Jr. ‘On the Origins of the Sherman Act’ (1990) 9 Cato Journal 737-42 at 737-8; Heike 
Schweitzer ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 
EC’ (paper presented at the 12th Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Robert Schuman 
Centre, 8-9 June 2007 EUI, Florence) at 2 accessed at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Schweitzer.pdf 
(date of last use: 6 July 2016); and Smit supra n 6.   
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general, and abuse of dominance provisions in particular, by a number of observers in 
other jurisdictions.10  As Bork candidly remarked, “antitrust laws ‘harass’ successful and 
dominant undertakings” .11   
 
Understanding the implications that observations and perceptions such as these may 
have on the legitimacy of competition law and its enforcement, the Competition Tribunal 
has attempted to allay fears or perceptions that the main aim of competition law is to 
eliminate dominant corporations from markets.12  Along with this assurance, is the often 
recited mantra in competition law and abuse of dominance enforcement that “no 
prohibition or punishment attaches to a firm by reason only of its dominance”.13  But few 
in our law have had the interest to investigate or challenge the validity of these claims.   
 
To challenge the status quo by suggesting that abuse of dominance law and its 
enforcement inherently prejudice dominant firms, one needs to accept the possibility of 
appearing to be pandering to monopoly.  It is taboo in our society openly to position 
oneself as a champion or defender of dominant firms and monopoly rights or interests.  
There is a longstanding perception that industrial giants, particularly those which are 
                                               
10  Oluseye Arowolo ‘Application of the Concept of Barriers to Entry Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty: Is 
There a Case for Review?’ (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 247-57 at 251; Per Jebsen and 
Robert Stevens ‘Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under 
Article 86 of the European Union’ (1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journal 443-516 at 504; and Nicolas Petit and 
Norman Neyrink ‘Industrial Policy and Competition enforcement: Is There, Could There and Should There 
Be a Nexus?’ (paper prepared for the 2012 Global Competition Law Centre's Eighth Annual Conference, 
8-9 November 2012, Residence Palace, Brussels) at 10 accessed at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225903 and http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225903 (date of last use: 6 July 
2016).   
11  Bork supra n 8 at 4.   
12  Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another Case No 
13/CR/FEB04 at par 124.  See also Martin Brassey et al Competition Law (Juta 2002) at 197. 
13  Brassey supra n 12.   
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privately owned, do not serve the common interest of the majority of citizens.14  The 
concentration of economic power in the hands of private corporations owned and 
controlled by a minority has been singled out as a major source of the inequality in 
wealth and income distribution in South Africa.  Competition policy and law in South 
Africa arose precisely as part of government efforts to counter the excessive 
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few.15   
 
While the noble ideal of regulating the process of market competition through the law in 
order to enhance consumer welfare is not faulted, the process and mechanism through 
which competition rules, in particular abuse of dominance rules, are enforced do, 
however, raise significant economic and legal problems.  The recent flurry of legal 
challenges to competition proceedings and decisions in superior courts illustrates this 
point.16 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
 
                                               
14  Bork, supra n 8 at 5, also observed a similar trend in American society, when he noted that there 
always existed in America a ‘populist’ hostility to big business, reinforced by the perception that major 
corporations are somehow to blame for society’s hardships. 
15   Simon Roberts ‘The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development: The South African 
Experience’ (2004) Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, Working Paper 8 at 7.  See also Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission ‘Better Regulation of Economic Infrastructure: Country-Based 
Review’ (2013) Working Paper No. 8, at 10. 
16   Competition Commission v Yara South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (9) BCLR 923 (CC); 
Competition Commission v Senwes Ltd 2012 (7) BCLR 667 (CC); and Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd and 
Another v Competition Commission 2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA), [2011] 3 All SA 192 (SCA).  For more details 
on this point see Phumudzo S Munyai ‘The Interface Between Competition and Constitutional Law: 
Integrating Constitutional Norms in South African Competition Law Proceedings’ (2013) 25 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 323-41 at 325 footnote 10. 
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The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the way in which the abuse of 
dominance provisions in the Competition Act have been formulated and are enforced 
supports the proposition that the law is hostile towards dominant firms.  The study also 
involves a comparative review of section 2 of the Sherman Act17 in American antitrust 
law and Article 10218 of the Treaty of Europe in European competition law.  The aim of 
this comparative study is to place us in a position to extrapolate lessons from these two 
jurisdictions on cases of unilateral conduct or abuse of dominance relevant to the 
understanding and enforcement of the abuse of dominance provisions in the 
Competition Act.  
 
I show that not only can the origin of competition law be traced to an historical 
philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings, but also that its current 
enforcement continues, to a large extent, to be influenced by the same philosophy.  I 
also show that despite efforts in modern competition enforcement to refine and 
modernise the law to ensure fair outcomes, particularly in cases involving allegations of 
abuse of dominance, this has not significantly shaken off traces of the law’s original 
philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings.19 
 
                                               
17  Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that: 
 
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony…”. 
 
18  Article 102 provides as follows: 
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States…”. 
 
19  Bradley supra n 9.  
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1.4 Why Emphasis on Abuse of Dominance? 
 
The majority of the provisions of our Competition Act are directly or indirectly concerned 
with the phenomenon of market domination and its impact on competition.  Even 
provisions that are not formally recognised as being concerned with abuse of 
dominance still echo concerns about dominance and its likely effect on competition.  For 
example, in their consideration of mergers, competition authorities invariably enquire 
whether the proposed merger is likely to create a dominant firm in the relevant market.  
And if the authorities are convinced that this is likely, they may prohibit the merger on 
that basis, on the assumption that the newly established dominant firm may thwart 
competition in the market.  Other provisions dealing with a range of prohibited practices, 
such as retail price maintenance and price discrimination, which fall outside the Act’s 
formal framework for dealing with abuse of dominance, are also predominantly 
concerned with the actions of dominant firms.  In cases involving these practices, proof 
that the defendant firm has market power plays an important role in establishing the 
potential anticompetitive effect of the practices.   
 
Because the eradication of anticompetitive conduct associated with market power is a 
fundamental aspect of South African competition law, provisions dealing with the abuse 
of dominance assume special importance in our law and in this study.  Another reason 
justifying the special attention given in this study to abuse of dominance law is that its 
enforcement is very controversial, providing ample room for competition authorities to 
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make decisions that are open to challenge.20  As Whish and Bailey remark, “it is not 
controversial to say that Article 102 of the Treaty of Europe, which prohibits the abuse 
of a dominant position, is controversial”.21  As former chairperson of the Competition 
Tribunal, David Lewis, has also remarked, ‘abuse of dominance provisions are the most 
notable area of competition law in which dominant firms are more likely to suffer 
prejudice, as a result of erroneous decisions by competition authorities’.22  For these 
reasons, abuse of dominance will be the central focus of this study.  To ensure a more 
focused study, merger and other provisions in which the issue of dominance and its 
potential impact on competition may still arise, will not be dealt with independently but 
will be considered only to the extent that they raise issues relevant to the abuse of 
dominance discourse.   
 
1.5 Hypothesis and Points of Departure 
 
The thesis that I develop through structured arguments across the chapters of the study 
hinges significantly on the following assumptions and points of departure: 
 
(a) The origin of competition law can be traced to an historical philosophy 
of hostility towards monopoly and dominant undertakings across the 
three jurisdictions under review. 
 
                                               
20  Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law (Oxford University Press 2012) at 174 and David 
Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) at 157. 
21  Whish and Bailey supra n 20 at 192. 
22 David Lewis ‘Chilling Competition’ at 1 accessed at 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Speeches/lewis13.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
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(b) Abuse of dominance provisions in the three jurisdictions have been 
formulated in a manner that reflects the law’s underlying philosophy of 
hostility towards dominant firms. 
 
(c) The vague and open-ended descriptions or definitions of some 
dominant firm practices considered anticompetitive and exclusionary, 
create a real possibility that perfectly legitimate dominant firm conduct 
may erroneously be declared anticompetitive and illegal.  This may 
result in dominant firms being unable to compete freely and effectively 
in the market.   
 
(d) Despite efforts in recent years by competition authorities and the 
courts across the three jurisdictions under review to refine the law of 
abuse of dominance in order to reduce errors and potential prejudice to 
dominant firms, competition rules and their enforcement are still 
fundamentally premised on an anti-monopoly and anti-dominance 
philosophy. 
 
(e) The persistent preoccupation with dominance and market power in 
some jurisdictions, at times with insufficient assessment of the 
anticompetitive effect of the allegedly abusive conduct, is indicative of 
the anti-monopoly and anti-dominance policy of the law of abuse of 
dominance. 
 
10 
 
(f) The general absence of an appropriate causation framework in abuse 
of dominance proceedings by which to determine whether the 
anticompetitive harm complained of can be reliably attributed to the 
conduct of the dominant firm, adds to an already hostile environment in 
which dominant firms are compelled to operate.  
 
(g) The fact that certain practices are only actionable when performed by 
firms enjoying a position of dominance, but attract no consequences 
when performed by non-dominant firms, reveals a lack of impartiality 
and exposes the discriminatory nature of the law 
 
(h) The overall hostile and potentially unfair nature of abuse of dominance 
provisions and their enforcement as regards dominant firms may raise 
significant economic and legal concerns.  The recent spate of appeals 
against and reviews of the decisions of competition authorities on 
competition and constitutional grounds illustrates this point.   
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
Considerable economic and legal problems arise because the formulation and 
enforcement of competition rules generally, and abuse of dominance provisions in 
particular, appear inherently hostile towards dominant firms.  While orthodox 
competition economic theory and law enforcement philosophy may seem oblivious to 
this, there are significant economic and legal factors that call us to rethink our approach 
11 
 
to the treatment of dominant firms in designing and enforcing our competition rules.  
Although economic theories and arguments will not feature prominently in this study 
(which is conducted primarily from a legal perspective), where relevant significant 
economic problems arising from the formulation and enforcement of competition rules 
will be highlighted to ensure that the legal arguments made and conclusions reached 
are informed by the economic realities of the market.  The policy of hostility towards 
dominant firms inherent in the formulation and enforcement of competition rules raises 
the following economic and legal concerns.   
 
1.6.1 Economic Concerns  
 
In orthodox economics the general assumption is that dominant firms are able to make 
monopoly profits by constraining supply and raising prices above marginal (and 
average) costs.23  In the same vein, there is an assumption that where markets are 
comprised of a small number of firms, they may collude rather than compete so as 
collectively to generate monopoly profits.24  It is not the aim of my study to either 
dismiss or challenge the validity of these assumptions.   
 
However, it is appropriate to point out that economic theory and experience have also 
shown that in certain circumstances monopolies and oligopolies can have various 
benefits for consumer welfare and economic development.  These benefits include 
                                               
23  Roberts supra n 15 at 3. 
24  Id.   
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economies of scale,25 international competitiveness,26 research and development,27 and 
efficiency.28  And some of these monopoly and oligopoly benefits may be of particular 
relevance to our economy.  South Africa’s domestic economy is relatively small and 
many of our markets can be served by one or a few firms operating on a globally 
efficient scale.29   These globally-efficient domestic monopolies and oligopolies may 
provide economies of scale benefits to the local market, while also competing effectively 
in global markets.   
 
It is important to note that one of the objects of our Competition Act is ‘to expand 
opportunities for South African firms in world markets’.30  With domestic and global 
markets increasingly dominated by multinational corporations, it may be essential for a 
firm to have a monopoly or a certain level of dominance in the domestic market in order 
to become globally competitive. 
                                               
25  Because most monopolies and dominant firms are able to produce greater quantity of goods at a lower 
average cost, the benefit of lower production costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices.  As Djolov observed, if a firm increases in size it may be able to benefit from economies of scale, 
which is a cost advantage based on size.  This is because when a firm becomes large it will have a lower 
cost per unit of output than a smaller firm, which should translate into lower product prices, see Djolov G 
‘Competition in the South African Manufacturing Sector: An Empirical Probe’ (2015) 46 South African 
Journal of Business Management 21-30 at 24.   
26  A local firm may be dominant in the domestic market but face effective competition in global markets.  
With markets increasingly globalised, it may be necessary for a firm to be dominant in the local market in 
order to become competitive internationally.   
27  For example, the opportunity to enjoy monopoly benefits arising out of protection conferred by certain 
intellectual property rights would encourage more business people to undertake research and innovate.  
Without the monopoly power that an intellectual property right such as a patent may confer, society may 
be deprived of much needed innovation essential for development.  
28  While this issue is often ignored in competition economics and law enforcement, most successful firms 
become dominant through being innovative, efficient and dynamic.  As Djolov, supra n 25 at 23-4, 
observes: monopoly can occur when incumbents maintain or gain competitive position according to the 
innovations they bring to the market.  For example, it is well recognised that companies such as 
Microsoft, Google and Apple have become dominant in their respective markets through their successful 
innovations. 
29  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Competition Law and Policy in 
South Africa, An OECD Peer Review (2003) at 10 accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/34823812.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
30  Section 2(d) of the Act. 
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A few of our firms have followed this path with great success.  For example, South 
African Breweries Limited, which has recently been acquired by Anheuser-Busch InBev, 
is a virtual monopoly in the domestic beer market.31  Few can doubt its efficiency and 
economies of scale benefits in the local beer market, reflected in high quality beer at 
relatively cheap prices.  It is also one of the dominant players in the global beer market, 
with a presence in more than 80 countries.32  The same could also be said of our four 
major banks which have established an oligopoly in the domestic banking sector.33  
Despite the concentrated nature of our banking sector, it is considered to be highly 
competitive,34 while our banks have expanded their operations exponentially into global 
markets.35  There are many more firms whose domination of the South African market 
has enabled them to compete effectively in international markets.36  In this regard, it 
may be argued that a dominant position in a South African market may be an important 
step towards the realisation of the Competition Act’s objective of expanding 
opportunities for South African firms in global markets. 
 
1.6.2 Legal Concerns  
                                               
31  Competition Commission v South African Breweries Limited and Others 2015 (3) SA 329 (CAC) at 
pars 1 and 54.  OECD supra n 29. 
32  For example in the American domestic beer market South African Breweries is one of two firms 
controlling 80% of the market.  See Carl T Bogus ‘The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and 
the Failure of Antitrust’ (2015) 49 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1-120 at 9 and SABMiller 
PLC ‘Who we are’ accessed at http://www.sabmiller.com/about-us/who-we-are (date of last use: 6 July 
2016). 
33  These are Standard Bank, ABSA, FNB, and Nedbank.  See Grietjie Verhoef ‘Concentration and 
Competition: The Changing Landscape of the Banking Sector in South Africa 1970-2007’ (2009) 24 South 
African Journal of Economic History 157-97 at 184 and 188-90.   
34  Id at 184, 194, 196 and 197. 
35  Id at 191-2.   
36   These would include MTN, Shoprite, MultiChoice, and a number of mining and construction 
companies.  
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To the extent that abuse of dominance provisions and their enforcement may indeed be 
generally hostile towards dominant firms, they may restrict the firms’ ability and freedom 
to compete freely and effectively in the market. 37   Because most competition law 
provisions are not concerned with the actions of firms with low or no market power,38 the 
restricted ability of dominant firms to compete freely and effectively in markets – as a 
result of this selective application and the enforcement of competition rules – raises 
significant legal and constitutional concerns.  The majority of basic rights and freedoms 
to which juristic persons are entitled under the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, (‘the Constitution’) and the law, may be invoked by firms affected by 
competition law.39  Indeed, the Bill of Rights applies to all law, including competition 
law.40   
 
In Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd and Another v Competition Commission,41 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal emphasised that ‘the Competition Act must be applied in a manner that 
least impinges on the fundamental rights of affected firms’.42  As other observers note, 
“the fundamental rights relevant to the field of competition law include, but are not 
                                               
37  Arowolo supra n 10.   
38  The assumption here is that the actions of firms that are not dominant are incapable of resulting in any 
substantial prevention and lessening of competition.  A central principle of the Competition Act that 
permeates all its rule of reason provisions, is that the prevention and lessening of competition is 
prohibited only if it is ‘substantial’.  See sections 5 (1), 8(c), 9(1)(a) and 12A of the Act. 
39   See sections 8(4) of the Constitution and 1(2)(a) of the Competition Act.  See also Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at par 57.   
40  Section 8(1) of the Constitution.  
41  Supra n 16.   
42  Id at par 10. 
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limited to, the right to fairness, freedom of trade, equality, and non-discrimination”.43  In 
AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and Security44 the Court held that “it is difficult 
to appreciate why a corporation should not be entitled to enforce the Bill of Rights, in 
particular the equality clause, where an executive or administrative functionary blatantly 
treats it unequally from all other persons”.45 
 
1.6.3 Summary 
 
Should the formulation and enforcement of competition rules be found to be inherently 
hostile towards dominant firms, in a way that raises the economic and legal concerns 
highlighted above, this study would be of considerable significance for the enforcement 
of the Competition Act and the development of our economy.  It is essential that the 
rules governing market competition are economically and legally fair.  The prevailing 
economic theory underpinning competition law and the enforcement of abuse of 
dominance provisions seems to overstate the dangers of monopoly and market 
dominance.  The economic and social benefits of monopoly appear to have been 
undervalued disproportionately.  The result is that innovative firms that become 
successful and dominant through lawful means, may be unable freely to enjoy the fruits 
of their commercial success.  Some of these firms start small in backyards and garages 
and become dominant through their skill and diligence.  A fair system should encourage 
and reward their spirt rather than stifle it. 
                                               
43  J Neethling and BR Rutherford ‘The Law of Competition and the Bill of Rights’ in JA Faris Law of South 
Africa, Annual Cumulative Supplement 2 ed Vol 2(2) (Lexis Nexis Online 2014) at par 233.  J Neethling 
Van Heerden-Neethling Unlawful Competition 2 ed (Lexis Nexis 2008) at 12-13. 
44  1994 (4) BCLR 31 (E); 1995 (1) SA 783 (E). 
45  Id at 38; 790. 
16 
 
 
1.7 Nature and Scope of the Study 
 
Given the inevitable interplay between law and economics in competition law, it is 
important to caution that this study is conducted primarily from a legal perspective.  To 
the extent that fundamental economic issues or questions that are germane to 
competition law may arise, these will be highlighted (without being dealt with in great 
detail) in order to retain the focus of this study as a legal one.  As a legal study, primary 
sources of law such as legislation, case law, rules, and regulations are an important 
point of reference and analysis.  Secondary sources of law such as books, journal 
articles, reports, and conference papers also provide a rich source of knowledge and 
legal analysis.   
 
As I have said, the study is also comparative.  Discussions of aspects of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act in American antitrust law and Article 102 in European competition law 
relevant to the enforcement of the abuse of dominance provisions in the Competition 
Act are included across the chapters.  This comparative study aims to facilitate the 
extrapolation of lessons from the two jurisdictions on cases of unilateral conduct or 
abuse of dominance relevant to the assessment of the abuse of dominance provisions 
in the South African Competition Act. 
 
1.8 The Choice of America and Europe as Comparators 
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The majority of the provisions of our Competition Act have been influenced largely by 
foreign law.  As an observer has remarked, “our Act owes a considerable debt” to the 
competition laws from other jurisdictions.46  The day-to-day enforcement of the South 
African Act has also retained the umbilical cord connecting our law with its foreign 
counterparts.  Indeed, our case law is replete with generous quotations from foreign 
competition law decisions, particularly those of American and European law.  In seeking 
to understand the principles of our own law and situate them in their proper context, it is 
helpful to determine how these principles actually developed in the jurisdictions that 
have influenced our law.   
 
1.8.1 America 
 
What we today known in South Africa as competition law originated in the United States 
of America more than 120 years ago, through the Sherman Act of 1890.47  When South 
Africa adopted its first comprehensive competition legislation, the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Act,48 considerable lessons were drawn from American antitrust 
law.  Prior to the adoption of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act, the Minister 
of Economic Affairs observed in parliament that there was a growing feeling that South 
Africa should follow the example of the United States by introducing legislation along 
the lines of the Sherman Act, to counter the emergence of monopolies in the 
economy. 49   He instructed the Board of Trade and Industries to investigate the 
                                               
46  Brassey supra n 12 at 180. 
47  15 USC ch 1. 
48  24 of 1955. 
49  D V Cowen ‘A Survey of the Law Relating to the Control of Monopoly in South Africa’ (1950) 8 South 
African Journal of Economics 124-47 at 124-5. 
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possibility of South Africa enacting legislation modeled on the Sherman Act.50  In its 
investigation, the Board of Trade and Industries surveyed modern thinking on the 
control of monopolies in America and other parts of the world and recommended 
completely new legislation for the regulation of monopolies in South Africa.51  This led to 
the enactment of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act.52 
 
When the idea of enacting our current Competition Act was mooted, American antitrust 
law continued to serve as a model.  The ANC’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (‘RDP’) policy document, for example, proposed that strict ‘antitrust’ 
legislation was needed in the country, systematically to eliminate the high market 
concentration levels that existed in South Africa.53  The expression ‘antitrust’ originates 
from North America and the United States in particular.  Most importantly, the 
philosophy underpinning the South African Competition Act is substantially the same as 
that on which the Sherman Act was premised.  Both laws were founded on concerns 
about the perceived dangers of monopolies to the economy and society in general.  In 
Competition Commission v South African Breweries Limited and Others 54  our 
Competition Appeal Court noted that “the Sherman Act and judicial decisions 
                                               
50  Id at 125.  See also EE Bekker Monopolies: Review of the Role of the Competition Board (Rand 
Afrikaans University 1992) at 13 and EE Bekker ‘Monopolies and the Role of the Competition Board’ 1992 
Journal of South African Law 618-44 at 625. 
51  Bekker Monopolies: Review of the Role of the Competition Board supra n 50 and Bekker ‘Monopolies 
and the Role of the Competition Board’ supra n 50 at 626.   
52  Bekker Monopolies: Review of the Role of the Competition Board supra n 50; Brassey supra n 12 at 
63; OECD supra n 29 at 12-13; JV Tregenna-Piggott ‘An Assessment of Competition Policy in South 
Africa’ (1980) Occasional Paper No. 8, Economic Research Unit, Department of Economics, University of 
Natal at 24; and Neo Chabane ‘An Evaluation of the Influence of BEE on the Application of Competition 
Policy in South Africa’ (2003) Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS); CSID Research Project at 4 
accessed at http://www.tips.org.za/files/732.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
53   ANC ‘RDP White Paper: Discussion Document’ at par 3.8.1 accessed at 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=232 (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
54  Supra n 31. 
19 
 
interpreting it were based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected 
from the evils of monopoly by the maintenance of competition”.55  With more than a 
century of jurisprudence behind it, American antitrust law continues to play a pivotal role 
in guiding the enforcement and development of our own competition rules.  This is 
particularly true of cases involving the abuse of dominance.   
 
1.8.2 Europe 
 
In recent times there has been a growing feeling that European competition law has 
begun to exert greater influence in our law.  As the Competition Appeal Court found in 
Senwes Limited v Competition Commission, 56  the theoretical underpinnings of 
European competition law “are more congruent with those of our own Competition 
Act”.57  This can be attributed to the fact that many smaller national economies in the 
European Economic Community are, like South Africa, not yet fully developed and still 
characterised by market structures that may be perceived not to be conducive to 
effective competition.  Such market structures include the prevalence of firms wielding 
considerable market power.  As a result, the enforcement of competition rules in Europe 
is driven by concerns about addressing market structure conditions that may hinder 
effective competition and allow anticompetitive conduct to thrive.  Having regard to the 
similarities in the market structure conditions characterising the two jurisdictions, South 
African competition authorities feel more comfortable adopting European competition 
principles when adjudicating disputes under the Competition Act. 
                                               
55  Id at par 30. 
56  87/CAC/Feb09. 
57  Id at par 54.  See also Munyai supra n 16 at 326-7. 
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1.8.3 Summary 
 
It is virtually impossible to find an important decision by our competition authorities, 
particularly in abuse of dominance cases, in which there is no recourse to the decisions 
and writings of American or European courts, competition authorities, and 
commentators.  An assessment of some aspects of South African competition law 
would, therefore, be incomplete without reviewing the position under American and/or 
European law.  As stated earlier, any effort to gain a sound understanding of the 
principles of our competition law also requires an understanding of how these principles 
actually developed in the jurisdictions that have so greatly influenced our law.   
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is presented in six chapters which seek individually and collectively to 
identify traces of hostility towards dominant firms in various aspects of abuse of 
dominance law and its enforcement in the three jurisdictions under review.  These are 
structured of follows:   
   
1.9.1 Chapter 1 
 
As is customary, in Chapter 1 I provide a synopsis of the study.  I identify 
the problem that the study seeks to address and further outline its main 
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objective.  Here, I also set out the key assumptions underpinning the study 
and show its significance to competition law enforcement and society in 
general.   
 
1.9.2 Chapter 2 
 
In this Chapter I trace the historical contexts in which competition laws 
originated and developed in the three jurisdictions under review, focusing 
on their treatment of dominant firms.  A study of the historical development 
of competition law will help identify formative influences in the evolution of 
the law, which may also have a bearing on its current enforcement and 
future development.58  Because American antitrust law is the oldest of the 
three jurisdictions, a review of the historical development of American 
antitrust law is presented first, followed by European competition law as 
the second oldest, and South African competition law as the ‘newcomer’.   
 
The Chapter reveals that the origins of competition laws in the three 
jurisdictions can be traced to an historical philosophy of hostility towards 
dominant undertakings.  I also show that, given how the law developed, 
the historical philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings has in 
some instances been carried over into modern competition law. 
                                               
58  WE Kovacic ‘Modern US Competition Law and the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Comments on the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Proceedings Relating to Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act’ at 2 accessed at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-commissioners-
react-department-justice-report-competition-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-
under/080908section2stmtkovacic.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016).   
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1.9.3 Chapter 3 
 
In this Chapter I review the abuse of dominance provisions in the South 
African Competition Act with particular focus on section 8(c). 59  The aim of 
the Chapter is to investigate whether the formulation and enforcement of 
the abuse of dominance provisions in the Competition Act reinforce 
perceptions of hostility towards dominant firms.  The Chapter concludes 
that indeed the formulation and enforcement of the abuse of dominance 
provisions in the Act, and in particular section 8(c), reinforce perceptions 
of the hostility of the law towards dominant firms. 
 
1.9.4 Chapter 4 
 
Here I consider whether an appropriate causation framework exists in 
abuse of dominance adjudication to help determine whether the 
anticompetitive harm the complainant alleges can be attributed to the 
conduct of the dominant firm.  The argument advanced is that causation 
should be an important element in antitrust liability, particularly in some 
                                               
59  Section 8(c) of the Competition Act provides as follows: 
 
“8.  Abuse of dominance prohibited 
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
… 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain; or…”. 
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exclusionary abuse of dominance cases where the establishment of 
anticompetitive effects may be vital.  I conclude that the issue of causation 
is not sufficiently addressed in abuse of dominance proceedings.  As a 
result, firms facing abuse of dominance complaints may be found liable for 
market distortions which cannot satisfactorily be traced back to their 
conduct.   
 
1.9.5 Chapter 5 
 
In this Chapter I critically evaluate the unique nature of obligations 
imposed on dominant firms by the so-called principle of ‘special 
responsibility’ and the doctrine of ‘super-dominance’ in European 
competition law.  Particular attention will be given to constraints on the 
market conduct of dominant firms occasioned by the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance.  The ultimate goal of 
this Chapter is to establish whether such constraints perpetuate the 
historical philosophy and practice of hostility towards dominant firms in 
modern competition law enforcement.  I conclude that the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance are in keeping 
with the philosophy of hostility towards dominant firms which has 
dominated European competition law and its enforcement from its 
inception.   
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I further review attempts to introduce the principle of special responsibility 
and the doctrine of super-dominance into South African competition law 
and the legal implications this holds.  Because neither American 
competition authorities nor courts have expressly recognised the 
existence of any special responsibility or obligation on the part of dominant 
firms, the position under American antitrust law will not be considered in 
this Chapter.   
 
1.9.6 Chapter 6 
 
Chapter 6 is a conclusion, reflecting the main arguments and findings in 
the preceding chapters.  I emphasise that the formulation and 
enforcement of abuse of dominance rules are inherently hostile towards 
dominant firms.  I also make recommendations on the appropriate 
structure and content of unilateral conduct rules and propose a suitable 
approach to their enforcement. 
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____________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: A POLICY BORN OUT OF 
HOSTILITY TOWARDS DOMINANT FIRMS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Why is it essential to torment readers with old tales of the historical development of 
competition law as well as the original economic philosophy behind it?  Given the 
important role that lessons from economic and legal history play in the functioning of 
modern economies and societies, it is helpful, for purposes of this study, to delve into 
the origins and development of competition policy and law.1  Indeed, “the seed of future 
development can often be found in the past”.2  A review of the historical development of 
competition policy and law, it is submitted, can provide “a helpful platform from which to 
understand formative influences in their evolution, which may also have a bearing on 
future development”.3   
 
As Kovacic observed, “significant developments in antitrust doctrine hinge on 
interpretations of distant episodes in antitrust experience, which is why recent shifts in 
                                               
1  Nicola Giocoli ‘Competition versus Property Rights Advance: American Antitrust Law, The Freiburg 
School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 747-86 at 747. 
2  Roman Tomasic ‘The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement: Corporate Law Reform in Australia 
and Beyond’ (2006) 10 University of Western Sydney Law Review 1-23 at 1. 
3  William E. Kovacic ‘Modern U.S. Competition Law and the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Comments on 
the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Proceedings Relating to Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act’ at 2 accessed at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-
commissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-
under/080908section2stmtkovacic.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
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enforcement activity have been motivated substantially by commentary on historical 
records to identify perceived and longstanding flaws in antitrust policy”.4  According to 
Bork, not only does an historical study of competition law’s development allow us to 
understand how “the law’s grand ideas actually took root and grew, it also helps free us 
from a falsely imagined past”.5  Without its appeal to history, Kovacic further observes, 
Bork’s seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, would probably have not played so 
extraordinary a role in molding competition law doctrine and determining the agenda for 
modern debate.6  
 
Before proceeding to the substance of this Chapter, it is appropriate to note that the 
majority of modern academic works and court decisions in competition law have 
appeared to adopt an interpretation and enforcement approach to competition rules that 
are generally tolerant and welcoming towards dominant firms.  This is encapsulated by 
the often stated mantra in competition law enforcement that “no prohibition or 
punishment attaches to a firm by reason only of its dominance”.7  But, this is more 
apparent than real. 
 
Historically, antitrust enforcers did not exactly roll out the red carpet for dominant firms.  
A study of the historical development of competition law overwhelmingly reveals that the 
origin and development of the law had its roots in the widespread hostility that existed 
                                               
4  William E. Kovacic ‘The Sherman Act: The First Century – Comments and Observations’ (1990) 59 
Antitrust Law Journal 119-30 at 119. 
5  Robert H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (Basic Books Inc 1978) at 15. 
6  Kovacic supra n 4. 
7  Martin Brassey et al Competition Law (Juta 2002) at 197. 
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towards dominant firms.8  The domination of markets by one or a few enterprises was, 
and to a large extent still is, considered incompatible with the ideal of free and effective 
competition.  Connected to this view was a long held assumption in competition policy 
and law, prevalent to this day, that market domination enables dominant firms to harm 
consumer welfare, for example by reducing output, raising prices, degrading product 
quality, suppressing innovation, and depriving consumers of choice.9   
 
As opposed to market domination, policy and law makers preferred a market or 
industrial structure characterised by a plurality of firms, the general assumption being 
that the level of competition between these firms and the welfare benefits to consumers 
would be high.10  In markets where there were numerous firms, each with proportionate 
                                               
8  Robert L. Bradley, Jr. ‘On the Origins of the Sherman Act’ (1990) 9 Cato Journal 737-42 at 737-38; 
Heike Schweitzer ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and 
Article 82 EC’ paper presented at the 12th Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Robert 
Schuman Centre, 8-9 June 2007, EUI, Florence at 2 accessed at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Schweitzer.pdf 
(date of last use: 6 July 2016).  As the Federal Trade Commission observed: 
  
“With one company controlling an entire industry, there was no competition, and smaller 
businesses and people had no choices about from whom to buy. Prices went through the roof, 
and quality didn’t have to be a priority. This caused hardship and threatened the new American 
prosperity. The public got angry and demanded the government take action. President Theodore 
Roosevelt busted or broke up many trusts by enforcing what came to be known as antitrust laws”. 
 
See Federal Trade Commission ‘Antitrust Laws: A Brief History’ accessed at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-Competition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf (date of 
last use: 6 July 2016). 
9  William Duncan Reekie ‘A View on the Treatment of Collusive and Restrictive Practices in Competition 
Policy’ (1998) 1 South African Journal of Economic Management and Science (Suid-Afrikaanse tydskrif 
vir ekonomiese en bestuurswetenskappe) 8-35 at 22.  Indeed monopoly has long been associated with 
harmful effects such as higher prices, reduced output, lowered quality and innovation, see Standard Oil 
Co of New Jersey v United States 221 US 1 (1911) at 52.  See also Richard Whish and David Bailey 
Competition Law 7 ed (Oxford University Press 2012) at 1-2.  
10  Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook Antitrust: Cases, Economic Notes and Other Materials 2 
ed (West Publishing Co 1981) at 903; Carina Smit ‘The Rationale for Competition Policy: A South African 
Perspective’ paper presented at the biennial ESSA Conference, 7-9 September 2005, Elangeni Holiday 
Inn Hotel, Durban, South Africa at 4 accessed at http://econex.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/econex_researcharticle_10.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016); and Bork supra n 
5 at 54-5.  The history of section 2 of the Sherman Act, it has been observed, reveals an antitrust 
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market share, no single firm was deemed to have sufficient power on its own to exert 
significant influence over price and output.11   
 
It is possible that these assumptions may have been and remain correct in certain 
instances.  But a considerable number of studies have also found that the absence of 
dominant firms and the prevalence of multiple firms competing in a market, offer no 
guarantees that competition levels and welfare benefits to consumers will be higher 
than in a market with few competitors.12  In some instances, the most productive way of 
meeting consumer needs, it is submitted, could be through fewer suppliers, particularly 
when economies of scale are great.13  The exclusion of an inefficient competitor from a 
market would then not harm consumer welfare, if that competitor was unable to 
guarantee consumer welfare in the form of lower prices, better quality, and quantity.14 
 
Nevertheless, anti-dominance concerns and preference for a market structure 
comprising multiple competitors, among them many small businesses, have provided a 
strong theoretical foundation for the development of the entire concept of competition 
regulation.  In this regard, it is no surprise that the majority of the world’s competition 
                                                                                                                                                       
jurisprudence dominated by political concerns, in particular, the preoccupation with maintaining a market 
structure in which a significant number of competitors and small and medium-sized enterprises could 
compete, see Schweitzer supra n 8.  With this in mind, Unterhalter questions whether in South Africa 
competitive markets can also be brought about by merely ensuring that there is commercial rivalry 
between a significant number of competitors or there is more to the concept of competition than mere 
rivalry, see Brassey supra n 7 at 200. 
11  Posner and Easterbrook supra n 10. 
12  Massimo Motta Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2004) at 51 and 
Liza Lovdahl Gormsen ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the 
Modernisation of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3 European Competition Journal 329-44 at 330.  See also Paul W. 
McCracken and Thomas Gale Moore Competition and Market Concentration in the American Economy 
(American Enterprise Institute1974) at 1-9. 
13  Gormsen supra n 12 at 331. 
14  Id. 
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legislation contains express and implied provisions designed to curtail the market power 
of dominant firms.  By contrast, corresponding provisions aimed specifically at 
eliminating or punishing inefficient and anticompetitive non-dominant firms remain 
conspicuous by their absence.   
 
The original objective of competition policy was “to give ‘special attention’ to dominant 
firms by regulating and controlling their market power”.15  To this end, antitrust remedies 
such as requiring some dominant firms to divest themselves of their assets, to modify 
their contractual relationships with other businesses, and to oblige them to deal with or 
grant other businesses access to their own facilities, were thought to be appropriate.16  
In addition, the whole merger control enterprise significantly evinces intent on the part of 
antitrust policy makers and enforcers to prevent and control the acquisition and 
maintenance of a dominant status in the market.   
 
It is clear, therefore, that competition laws were by design and effect never initially 
intended to be dominant firm or monopoly friendly.  A prime example of this is the 
ordinary term used for competition laws across several jurisdictions: in the United States 
of America competition laws are referred to as ‘ANTI’-trust laws, which has the same 
meaning as anti-monopoly; whereas in several other jurisdictions (particularly in Asia) 
the law is also unashamedly referred to as ‘ANTI’-monopoly law.17  Although modern 
antitrust enforcers across jurisdictions have worked hard to rebut suggestions of the 
                                               
15  Smit supra n 10 at 8. 
16  Posner and Easterbrook supra n 10 at 909. 
17  Competition law is generally referred to as ‘Anti’-monopoly law in Japan, China, Hong Kong and 
Russia. 
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perceived bias of the law against dominant firms, explaining that mere possession of a 
dominant status is not prohibited but rather the abuse of such status,18 accusations of 
bias have not completely disappeared.  As an observer remarks, ‘even a supposedly 
modern and refined practice of competition law enforcement, particularly in abuse of 
dominance cases, has not rescued the law from its questionable original motives’.19 
 
One of the unintended effects of a competition policy primarily focused on the structure 
of the market and limiting the market power of dominant firms in order to foster 
competitive rivalry through plural actors in markets, is that it may unwittingly discourage 
the acquisition and maintenance of dominance, which should not be prohibited by law.20  
And this opposition to the acquisition and maintenance of dominance in a market may 
occur regardless of the actual or proven impact of the dominant firm’s pricing and other 
actions on consumer welfare, which should be the ultimate focus of competition law.21  
Indeed, such policy positions have historically provided fertile ground for competition 
legislation and enforcement actions which have tended to be inherently and unfairly 
biased towards dominant firms.   
 
For example, in early American antitrust jurisprudence under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act similar policies led to calls for the break-up of large firms in the expectation that 
competition in the market would increase. 22  In American antitrust law it was widely 
                                               
18  No prohibition attaches to a firm, it is submitted, by reason only of the fact that it is dominant, Brassey 
supra n 7. 
19  Bradley supra n 8. 
20  Bork supra n 5 at 57. 
21  Id. 
22  Whish and Bailey supra n 9 at 21; Bork supra n 5 at 67 and 163; and Thomas J. Dilorenzo ‘The Origins 
of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective’ (1985) 5 International Review of Law and Economics 73-90 at 
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understood that the purpose of competition laws was to preserve and perpetuate, for its 
own sake, an industrial structure in which small enterprises could effectively compete 
with each other.23  As Fox has remarked, “since their inception American antitrust laws 
reflected a pervasive distrust of concentrated economic power”.24  
 
Similarly, in European competition law a pluralist market structure comprising several 
independent entities was thought to guarantee what was termed, in the literature of 
ordoliberal philosophy, ‘complete competition’: that is competition in which no firm in a 
market has the power to coerce other firms.25  This market structure view or industrial 
organisation theory was deemed to guarantee greater prospects of welfare benefits to 
consumers than would be found under conditions of market domination. 26   Like 
America, Europe underwent a period in the enforcement of its competition rules when 
significant hostility was exhibited towards dominant firms, particularly in the application 
of Article 10227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 
82 of the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community).  In general, it has been observed that European courts have replicated the 
                                                                                                                                                       
74.  See also generally Bruno S. Frey et al ‘Consensus and Dissension among Economists: An Empirical 
Inquiry’ (1984) 74 American Economic Review 986-94. 
23  United States v Aluminium Company of America 148 F 2d 416 (2d Cir 1945) at 428-9; and Bork supra 
n 5 at 51-2. 
24  Eleanor M. Fox ‘Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: 
Efficiency Opportunity and Fairness’ (1986) 61 Notre Dame Law Review 981-1020 at 983. 
25  David J Gerber ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the 
“New” Europe’ (1994) 42 American Journal of Comparative Law 25-84 at 43 and Pinar Akman ‘Searching 
for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 267-303 at 274.   
26  This is evident when one looks at the history of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
27  Article 102 of the Treaty of the European Union, in part, provides generally as follows:  
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States”. 
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trend seen in America during the early enforcement stage of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, by interpreting Article 102 in a manner that exhibited considerable hostility towards 
dominant firms.28   
 
In South Africa, competition policy and law arose in the context of the history of 
monopoly and industrial concentration.  Prior to the adoption of the Competition Act,29  
there was little doubt that the South African economy was characterised by high levels 
of industrial concentration.  By the time South Africa undertook the process of political 
transition in 1994, the new government inherited an economy characterised by state-
owned monopolies, conglomerates, and high market concentration levels. 30   As an 
observer has noted, “not more than five conglomerate groupings controlled the majority 
of economic activity in the country”.31  The ANC’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme policy proposed that “strict antitrust legislation was needed to 
systematically eliminate the high market concentration levels”.32  In particular, the new 
ANC government wanted “to restructure the economy by, among others, breaking up 
the economic power of large conglomerates, lowering concentration levels, and 
spreading corporate ownership and control more equally”.33   
 
                                               
28  Schweitzer supra n 8. 
29  89 of 1998. 
30  Smit supra n 10 at 1. 
31   Simon Roberts ‘The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development? The Effects of 
Competition Policy in South Africa, and Selected International Comparisons’ Trade and Industrial Policy 
Strategies’ (TIPS), Working Paper 8-2004, at 1 - 2 accessed at 
http://www.tips.org.za/events/event_details/papers/forum2003/ppp_roberts.pdf.(date of last use: 6 July 
2016). 
32   ANC ‘RDP White Paper: Discussion Document’ at par 3.8.1 accessed at 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=232 (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
33  Smit supra n 10 at 13. 
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When the Competition Act was adopted it represented an important part of broader 
economic reforms designed to correct the historical economic structure characterised by 
market concentration and anticompetitive practices.34  One of the stated purposes of the 
Competition Act is to create an environment in which small and medium-sized 
enterprises and historically disadvantaged persons have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy.35   
 
In the opening discussion above, I highlighted in general terms the backgrounds and 
contexts in which competition laws evolved in relation to their approach to the treatment 
of dominant firms in the three jurisdictions under review.  In the discussion that follows, 
part 2.2 provides a focused examination and analysis of the historical development of 
American antitrust law.  Parts 2.3 and 2.4 further provide a review of the historical 
development of competition law in the European Union and South Africa, respectively.  
Part 2.5 provides the main findings and conclusions of this Chapter.   
 
It is appropriate to point out that competition policy and law in the jurisdictions under 
review have been subjected to different philosophical, economic, political, and social 
influences leading over time to different enforcement patterns.  In a limited study such 
as the present, it is not possible exhaustively to cover all the issues in the evolution of 
competition rules in the jurisdictions under review.  Therefore, I have had to make a 
delicate selection in order to retain the focus of the study.  This study focuses primarily 
                                               
34  Roberts supra n 31 at 1.  
35  Section 2(e) and (f) of the Competition Act. 
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on investigating evidence of hostility and bias towards dominant firms from the law’s 
history to its current practice. 
 
2.2 Historical Development of American Antitrust Law 
 
According to Orbach: “American competition laws are aptly described ‘anti’-trust laws 
primarily because they were chiefly intended to counter the emergence of big 
businesses called trusts in the nineteenth century”.36  As also noted by other observers, 
“the term ‘antitrust’ generally refers to a fluid set of American national competition 
policies designed in response to the threat posed by the emergence of monopolies”,37 
and “the excessive concentrations of economic power in the hands of a few”.38   
 
The most significant American federal antitrust statute is the Sherman Act of 1890.39  
Although other supplementary antitrust legislation has been enacted in America from 
time to time, Thorelli observes that “the Sherman Act has prevailed as a seemingly 
timeless expression of public policy in relation to economic life and remains by far the 
most important legislation in the field”.40  The US Supreme Court, too, has termed the 
Sherman Act “the Magna Carta of our free enterprise economy”.41  It therefore goes 
                                               
36  Barak Orbach ‘How Antitrust Lost its Goal’ (2013) 81 Fordham Law Review 2253-77 at 2254.  
37  Jeffrey L. Cotter ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Application of US Antitrust Laws to Acts Outside the 
United States – Hart Ford Fire Insurance Co v California 113 S Ct 2891 (1993)’ (1994) 20 William Mitchell 
Law Review 1109-41 at 1114. 
38  Eleanor M. Fox ‘US and EU competition Law: A Comparison’ in Edward M. Graham and J. David 
Richardson (eds) Global Competition Policy (Peterson Institute 1997) at 340. 
39   Washington State - Office of the Attorney General ‘Guide to Antitrust Laws’ accessed at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/guide-antitrust-laws (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
40  Hans B. Thorelli The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition (Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1954) at 1. 
41  United States v Topco Associates Inc 405 US 596 (1972) at 610. 
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without saying that a study of the origin of American antitrust policy should properly 
focus on the history of the Sherman Act.42 
 
2.2.1 The American Historical Economic Structure and the Problem of 
Trusts/Monopoly 
 
When the United States Congress passed the Sherman Act the American economy was 
experiencing a period of turbulent industrial change.  As observers have noted, new 
mass production technology for various goods, and a rapidly expanding distribution 
network associated with the railroad industry boom, gave birth to some of the country’s 
earliest big businesses called ‘trusts’.43  Technological developments also made the 
emergence of big business possible and indeed inevitable. 44   As Thoreli further 
observes, “the heavy investments needed to secure the efficient use of the technical 
means of production in growing enterprises were beginning to create a demand for 
capital that could not be met by a single or even a minor group of investors”.45   
 
While these industrial developments brought greater economic efficiency than had been 
seen in the past, they also created a situation where industries were increasingly 
becoming concentrated.46  In the decade preceding the enactment of the Sherman Act 
industrial combinations or trusts proved an almost indispensable vehicle for the smooth 
                                               
42  Thorelli supra n 40 at 164. 
43  Id at 63-4; William Letwin Law and Economic Policy in America (Edinburg University Press 1967) at 
74; and Rudolph J.R. Peritz ‘The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 – A More Dynamic and Open American 
Economic System’ accessed at 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/04/20080423212813eaifas0.42149.html#axzz3
gX5vJ1HA (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
44  Thorelli supra n 40 at 64. 
45  Id. 
46  Peritz supra n 43. 
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rearrangement of capital.47  As two of the popular industrialists of the time remarked, 
“the day of combination and trusts was there to stay while individualism was gone and 
would never to return”48 because “combination and trusts had become the tendency of 
the time”.49  The combinations took a variety of forms, including associations between 
competitors in the form of gentlemen’s agreements or pools as well as outright 
combinations in the form of mergers.50   
 
Because of these developments, the number of competitors tended to decrease in 
many industries, while the average size of the combination or trust grew. 51   This 
affected the competitive positions and livelihoods of remaining individual firms, 
particularly small local firms, as emerging trusts, it has been observed, “had expanded 
from local to national and even international markets”.52   
 
The American public, and small businesses in particular, deeply resented the trusts as 
they were widely regarded a new form of monopoly.53  The concept of monopoly was 
used in America at first to denote a “special legal privilege granted to a person by the 
state”, but it was later extended to include “any acquisition of exclusive control that a 
few persons achieved by their own efforts”.54  In both instances the term has always had 
                                               
47  Id.  Thorelli supra n 40 at 65 and Letwin supra n 43 at 70.   
48  Ron Chernow Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr (Random House 1999) 149 at footnote 82. 
49  Letwin supra n 47. 
50  Thorelli supra n 40 at 72. 
51  Id at 63.  
52  Gary D. Libecap ‘The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspections and Antitrust’ 
(1992) Vol XXX Economic Inquiry 242-62 at 243. 
53  Letwin supra n 43 at 59. 
54  Id. 
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connotations of unjustified power which created obstacles to equal opportunity.55  The 
most common problems generally associated with trusts and monopoly were the 
restraint of trade, high prices, limited production, low wages, losses to small businesses, 
and other forms of perceived economic oppression.56   
 
2.2.2 The Sherman Act as Solution to the Trust/Monopoly Problem  
 
American public opinion and feeling about trusts or monopoly has always been clear.  
Prior to the adoption of the Sherman Act, it has been observed, “there were few who 
doubted that the American public hated trusts or monopolies fervently”.57  Indeed, the 
hatred of monopoly was considered to be deeply ingrained in the American social 
fabric.58   
 
In response to the higher levels of industrial concentration that developed in the pre-
Sherman Act era, small businesses affected by the combinations and trusts, as well as 
members of the public, appealed to the federal government to introduce legislation to 
mold and control the trusts. 59   As Troesken observed, small businesses were the 
biggest lobby group to send Senator John Sherman complaint letters raising their 
concern about growing trusts and encouraging him to introduce antitrust laws to deal 
with them.60  In Congress debates relating to the Sherman Bill, Libecap observes, “most 
                                               
55  Id. 
56  Orbach supra n 36 at 2262. 
57  Letwin supra n 43 at 15 and 54. 
58  Id at 59.  Thorelli supra n 40. 
59  Libecap supra n 52. 
60  Werner Troesken ‘The Letters of John Sherman and the Origins of Antitrust’ (2002) 15 The Review of 
Austrian Economics 275-95 at 276.  Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
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commentators also emphasised the protection of small businesses that were being 
crushed by the trusts”.61   
 
The Sherman Act was eventually passed in response to small-business driven public 
protests against the trusts.62  As Thorelli observed, “that the Sherman Act was actually, 
if not formally, intended as a weapon against monopoly cannot be doubted”.63  Antitrust 
law, and the Sherman Act in particular, were seen as being in harmony with long-
cherished ideas of equality of opportunity and freedom of enterprise and other concepts 
of liberalism and capitalist democracy.64  The Sherman Act was designed to restore a 
naturally harmonious economic, moral, political, and social order that the emergence of 
trusts and dominant firms had disrupted.65   
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the cornerstone of American antitrust law, specifically 
provides that: 
 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony…. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Antitrust Principles and Their Application 4 ed Vol 1 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2013) at 100b and 
101. 
61  Libecap supra n 52 at 259. 
62  Letwin supra n 57. 
63  Thorelli supra n 40 at 5. 
64  Id at 1. 
65  Kovacic supra n 4 at 121. 
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From a literal reading of section 2, one is inclined to deduce that the purpose of the 
provision is actually the prohibition of market domination per se.  Indeed, as observers 
have noted, ‘relying on section 2 of the Sherman Act, the American government has 
since 1890, the year in which the Act was enacted, attacked various forms of market 
domination in courtrooms across the country’. 66   As Kovacic further observes, “the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have throughout the history 
of the Sherman Act mounted an ambitious monopolisation agenda through which they 
have sought to curtail the market power of dominant firms in several industries”.67  
Trust-busting, he continues, “became section 2 of the Sherman Act's most alluring and 
enduring image as federal antitrust enforcement officials relied on this provision to 
mount campaigns to disassemble leviathans of American business”.68  As Bork puts it, 
“there always existed in America a ‘populist’ hostility to big business reinforced by the 
perception that major corporations are somehow to blame for society’s hardships”.69   
 
2.2.3 Manifestation of Hostility Towards Dominant Firms in Early 
Monopolisation Cases: The Development of Jurisprudence Under Section 2 
of The Sherman Act 
 
The majority of early and historically-significant decisions in American antitrust law 
exhibited considerable hostility towards dominant firms.  This is because historically 
antitrust laws in America were in the main viewed as instruments designed to curb the 
                                               
66  Walter Adams and James W Brock The Bigness Complex (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group 1986) 
at 198. 
67  William E. Kovacic ‘Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act 
as a Tool for Deconcentration’ (1988-1989) 74 Iowa Law Review 1105-50 at 1106-08. 
68  Id at 1105. 
69  Bork supra n 5 at 5. 
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market power of larger corporations and to protect small businesses.70  In other words, 
American antitrust laws were seen as a device to protect competitors rather than 
competition.  This is confirmed in several antitrust decisions of historic significance.   
 
In one of the earliest decisions, United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association,71 in 
applying section 2 of the Sherman Act, Justice Peckham expressed concern about the 
plight of ‘small dealers and other worthy men’ whom he feared could face extinction 
from the market as a result of fierce competition from their much bigger rivals, against 
whom he felt they deserved protection.72  He found that it would be unfortunate for the 
American economy to lose the services of a large number of small and independent 
dealers who had spent their lives developing their own businesses, becoming experts in 
their trade, and supported themselves and their families from the small profits realised 
from their business.73  He believed that bigger corporations were against American 
national interests because they increased the likelihood that some essential 
commodities could fall within the exclusive control of a single corporation.74  These 
remarks by Justice Peckham in Trans-Missouri Freight Association reveal a sharp focus 
on protecting competitors rather than competition.   
 
                                               
70  Robert H. Lande ‘Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged’ (1982) 34 Hastings Law Journal 65-151 at 65.  See also Areeda and 
Hovenkamp supra n 60 at 100b and Douglas H Ginsberg ‘Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare and Antitrust 
Law’ (2008) 31 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 449-55 at 453. 
71  166 US 290 (1897). 
72  Id at 323.  See also Thomas W. Hazlett ‘The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined’ 
(1992) Vol XXX Economic Inquiry 263-76 at 264. 
73  United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association supra n 71 at 324. 
74  Id. 
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A short while later, in Northern Securities Co v United States,75 Justice Holmes crucially 
observed that ‘maintaining competition was not the expressed object of the Sherman 
Act as the Act did not even mention the word “competition”’.76  His observation took full 
cognisance of the exact wording of section 2 of the Sherman Act.77  According to 
Troesken, who conducted an extensive survey of the historical letters received by John 
Sherman from groups lobbying for antitrust legislation to stem the rising tide of trusts, it 
is clear that the Sherman Act was born out of concern to protect the interest of small 
competitors.78   
 
The tendency to apply section 2 of the Sherman Act to protect smaller competitors and 
to encourage an industrial structure comprising several small and independent dealers, 
probably reached its climax in Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States.79  Here, 
the American Supreme Court broke a large corporation into more than 30 separate 
units, consistent with the notion that the Sherman Act was founded on the philosophy of 
hostility towards big corporations.80  The following year, in United States v Terminal 
Railroad Association of St. Louis,81 a ruling considered to have continuing significance, 
the Court ordered various major railroad companies to desist from using their control of 
terminal facilities at the main crossing of the Mississippi River in a manner that 
                                               
75  193 US 197 (1904). 
76  Id at 403.  See also Thorelli supra n 40 at 473. 
77  Section 2 of the Sherman Act specifically provides that: 
 
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
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78  Troesken supra n 60 at 275. 
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80  Id at 77-82.  William E Kovacic and Carl Shapiro ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking’ (2000) 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives 43-60 at 45. 
81  224 US 383 (1912). 
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discriminated against smaller rivals.82  Failure to comply with this directive, the Court 
warned, would leave it with no choice but to dissolve the Terminal Railroad 
Association.83 
 
In United States v Aluminium Company of America84 (‘Alcoa’) Justice Hand observed 
that “throughout the history of the Sherman Act the purpose of the law was to 
discourage monopoly at all costs and to encourage the existence and preservation of 
several small independent operators”.85  He found that “possession of unchallenged 
economic power invariably killed initiative and discouraged thrift and for that reason the 
Sherman Act outlawed monopoly in all its manifestations in favour of an industrial 
structure in which small enterprises could effectively operate”.86  According to Waller, 
Justice Hand used ‘ringing words’ that resonated well among those who believed that 
possession of monopoly power is the source of all evils the Sherman Act was intended 
to cure.87   
 
The principle that emerged from Alcoa88 – that high levels of market domination are a 
violation of section 2 – became central to the Supreme Court’s understanding of the 
Sherman Act.89  For several decades afterwards, the Supreme Court of the United 
                                               
82  Id at 411-12.  Kovacic and Shapiro supra n 80 at 46. 
83  United States v Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis supra n 81 at 409 and 412-13. 
84  Supra n 23.   
85  Id at 429.  
86  Id at 427.  Bork supra n 5 at 51-2 and Spencer Weber Waller ‘The Story of Alcoa: Enduring Questions 
of Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases’ in Eleanor M Fox and Daniel A Crane 
(eds) Antitrust Stories (Foundation Press 2007) at 132-3. 
87  Waller supra n 86 at 132. 
88  Supra n 84.  
89  Harold Demsetz ‘How Many Cheers for Antitrust’s 100 Years?’ (1992) Vol XXX Economic Inquiry 207-
17 at 210. 
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States applied antitrust laws, in particular section 2 of the Sherman Act, to protect the 
viability of small and middle-sized businesses.90  As Waller observed, Justice Hand’s 
interpretation of section 2 of the Sherman Act “was rapidly endorsed by the Supreme 
Court and set the ground rules for section 2 litigation for a generation”.91 
 
In United States v Columbia Steel Co92 the Court noted that “the philosophy of the 
Sherman Act was that monopoly should not be allowed to exist because the Act was 
founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration of economic power in the private 
hands of a few”.93  In this case a bigger firm size was seen as a curse which had the 
potential to turn into both an industrial menace (because of the firm’s ability to create 
inequalities in relation to its competitors) and a social menace (because of the firm’s 
ability to control prices).94   
 
In Brown Shoe Co Inc v United States95 Chief Justice Warren stated that “we cannot fail 
to recognise Congress’s desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, 
small, and locally owned businesses”.96  Although Brown Shoe was a merger decision 
and was not decided under section 2 of the Sherman Act, it nevertheless raised a 
principle of fundamental importance under section 2. Indeed Brown Shoe, although 
decided more than 60 years later, confirmed and was in line with the principle 
established in an earlier monopolization case decided under section 2, Trans-Missouri 
                                               
90  Fox supra n 24. 
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Freight Association,97 where Justice Peckham expressed concern about the need “to 
protect small dealers and other worthy men” whom he feared could face extinction from 
the market as a result of fierce competition waged against them by their much bigger 
rivals.98 
 
In United States v Von's Grocery Co99 the Supreme Court observed, per Justice Black, 
that “from the birth of the United States there has been an abiding and widespread fear 
of the evils which flow from monopoly and that it was in response to this fear that the US 
Congress passed the Sherman Act”. 100   Justice Black further observed that when 
enacting the antitrust laws: “Congress sought to arrest a trend toward concentration by 
preserving competition among small independent businesses”.101  He felt that courts 
had a duty always to be ready to carry out this particular intent of Congress.102  In his 
dissent in Von’s Grocery, Justice Stewart could not have been more apt when he 
observed that in Supreme Court antitrust cases where market domination concerns 
were an issue the sole consistency he could find was that “the government always 
won”. 103   This demonstrates the extent to which bias against dominant firms was 
entrenched in Supreme Court antitrust decisions, as the majority of the decisions 
favored the state.   
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103  Id at 301.  Kovacic and Shapiro supra n 80 at 51. 
45 
 
Perhaps the most hostile views by a judge against large corporations were those held 
and expressed by Louis D. Brandeis, who was associate justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States between 1916 and 1939.  In his view “a big firm size is indicative of 
past transgressions by the firm against the economy, the political process, and 
consumers”.104  He argued that “no monopoly could be attained by efficiency alone as 
no business could be superior to its competitors in the process of manufacture and 
distribution in a manner that enabled it to control the market”.105   
 
As McGraw has observed, early in his career Brandeis decided that business could 
become big only through illegitimate means and by his frequent references to the ‘curse 
of bigness’ he meant that a big firm size was ‘a sign of prior sinning’.106  He was greatly 
concerned about small competitors and the way they were treated in the marketplace 
and saw the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals as unfairly choking 
off opportunity for them.107  From the 1930s the mistrust of big business, influenced by 
the Brandeis philosophy, grew in relevance to an extent that it became the dominant 
viewpoint and would remain at the centre of American antitrust policy until well into the 
1960s.108   
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2.2.4 Current Law on Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Position of 
Dominant Firms in American Antitrust Law  
 
While American antitrust policy of the 20th century was defined by the philosophy of 
hostility towards dominant firms, modern antitrust policy has appeared to be more 
welcoming towards dominant undertakings.109  The historic emphasis on using antitrust 
law as a tool to structure markets and protect small businesses has been replaced by a 
spirited emphasis on consumer welfare as a policy standard and the ultimate goal of 
antitrust law.110  Consequently, consumer welfare is today generally accepted as the 
goal of US antitrust law.111   
 
Even the US Supreme Court, which has handed down many historic judgments in which 
the philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings and the protection of small 
businesses have been placed above any other antitrust goal, had by the end of the 
1970s declared its support for the view that: “Congress designed the Sherman Act 
primarily as a consumer welfare prescript”.112  That the purpose of American antitrust 
laws is to advance consumer welfare by protecting competition and not competitors, it is 
submitted, “has now become so central to American antitrust jurisprudence that it is 
sometimes taken for granted”.113 
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The greater value attached to consumer welfare in modern American antitrust policy 
has created a strong perception that dominant firms have finally been ‘left alone’ and 
that their freedom to compete will not be tampered with, unless there is clear evidence 
that their conduct has caused or is likely to result in significant consumer harm.114  As 
former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, William Kovacic, notes, 
“developments in U.S. antitrust doctrine and enforcement policy since the 1970s have 
narrowed significantly the range of dominant firm conduct that is subject to 
condemnation, meaning dominant firms today have relatively broad freedom to choose 
pricing, product development, and marketing strategies as they please”. 115  
 
The flexibility and tolerance towards dominance and market power in modern American 
antitrust law has led to court decisions that, in recognition of the right of dominant firms 
to compete aggressively, make it clear that industrial success leading to dominance is 
not a violation of antitrust laws.116  In Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko LLP117 (Trinko) the US Supreme Court found that “mere possession of 
monopoly power and the consequential charging of monopoly prices is not unlawful but 
an important part of the free market system”. 118   The Court further held that “the 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices, at least for a short period, is what attracts 
business acumen and risk-taking in the first place, and that in order to safeguard the 
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incentive to innovate the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful, 
unless it is accompanied by anticompetitive conduct”.119  
 
An interesting question is whether this new romance between the Supreme Court and 
dominant firms, demonstrated by the decision in Trinko, 120  is broadly shared or 
endorsed by American antitrust enforcement agencies and commentators?  Put 
differently, has the historic hostility towards dominant firms completely or significantly 
disappeared in modern American antitrust discourse?  The answer to this question 
depends largely on whom you ask.  In my view, the philosophy of hostility towards 
monopoly and market dominance that has long been considered deeply ingrained into 
the American social fabric has not completely or even significantly disappeared.   
 
In his review of the Trinko121 decision, a highly critical Waller stated “this is the first time 
that I am aware that any court, let alone the Supreme Court, has chosen to characterise 
the possession and exercise of monopoly power as an important element of the free-
market system”.122  Expressing his disapproval of the reasoning in Trinko, Waller further 
pointed out “if the point of antitrust law is to encourage the acquisition and retention of 
long term monopoly power then we might as well abandon the entire enterprise of 
regulating competition by law”.123  It is one thing, he continued, to say that we tolerate 
the existence of monopoly power (if not illegally acquired) but it is quite another to 
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“worship at the altar of monopoly power”.124   From the debates that preceded the 
passage of the Sherman Act until the decision in Trinko, he concluded, “one can search 
long and hard before finding anything close to this love affair with monopoly either in 
Congress or in the majority of concurring or dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in 
section 2 cases”.125 
 
Waller is not a lone voice in modern American antitrust law, counselling against what he 
sees as the misguided love for monopoly by those entrusted with enforcing antitrust 
laws, classically demonstrated in Trinko.  Indeed, in modern American antitrust law, 
where consumer welfare is regarded the main goal of the law, the Brandeis-inspired 
dislike of monopoly power and market dominance has continued to have some 
relevance.126  There are those who still hold Brandeis in great esteem, as they regard 
him as an energetic proponent of fair trade who has contributed immensely to the 
antitrust movement.127  Thus, to find evidence of hostility towards dominant firms in 
American antitrust law, one does not only have to look at the anti-monopoly concerns 
that dominated American public life and antitrust enforcement in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, as recourse to modern American antitrust law may also yield interesting 
results.128   
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The US Department of Justice’s decision in 2009129 to withdraw its 2008 Report on 
Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,130 which proposed a more 
cautious antitrust enforcement approach in dealing with unilateral conduct by dominant 
firms – because overzealous enforcement was seen as undermining legitimate 
competition in the market,131 signalled an intent to return to the old policy of aggressive 
and vigorous enforcement action against dominant firms. 132  The Report on Single-Firm 
Conduct, the Justice Department said in a statement announcing its withdrawal, raised 
too many hurdles to government antitrust enforcement action against dominant firms.133  
The withdrawal of the Report was a clear statement that the Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division would no longer allow dominant firms the free pass they had enjoyed 
as a result of the passive monitoring of markets associated with the Report on Single-
Firm Conduct.134   
 
In modern American antitrust law there are those who still hold the view that market 
dominance is generally incompatible with the ideal of free and effective competition and 
have advocated for the revival of the old antitrust policy of discouraging the domination 
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of markets by a few corporations.135  As Carstensen argues, “antitrust intervention and 
remedies aimed at the elimination of monopoly should again be the primary goal in 
monopoly cases, the fundamental insight being that the elimination of monopoly would 
obviate the need for detailed oversight and analysis of complex monopoly conduct”. 136  
If section 2 of the Sherman Act is to retain its commitment to the view articulated in 
Standard Oil – that possession of monopoly is unlawful – he argues further, “then 
antitrust authorities should impose remedies aimed at the termination of the monopoly 
itself rather than mere regulation of its conduct”. 137 
 
In a recent article, Bogus, inspired by Brandeis’ Curse of Bigness theory,138 calls for a 
radical change in antitrust policy to tackle “behemoth corporations, consolidated 
industries, and enormous wealth flowing into the hands of a few”.139  He argues that 
antitrust law should be used to break-up large financial institutions, whose failure may 
cause significant economic turmoil, as witnessed in the 2008 global financial crisis. 140  
Failed Democratic contender for party nomination to contest the American Presidency in 
November 2016, Bernie Sanders, gained popularity through his proposals to break-up 
the country’s largest financial institutions, because they have acquired too much 
economic and political power, which he felt risked endangering the American economy 
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and political process.141  In her campaign, Hillary Clinton also promised that if elected 
President she will “beef up the antitrust enforcement arms of the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission,” and hire “aggressive regulators”. 142   
 
While monopolization cases by public enforcement agencies have in recent times 
become fewer than in the past,143 there have been some recent antitrust decisions that 
made findings that, arguably, are consistent with the historical philosophy of hostility 
towards dominant undertakings.  In LePage's Inc v Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Company (3M) 144  the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 
stated that the principles enunciated in Alcoa145 “remain fully applicable today.”146  To 
remind ourselves, one of the important principles to emerge from Alcoa was that “the 
Sherman Act outlawed monopoly in all its manifestations, meaning that once monopoly 
power was proven it was difficult for any defendant to avoid condemnation under 
section 2”.147  As Dorsey and Jacobson recently observed, ‘many of the traditional 
theories and assumptions associated with the philosophy of hostility towards dominant 
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undertakings, made popular in historic cases such as Alcoa, have survived the antitrust 
revolution that began in the 1970s and reached its climax in Trinko’.148  In West Penn 
Allegheny Health System v University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre (UPMC) and 
Highmark Inc149 the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, found that poaching 
by a dominant firm of a rival's employees and offering them better salaries may amount 
to an unlawful attempt to monopolize the market under section 2 of the Sherman Act.150   
 
In 2014 and 2015 the Federal Trade Commission, in McWane Inc v Star Pipe Products 
Ltd,151 and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in McWane Inc v Federal 
Trade Commission,152 made decisions relying on outdated theories for dealing with 
exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, imputing antirust liability to dominant firms in 
the absence of evidence of consumer harm.153  In his dissenting opinion in the Federal 
Trade Commission’s McWane Inc decision, Commissioner Wright, holding that 
foreclosure in modern exclusionary practice analysis is not in itself the end but rather a 
starting point for understanding whether the exclusionary practice complained of is 
capable of harming competition, expressed dismay that what was strikingly absent from 
the Commission’s analysis was evidence establishing the link between foreclosure and 
harm to competition, in the form of increased prices and reduced output. 154   He 
observed that by inferring anticompetitive harm from the exclusion of rivals without 
direct evidence of antitrust injury in the form of increased prices and reduced output, the 
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Commission’s majority decision in effect amounts to the application of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act to protect competitors and not competition.155 
 
There are also a number of proposed and ongoing antitrust cases against dominant 
firms, particularly in the high technology sector, that have been construed by some as 
reinforcing the old-school anti-big business philosophy.  To paraphrase a commentator, 
the recent ‘string of trumped-up antitrust charges, harassment, lawsuits, and fines 
against major technology companies, such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft, 
is part of the 19th century antitrust mumbo jumbo, which enables the government to raid 
successful firms for their huge profits, great products, and market share deemed to be 
too much’.156 
 
2.2.5 Summary 
 
There are a number of crucial observations that can be made from the assessment of 
the historical development of American antitrust law.  But the most important one, for 
purposes of this study, is that American antitrust law, and the Sherman Act in particular, 
were born out of the philosophy of hostility towards monopoly and dominant 
undertakings.  This is evident when one looks at the dominant role that anti-monopoly 
concerns and small business interests have played in the lobbying and debates that 
preceded the enactment of the Sherman Act.  It is also clear from the actual text and 
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provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act which, when taken literally, makes market 
domination illegal.   
 
The philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings has also greatly influenced 
the interpretation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by American courts, and the Supreme 
Court in particular, in the majority of early monopolization cases.  This philosophy has 
also underpinned the decisions of American courts in other early and historically 
significant cases concerning the application and interpretation of other antitrust 
legislation complementing the Sherman Act.157   
 
However, in modern American antitrust law the expressed philosophy and policy 
standard driving antitrust enforcement is consumer welfare.  This means the philosophy 
of hostility towards dominant firms is no longer regarded as the official or expressed 
goal of American antitrust law.  Some recent decisions, like Trinko,158 have explicitly 
abandoned the traditional policy of hostility towards market power and rolled out the red 
carpet for dominant firms in markets in unprecedented fashion in American antitrust 
history.  But the rise of consumer welfare as a guiding principle in modern American 
antitrust enforcement has not meant that anti market dominance concerns have 
completely or even significantly disappeared.  The reality is that the actions of antitrust 
enforcement agencies, some recent court decisions, and the remarks by some 
influential commentators show that a deep mistrust, and perhaps resentment, of 
dominant undertakings is alive and well in modern American antitrust law.    
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2.3 Historical Development of European Competition Law with Special 
Focus on Article 102 of the Treaty of the European Union 
 
While American antitrust lawyers and economists have made a tremendous effort to 
investigate the historical origins of their antitrust law, the origins of European 
competition law have been relatively under-investigated.159   Existing reports on the 
origins of European competition law have produced differing accounts of how European 
competition law developed.  There are three major versions or viewpoints about the true 
origin of European competition law.   
 
The first viewpoint is that initial European competition rules originated in Germany.160  In 
this regard, an understanding of German competition law background is helpful in 
shedding some light on the perspective from which Germans contributed to the 
development of European competition law.  The development of German competition 
law can be divided into two periods: pre- and post- 1945.161  Germany is believed to 
have conceived the idea of competition law as early as the end of the eighteenth 
century, when a group of intellectuals met in Vienna to explore the possibility of using 
the law to protect the process of competition.162  When the first anti-cartel law was 
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enacted in Germany in 1923, 163  it had traces of some of the ideas canvassed in 
Vienna.164  In the pre-1945 era the 1923 anti-cartel law is regard as the most significant 
competition statute in Germany.165  The 1923 anti-cartel law shows that Germany had 
an existing competition law system long before any other country in Europe.   
 
The German anti-cartel law of 1923 is believed to have influenced the competition rules 
included in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which is credited with establishing the first truly 
supranational competition policy for Europe.166  But there are those who challenge the 
extent of German influence on European competition law.  They contend that the 
drafting of European competition rules was the subject of fierce negotiation between the 
various delegates involved in the establishment of the European Union, and that the 
final competition rules were a compromise between the various proposals made by the 
delegates.167 
 
In the post-1945 era German competition law was significantly shaped by the influences 
of the occupying forces, led by America, at the end of the Second World War.168  This 
leads us to the second viewpoint on the origin of European competition law, which is 
that European competition law has some American roots.  It has been suggested that 
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between 1945 and 1952, following the American-led Allied occupation of Germany after 
the Second World War, Germans adopted US antitrust rules contained in the Sherman 
Act and subsequently transmitted these rules to Europe. 169   However, as Giocoli 
argues, the American antitrust tradition has had less influence over the foundations of 
European competition policy than is commonly claimed.170  European competition law is 
thus considered by some to have developed separately from the US economic policy 
contained in the Sherman Act.171 
 
The third viewpoint is that the origins of European competition law dates back to a 
series of measures adopted by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands under the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and 
Steel Community.172  The European Coal and Steel Community is credited by some 
with creating the first competition rules in Europe.173   
 
An important breakthrough in the development of European competition rules, it has 
been argued, was achieved by the European Coal and Steel Community when the 
Foreign Ministers of the member states held a meeting in Brussels in 1956.174  At this 
meeting, former Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, introduced a report, 
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commonly known today as the Spaak Report, which is considered by some to have laid 
the foundation for European competition law.175  As Akman has observed, “the Spaak 
Report suggested measures to preclude the creation of monopolies and the domination 
of markets by single enterprises”.176  The policy of the Spaak Report, Akman observed 
further, “was actually the prohibition of monopoly and market domination per se”.177   
 
Therefore, the Spaak Report proposed the prohibition of monopoly and market 
domination in terms that were substantially similar to those of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act in American antitrust law.  Like the Americans, Europeans historically had 
considerable experience with monopolies in a variety of sectors such as energy, 
transportation, broadcasting, telecommunications, and medicine.178  In particular, post-
war European economies were characterised by monopolies. 179   The discussions 
relating to the establishment of the European Common Market and accompanying 
preparatory documents alluded to this problem of monopoly. 180   In this regard, 
European competition rules that emanated from the European Coal and Steel 
Community are seen as having responded to Europe’s socio-economic conditions of the 
time.181   
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The European Coal and Steel Community is also regarded by many to have 
substantially influenced the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome.182  Some 
concepts and institutions which appeared first in the European Coal and Steel 
Community are deemed to have served as a model for the European competition 
system contained in the Treaty of Rome.183  This has prompted some to suggest that 
the true history of European competition policy starts with the history of European 
integration.184   
 
On closer inspection, the three viewpoints on the origin of European competition law 
may not be irreconcilable.  Firstly, there is no doubt that by at least 1923 Germany was 
the first country in Europe to have had a system of competition law in place.  America’s 
leading role in the Allied occupation of Germany after the Second World War, and its 
attempt to control the German economy and install competition rules is a matter of 
undisputed historical record.185  Before the establishment of the European Union and 
European competition rules, America and Germany were regarded as two of the few, if 
not the only, countries in the world to have well-developed competition systems.186   
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Furthermore, the contribution of Germans in the drafting of European competition rules 
is a general truism that cannot be gainsaid.  Of the original six member states of the 
European Union, only Germany had an existing competition law and experience in the 
area.187  By the time the European Union was being established and the competition 
rules were being put in place, it is likely that Germans brought experience from both 
their 1923 cartel law and the competition rules that developed during the American-led 
Allied occupation period of 1945 and 1952.  The result was negotiated European 
competition rules, but with a significant Germano-American flavour.   
 
The cornerstone of European competition law is Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.188  Article 102 provides as follows: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
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(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
 
In short, Article 102 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by dominant firms within 
the European common market or any substantial part of it.  Such abuse may include, 
but is not limited to, anticompetitive practices by dominant firms such as unfair pricing or 
unfair trading conditions, limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; discriminatory practices, and tying, among others.  
 
2.3.1 Influence of Ordoliberal Philosophy in Article 102  
 
The process of the establishment of European competition rules was largely dominated 
by Germans, who had the most interest and experience in competition law.189  Many of 
the key German figures involved in the establishment of the European Union, including 
Walter Hallstein – who became the first President of the Commission of the European 
Economic Community – were closely associated with the philosophy of 
ordoliberalism.190   
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At the time of the drafting of the Treaty of Rome, ordoliberalism was the leading 
economic philosophy in Germany, which was the strongest continental European 
economy and the only state with a modern competition law in place.191  Inevitably 
ordoliberal perspectives influenced the way in which European competition rules were 
drafted.192  Indeed, there is general consensus among commentators that the policy 
behind Article 102 drew considerable inspiration from ordoliberal philosophy.193   
 
The ideas of ordoliberalism were developed by the Freiburg School194 as a response to 
the economic, political, and social crises that followed the fall of the Weimar Republic in 
1933 and the rise of Nazi Germany. 195   In the sphere of competition, ordoliberal 
philosophy emphasised the protection of the structure of the market to prevent a 
situation where one or a few undertakings dominated the market, something that was 
considered incompatible with a competitive market system.196   
 
In general, ordoliberalism was in line with other conceptions of liberalism by regarding 
competition as essential for a prosperous, free and equal society. 197  In particular, 
ordoliberalism shared some characteristics of classical liberalism by placing a 
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competitive market at the center of an economic system in which all market participants 
interacted freely and as equals.198   
 
However, ordoliberals went further than other concepts of liberalism by arguing that a 
prosperous, free, and equal society could only be achieved through state intervention in 
the market and the establishment of legal rules aimed at protecting the process of 
competition from distortion and abuse by dominant entities.199  Therefore, ordoliberals 
differed from traditional liberalists in that they believed that an unregulated free market 
(or a market regulated by the ‘invisible-hand’ as advocated by Adam Smith)200 was not 
the most reliable or effective way of achieving a prosperous, free and equal society.201  
They felt that an unregulated free market was likely to breed monopolies which in turn 
would inevitably thwart individual economic freedom.202  In fact, ordoliberals criticised 
Adam Smith for positing the economy as autonomous, disregarding the role of the state, 
and believing in the capacity of the free economy to regulate itself by means of the 
‘invisible-hand’.203   
 
Ordoliberals strongly believed that competition law had to be applied vigorously to 
prevent the creation of monopoly power, to abolish existing monopoly positions where 
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possible, and where not possible to control the conduct of monopolists.204  As one of the 
leading proponents of ordoliberalism, Walter Eucken, proposed “avoidable monopolies 
were to be broken up and unavoidable ones were to be regulated”.205  Ordoliberals 
thought that concentrated industries would eventually evolve into a collective monopoly 
and as an alternative they preferred a market structure comprising several smaller and 
independent competitors as these were thought to carry the greatest promise that 
markets would remain competitive. 206  Ordoliberal ideas about the use of competition 
law as a means to protect the structure of the market or the competitive process by 
discouraging the attainment, maintenance, and enhancement of market power are 
reflected in the majority of European competition decisions.207   
 
In Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v Commission208 the 
Court observed that when regard is had to the spirit, general scheme, and wording of 
Article 102, and the entire system and objectives of the Treaty of the European Union, a 
number of measures or actions taken by a firm in a dominant position which increase its 
size and market power may have negative implications for competition.209  The Court 
then confirmed that an abuse of dominance may indeed be found to have occurred if an 
undertaking in a dominant position ‘strengthens its position in the market to such an 
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extent that the degree of dominance achieved makes it impossible for other firms to 
survive in the market’.210 
 
In Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission211 the Court suggested that the ‘mere 
presence of a dominant undertaking in a market automatically means that the degree of 
competition in that market has been weakened’.212  This idea has also been endorsed in 
other important cases such as Michelin v Commission.213  In classic ordoliberal fashion, 
European competition decisions have shown considerable distaste for dominance and 
have sought to protect smaller competitors which, because of their limited financial 
resources, would be unable to withstand the competition waged against them by their 
bigger rivals.214  As Marsden and Gormsen have observed, “when applying Article 102 
the European Competition Commission and the courts rely largely on the ordoliberal 
assumption that the existence of dominance triggers the presumption that there is harm 
to competition in the market”.215   
 
2.3.2 Current Law on Article 102 
 
In recent years the European Competition Commission has declared its intention to 
modernise its approach to abuse of dominance enforcement.  It has shown an interest 
in adopting an economic and effects-based approach to the assessment of dominant 
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firm conduct.216  Unlike a form-based or structural approach to competition enforcement, 
which is based on the assumption that dominance triggers the presumption of harm to 
the structure of the market and the competitive process, an economic and effects-based 
approach focuses more on the proven economic effects of conduct in the market and 
prioritises the protection of consumer welfare over the protection of competitors. 217  
Indeed, it has become common in recent years for the European competition authorities 
to emphasise in policy documents and speeches that their enforcement of Article 102 
will be informed by an effects-based approach in which consumer welfare will be the 
ultimate yardstick.218   
 
For example, the European Director General for Competition has stated that the main 
objective of Article 102 is consumer welfare.219  In its 2009 Guidance Paper on the 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, the European Competition Commission also 
indicated that its abuse of dominance enforcement will be guided by the question, and 
indeed the principle, whether the impugned dominant firm conduct has had any harmful 
effects on consumers.220   The Commission recognised in the Guidance Paper that 
dominant firms are also entitled to compete vigorously on merit and as a general rule 
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they will tolerate competitive dominant firm conduct, even if such conduct leads to the 
removal of some inefficient competitors from the market.221 
 
The statements by the European Competition Commission have been taken by some as 
a sign that the application of European competition law is now inspired by the same 
principles that currently govern American antitrust enforcement. 222   This has been 
termed the: “Americanisation of European Competition law”, a reference to the 
perception that European competition law has now reached a greater level of 
convergence or uniformity with its American counterpart. 223   The European 
Commission’s public commitment to follow an effects-based approach to the 
assessment of dominant firm conduct suggests that European competition law is finally 
shaking off its ordoliberal history and embracing a modern way of antitrust thinking in 
abuse of dominance enforcement.224 
 
However, no straightforward conclusions may be drawn from the statements made by 
the European Competition Commission that they now follow an effects-based approach 
in their abuse of dominance enforcement in which consumer welfare has become the 
main goal of Article 102. 225  While the Commission’s abuse of dominance enforcement 
philosophy in speeches and the Guidance Paper may favor effects analyses and 
consumer welfare, the reality is that in practice there has not been any radical policy 
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shift and the past is, therefore, still a big part of the present.226  Thus, despite claims 
that European competition law has undergone a process of modernisation, ordoliberal 
thoughts and market structure ideas are still part and parcel of modern European 
competition law. 227   Even the Guidance Paper, it is submitted, “relies largely on 
ordoliberal presumptions”.228   
 
Accordingly, European competition policy and law on abuse of market power have seen 
less development in recent years than is claimed. 229   The main criticism of the 
application of Article 102 remains that effects analyses of dominant firm conduct are not 
common, as ordoliberal economics still hold sway. 230   Even the Commission has 
admitted that its much vaunted new focus on consumer welfare does not mean that 
market structure imperatives and other common market ideals will fall by the wayside.231  
Indeed, according to recent European competition case law, consumer welfare or direct 
injury to consumers ‘is not the main objective of Article 102 as dominant firm conduct 
which interferes with the competitive freedom of competitors is also the target of the 
provision’.232 
 
In the T-Mobile Netherlands and GlaxoSmithKline decisions the European Court of 
Justice found that competition rules laid down in the Treaty of the European Union are 
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aimed at protecting the interests of competitors and the structure of the market, among 
others. 233   Recently, in General Electric v Commission, 234  British Airways v 
Commission,235 and Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission,236 the 
courts regurgitated the old and form-based Hoffmann-La Roche 237  and Michelin 238 
dictum that “the very presence of a dominant undertaking in a market means that the 
degree of competition in that market is weakened”.239  The Court in Tomra Systems 
further observed that the purpose of Article 102 is to prohibit a dominant undertaking 
from eliminating its competitors. 240   In Tomra Systems the Court generally treated 
consumer harm or consumer welfare in a manner that suggested that it did not regard 
this issue as a key requirement under Article 102, but rather saw it as merely one of 
many factors that might be taken into account by a court.   
 
Indeed, European competition law enforcement appears, in practice, to be primarily 
focused on objectives other than consumer welfare, such as promoting European 
market integration which still serves as both a political and an economic objective of 
European competition policy.241  As former European Competition Commissioner, Karel 
Van Miert, once remarked ‘European competition policy is not only concerned with 
efficiency but also with achieving the political and social aims of the Treaty of the 
European Union, such as establishing a common market and bringing Member States 
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together’.242  Because Article 102 exists as part of the Treaty of the European Union, it 
has been developed by the courts within the broader context of the Treaty by making 
continuous reference to the Treaty's objectives of integration and other economic, 
political and social aspirations of the European Union. 243   The European Court of 
Justice, it has been observed, also regards Article 102 as an extension of the general 
objectives of the European Community.244   
 
2.3.3 Summary 
 
There are different views on the true origins of European competition law.  As observed 
earlier, three major views emerge in this regard.  The first is that initial European 
competition rules originated in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century when a 
group of intellectuals met in Vienna to explore the idea of using the law to protect the 
process of competition.  When the first anti-cartel law was enacted in Germany in 1923 
it is said to have had traces of the ideas initially canvased in Vienna.  The 1923 German 
anti-cartel law is in turn believed to have influenced the competition rules included in the 
1957 Treaty of Rome.   
 
The second viewpoint is that European competition law has American roots.  According 
to this view, Germans are believed to have adopted US antitrust rules contained in the 
Sherman Act following an America-led Allied occupation of Germany after the Second 
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World War.  Germans are then said to have transmitted these American antitrust rules 
to Europe.  The third viewpoint is that the origins of European competition law date back 
to the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community.  
The Coal and Steel Community is credited by some with creating the first competition 
rules in Europe, which are also said to have been adopted by the Treaty of Rome.   
 
On examination, the three viewpoints on the origin of European competition law can be 
reconciled.  To this end, it is appropriate to first note that in some respects the history of 
European competition law is inextricably intertwined with German competition history.  
This is because Germany is widely regarded the first country in Europe to have had a 
system of competition law.  Given their experience and knowledge in the area, Germans 
are also credited with playing an active role in the establishment of European 
competition law.  When the European Union was being established and the competition 
rules were being put in place between 1951 and 1957, it is likely that Germans brought 
along experiences from both their earlier 1923 anti-cartel law and the competition rules 
that developed during the America led Allied occupation period of 1945-1952.  The 
result was European competition rules as negotiated, but with a significant German and 
American flavour.   
 
The German and American influences on European competition law are most clearly 
evident in Article 102.  While German ordoliberal philosophy postulated that the 
presence of dominant firms in markets was incompatible with a competitive market 
system, section 2 of the Sherman Act in American antitrust law was founded on the 
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philosophy of hostility towards dominant firms.  The policy of hostility towards dominant 
firms which has been central in a number of seminal American antitrust decisions under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, has been equally integral to a number of European 
competition decisions decided under Article 102.  The flaw of an enforcement approach 
to Article 102 inspired by this philosophy has been exposed in a number of studies.245  
The main criticism against the European competition authorities and the courts is that 
they follow an abuse of dominance enforcement approach based on form (that 
dominance presupposes a decline in competition) and does not value substance (the 
actual economic effects of the impugned conduct on competition and consumers).246   
 
This has prompted the European Competition Commission to reconsider its approach to 
the enforcement of Article 102.  The Commission has stated that it is committed to 
adopting a new enforcement approach to Article 102, based primarily on the 
assessment of the economic effects of the impugned conduct on consumers.  Despite 
these guarantees, many observers have found that effects analyses and consumer 
welfare as guiding principles are uncommon in European abuse of dominance 
enforcement.247   Instead, ordoliberal ideas have been found to dominate abuse of 
dominance enforcement in European competition law. 
 
2.4 Historical Development of South African Competition Law 
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Under Roman law the Lex Julia de Annona declared certain monopolistic practices 
illegal as early as 50 BC – around the time of Julius Caesar’s dictatorship.248  From a 
South African perspective Roman law is of particular interest because it forms a major 
part of Roman-Dutch law, which is an important part of the common-law in South 
Africa.249  After the fall of the Roman Empire, Charles V promulgated an Edict for the 
Netherlands in October 1540 – itself a re-enactment of the old Roman law against 
monopolies – which became the main pillar of Roman-Dutch law on monopolies.250 
 
However, there is no evidence that Roman and Roman-Dutch law against monopolies 
became part of South African law.  As Cowen observes, “there is no record of anyone 
ever being prosecuted in South Africa for the crime of monopoly under Roman-Dutch 
law”.251  In the main, Cowen further observes, the burden of controlling monopolistic and 
unfair trade practices was left to the common-law, particularly the laws of contract and 
delict, which proved to be ill-equipped to deal with the problems to which these 
practices gave rise.252  And after a lengthy period of reliance on the common-law, it 
became clear that legislation was needed to deal with the monopoly problem in South 
Africa.   
 
Competition legislation in South Africa, therefore, arose primarily as part of 
government’s efforts to fight the excessive concentration of economic power and the 
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abuse of market power.253  In the period between 1907 and 1955 attempts to control the 
monopoly problem were made in piecemeal fashion through various pieces of 
legislation, which generally proved inadequate. 254   In 1949, during a parliamentary 
reading of the Bill which resulted in the enactment of the Undue Restraint of Trade 
Act,255 an anti-monopoly law intended only as a temporary measure while a long term 
solution was being investigated, the Minister of Economic Affairs observed that “there 
was an undoubted tendency towards the creation of monopolies in South Africa”.256   
 
The Minister further observed that there was a growing feeling that South Africa should 
follow the example of the United States by introducing legislation along the lines of the 
Sherman Act.257   The Board of Trade and Industries, which had been created by 
previous competition legislation,258 was instructed to investigate the possibility of the 
enactment in South Africa of legislation modelled on the Sherman Act. 259   In its 
investigation, the Board of Trade and Industries surveyed modern thinking on 
monopolies around the world and recommended completely new legislation for the 
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regulation of monopolies in South Africa.260  This led to the enactment of the Regulation 
of Monopolistic Conditions Act,261 which is widely regarded as the first comprehensive 
legislation for the control and regulation of monopolies in South African.262  It is not 
within the scope of this work to discuss the provisions of this Act in detail.   
 
It is sufficient to state that the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act was not the 
success it was hoped it would be.263  The Act did not result in any decline in the high 
rate of industrial concentrations and monopolies that were characteristic of the South 
African economy.264  Its principal weakness was that it did not forbid any particular type 
of defined conduct, but merely established a framework enabling the Board of Trade 
and Industries to investigate suspicious conduct in the public interest. 265   Another 
weakness of the Act was that it applied only to existing monopolistic conditions and not 
to those which might arise in the future.266  This meant the Act had no preventative 
function.  The Board of Trade and Industries had no power to commence investigations 
on its own initiative but had to function under the direction and control of the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, who was also not bound by the Board’s recommendations resulting 
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from its investigations. 267   This impacted negatively on the independence and 
effectiveness of the Board.  The Board was also severely under-staffed, which further 
impacted on its capacity to enforce the Act.268 
 
In 1975 the then President of South Africa appointed a Commission, originally under the 
chairmanship of retired Chief Justice LC Steyn who died before the completion of his 
brief and was replaced by Dr DJ Mouton, to investigate – among other things – the 
efficacy of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act as an instrument to deal with 
South Africa’s monopoly problems and to report on any new legislation necessary.269  
Under the chairmanship of Dr Mouton the Commission published its report in March 
1977.  As a general approach, it adopted the view that a new competition policy based 
on free enterprise and embracing the total economy was essential for South Africa.270  
As a result of the Commission’s report, the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition 
Act271 was enacted.  This Act created the Competition Board as a new body tasked with 
administering the Act.272   
 
It is also not necessary to discuss in great detail the provisions of the Maintenance and 
Promotion of Competition Act, which also turned out to be a failure, as the economy 
showed no sign of ridding itself of monopolies and industrial concentrations.  The Act 
was riddled with technical flaws which prevented its effective application on both 
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substantive and logistical grounds. 273  It is sufficient to observe here that many of the 
challenges that affected the previous Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act also 
continued to afflict the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act.274  The Act was 
amended in 1986 to introduce a number of specific and defined prohibited restrictive 
practices so as to give the Competition Board more clarity in its enforcement.275  The 
defined prohibited practices were resale price maintenance, horizontal price collusion, 
horizontal collusion on conditions of supply, horizontal collusion on market share, and 
collusive tendering.276   
 
The amendment was a positive and major development.  Prior to the amendment, the 
Act, like its predecessor, did not prohibit any specific conduct.  The relevant Minister 
could only prohibit conduct following a long and time consuming investigation and on 
the recommendation of the Board.277   But after several years it became clear that 
despite these amendments, the Act could no longer effectively serve the needs of a 
modern economy characterised by complex business practices and transactions.  A 
new competition regime was needed for democratic South Africa with its multifarious 
economic challenges.   
 
At the time of political reforms in 1994, the new ANC-led government signaled its 
intention to review the South African competition law regime in the White Paper on 
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Reconstruction and Development.278  The Trade and Industry Department also initiated 
a process of consultation with experts and stakeholders about a new competition policy 
framework for South Africa.  This culminated in the release in 1997 of a Competition 
Policy Guideline document entitled A Framework for Competition, Competitiveness and 
Development.279   
 
The public consultation process and the resultant Competition Policy Guideline 
document led to the enactment of the current Competition Act. 280   Against the 
background of poor enforcement of past anti-monopoly legislation, it was hoped that the 
new competition authorities would send out a strong signal to dominant firms by 
adopting a tough stance against abuses of dominance.281  The competition authorities 
also had the daunting task of developing new antitrust jurisprudence.  Indeed, no 
cognisable system of formal antitrust jurisprudence ever developed under any of the 
competition legislation that preceded the current Competition Act, as the processes 
prescribed by the legislation were largely political.282   
 
2.4.1 The South African Historical Economic Structure: Monopoly, 
Industrial Concentration and Unequal Wealth Distribution 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Competition Act, as highlighted earlier, several key 
industries in the South African economy were characterised by monopolies and 
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industrial concentration.283  Some of the roots of monopolies in South Africa can be 
traced back to state intervention in the economy, as a considerable number of 
conglomerates came into being either as creatures of statutes or through the granting of 
concessions.284 
 
Corporate ownership and control were concentrated in the conglomerate groups that 
dominated economic activity in strategic sectors of the economy such as mining, 
manufacturing and financial services.  For example, in 1994 five investment 
conglomerates (Anglo-American, Sanlam, Liberty Life, Rembrandt/Remgro and Old 
Mutual) accounted for 84 per cent of the capitalisation of the stock exchange and one of 
them, Anglo-American, accounted for 43 per cent by itself. 285   Anglo-American’s 
domination of the South African economy for over a century ensured that it was a 
consistently top-ranked company in terms of JSE market capitalisation.286   
 
Studies have also shown that manufacturing was one of the South African industries 
with a long history of concentration.287  The entire production chain of staple food such 
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as bread (from wheat production, storage, milling, baking and retail) was also 
characterised by abnormal levels of concentration of ownership and control.288   
 
The South African banking sector has historically also been marked by a high degree of 
concentration.289  Despite the changes in ownership patterns in the banking sector 
brought by mergers and acquisitions over the years, only a handful of banks have 
consistently held a combined market share of at least 80 per cent.290  The functions of 
banks are deemed to have a significant impact on all aspects of the economy and are 
therefore considered to be central to the overall performance and development of the 
economy. 291   For this reason, the highly concentrated nature of the South African 
banking sector had long been a source of political concern.292   
 
Policy makers were concerned that high levels of industrial concentration in the South 
African economy would result in inefficiencies and reduced competition.  This was seen 
as undesirable not only from the perspective of consumer harm likely to flow from higher 
prices and inferior products, but also from the perspective of their overall impact on 
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economic growth.293  Thus, balanced ownership and control patterns in the economy 
were considered to be among the most important factors in fostering competition in the 
market.  Industrial concentration or an unbalanced ownership and control structure was 
seen as the antithesis of competitive and healthy markets. 294  These are some of the 
general considerations which played an important role in the development of South 
African competition policy and law.295   
 
2.4.2 Competition Law as a Solution to the Problem of Monopoly, Industrial 
Concentration and Unequal Wealth Distribution 
 
The extent of control over economic activity enjoyed by a small group of companies in 
South Africa was one of the main reasons for the prominence of competition policy in 
the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme.296  The new ANC government 
proposed to use competition policy to correct the faults of the old system.297  Indeed, the 
current Competition Act outlines the Act’s motivations, which include policies of equity 
and distribution. 298  As Chabane has observed, “the Competition Act specifically seeks 
to address the problem of excessive concentration of ownership and control in the 
economy”.299  
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As part of its attempt to eliminate industrial concentration, the Act declares that the 
establishment of an environment in which small and medium-sized enterprises can 
flourish is one of its main priorities.300  The achievement of the small business agenda 
of the Competition Act requires carefully designed policy and enforcement actions in 
which small businesses interest are prioritised over those of their more established 
counterparts.  Indeed, as I shall show, in some cases the competition authorities have 
applied the Act in a manner that seemed to unduly favour small businesses, while 
exhibiting a considerable bias against dominant firms.  This is controversial.  It amounts 
to protecting competitors rather than competition and goes against good practice in 
antitrust enforcement.  Indeed, the use of competition law as a tool to promote small 
business interests is generally considered incompatible with the ultimate goal of 
competition law: the advancement of consumer interest.301   
 
However, given our peculiar history, drafters of the Competition Act found themselves in 
a position where – perhaps as a result of an appeal to populism – they had to 
incorporate into the Act objectives that are not necessarily in line with standard 
competition policy goals. 302   As Hartzenberg observed, “it was clear that a new 
competition policy would only be politically acceptable if the law specifically addressed 
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public interest concerns”.303  As a result, she observed further, “economic efficiency had 
to be tempered with by a strong emphasis on public interest issues”.304.   
 
Public interest, in particular small business interests, are widely recognised and 
promoted in the Act’s provisions protecting them against abuse of dominance by large 
firms,305 as well as in the exemption, and merger provisions.306  Indeed, the Competition 
Act allows for exemptions from the prohibitive provisions on anticompetitive practices 
where these practices promote the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises to 
become competitive. 307   In other words, the Act goes to the extent of using 
anticompetitive means to promote small business interests.   
 
A good merger, one which may not necessarily prevent or lessen competition or harm 
consumers, may nonetheless be declined if it does not satisfy some public interest 
requirements, including the ability of small businesses or firms controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons to become competitive.308  The Walmart/Massmart309 merger 
decision of the Competition Appeal Court has been described by some as ‘taking public 
interest too far’ for, among others, approving the merger subject to public interest 
conditions relating to local procurement for the benefit of small locally-owned 
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enterprises.310  Small businesses are seen in South Africa to serve best the public 
interest because they, unlike dominant firms, are considered an important catalyst for 
employment creation, equitable income distribution, and market competition.311  For 
these reasons, they appear to enjoy special protection under the Act.   
 
2.4.3 Trends in the Application of the Competition Act against Dominant 
Firms  
 
As no system of meaningful competition law jurisprudence can be said to have existed 
in South Africa before the coming into force of the Competition Act,312 it is not possible 
to provide a systematic discussion of our historical competition law decisions.  This is 
also because the current Competition Act is relatively new.  It is, however, necessary to 
investigate established trends in the enforcement of the Act in abuse of dominance 
cases to date.  In line with the main theme of this study, competition decisions and 
principles that appear to exhibit hostility towards and bias against dominant firms are 
prioritised.   
 
The main attention is given to the decisions of the Competition Tribunal, which is the 
primary adjudicative body under the Competition Act.  Functioning like a court of first 
instance, the Tribunal has the unique role of shaping the development of competition 
law jurisprudence in South Africa.  Its makeup of lawyers and economists, coupled with 
its ability to hear and interrogate expert economic witnesses, gives it an opportunity, at 
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least in theory, to make decisions that take into account the economic realities of the 
market in which the dispute arose.  The decisions of the Competition Appeal Court – 
which hears appeals and reviews from the Competition Tribunal – are also considered.   
 
It is generally accepted that our competition authorities apply the Competition Act 
primarily to “promote and protect competition”. 313   The assumption is that the 
enforcement of the South African Competition Act is generally geared towards the 
achievement of standard competition law goals, such as efficiency and consumer 
welfare.  However, the idea that the South African Competition Act is applied primarily 
to “promote and protect competition” requires closer investigation and further 
elucidation.  This is because people’s understanding of the concept of ‘competition’ and 
the process through which competition is to be ‘promoted and protected’ may differ.   
 
The unique local circumstances which led to the adoption of our Competition Act have 
had a bearing on the competition authorities’ understanding of the manner or process 
through which they must promote and protect competition.314  One of the fascinating 
features of South African competition law, as already indicated, is that standard 
competition policy goals have been combined with public interest objectives.  While 
competition officials are reluctant to regard themselves as champions of the public 
interest movement, the reality is that they understand that when adjudicating 
competition disputes they are bound by law to apply their minds to public interest 
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issues.  As former Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, David Lewis, remarked, 
‘public interest issues in the Competition Act are like the mad old uncle who comes 
knocking on the door when there are visitors and you have nowhere to hide him except 
to find some way to accommodate him’.315   
 
The incompatibility of standard competition policy goals and public interest issues has 
been pointed out.316  Indeed, the inclusion of broader developmental objectives in our 
competition policy poses significant challenges to effective enforcement of the 
Competition Act in both theory and practice.317  There seems to be a considerable 
disconnect between the theory underpinning our competition law and its practical 
enforcement. 318   While our competition authorities view the enforcement of the 
Competition Act as guided fundamentally by efficiency and consumer welfare, others 
have found that in practice efficiency and consumer welfare are trumped by public 
interest issues.319  In abuse of dominance cases the most notable public interest issue 
is the protection of the structure of the market from distortions by dominant firms in 
order to preserve economic opportunities for other enterprises, especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  This, essentially, has been the Competition Tribunal’s most 
consistent approach towards the realisation of the Act’s general object to ‘promote and 
protect competition’.   
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For example, in Nationwide Poles v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd, 320  a price discrimination 
complaint against a dominant firm, the Tribunal found that “the purpose of the 
Competition Act is to maintain accessible, competitively structured markets which 
accommodate smaller businesses, and enable them to compete effectively against 
larger and well-established incumbents”.321  The legislature, the Tribunal further pointed 
out, is concerned with problems confronting small and medium-sized enterprises which, 
in the absence of a ‘level playing field’, may find it difficult to enter new markets and 
compete effectively on merit. 322   
 
In defence of this approach, the Tribunal reasoned that those who deem competition 
law’s mandate to extend to the securing of competitive market structures, may be less 
troubled by the use of competition enforcement to secure conditions favourable to entry 
into markets and the strengthening of small businesses.323  In a clear statement of 
support for the idea that competition can also be promoted and protected by protecting 
competitors, the Tribunal argued that “an obvious rejoinder to the ‘protect competition 
and not competitors’ mantra is that if there are no competitors there is no 
competition”.324  The Tribunal’s ruling in Nationwide Poles is considered a landmark 
decision in the competition authorities’ history as regards how the conflicting interests of 
small and big business are dealt with generally.325   
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Although the Tribunal’s Nationwide Poles decision was overturned on appeal by the 
Competition Appeal Court due to lack of evidence of a substantial prevention and 
lessening of competition in the market,326 it is important to note that the Appeal Court 
did not interfere with the Tribunal’s reasoning and findings on the importance attached 
to the protection of small business interests under the Act.  Indeed, the Competition 
Appeal Court emphasised that its decision did not seek to minimise the weight which 
the legislature has given to the need to ensure that small and medium-sized businesses 
are protected under the Act.327 
 
In Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and 
Another328 the Competition Tribunal found that the fundamental task of competition law 
is to “promote and defend competitive market structures” and to guard against the 
conduct of market participants, in particular dominant firms, which seek to undermine 
the promise of those competitive market structures.329  Holding that Mittal had abused 
its dominant position, the Tribunal observed that lack of competition in the flat steel 
market had allowed Mittal to evolve into a ‘super-dominant’ firm, leaving competition 
authorities with no choice but to impose a remedy that would address the underlying 
market structure conditions that made the offending conduct possible.330   
 
The Tribunal further observed that at the core of competition law enforcement is the 
recognition that the benefits of competitively structured markets may be wiped out by 
                                               
326  Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v Nationwide Poles CC Case No 49/CAC/APRIL05 at 38-41. 
327  Id at 41. 
328  Case No 13/CR/FEB04. 
329  Id at pars 74 and 75. 
330  Id at pars 84 and 108. 
90 
 
the conduct of dominant firms.331  According to the Tribunal a ‘competitively structured 
market’ or a ‘perfectly competitive market structure’ is one comprising price-taking 
producers, usually firms that are not dominant, as opposed to price-setting monopolists 
– against which the Competition Act was adopted.332  While the Tribunal cautioned that 
competition law is not necessarily directed at eliminating dominant firms from the 
market, it surprisingly went on to state in the same paragraph that “dominant firms are 
beasts” - against whom competition regulators must remain vigilant in enforcing 
competition rules to prevent them from eliminating rivals.333   
 
It is possible that the Tribunal may have referred to dominant firms as ‘beasts’ jokingly 
and that its finding that Mittal had abused its dominance was correct.  But it is the 
manner in which the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion in this case which raises 
questions about its impartiality when dominant firms are concerned.  Firstly, it attached 
alien antitrust labels such as ‘super-dominance’ to the position held by Mittal in the 
relevant market, which appeared to create additional legal responsibility for and 
constraints on Mittal’s conduct.  Secondly, the concept of ‘super-dominance’ has no 
legal basis in our law and offends against the principle of legality. 334   Indeed, the 
Constitutional Court and the Competition Appeal Court have both cautioned the Tribunal 
and the Competition Commission against using alien substantive terms and language in 
their proceedings.335 
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When regard is had to the Tribunal’s decision in Mittal, it once again becomes clear that 
competitive rivalry is pursued as an end in itself, and that consumer welfare is not the 
immediate goal of our competition law.  Indeed, consumer welfare as a guiding principle 
for assessing allegedly abusive conduct is very scant in this decision.  And the Tribunal 
has admitted this, by stating that its reasoning in Mittal placed too much emphasis on 
the structure of the market.336  The Tribunal saw the structure of the market, ie the 
absence of an effective competitor, as the basis for explaining Mittal’s anticompetitive 
conduct and its primary concern.  The Tribunal paid almost no attention to the impact of 
Mittal’s excessive prices on customers. 
 
As the Competition Appeal Court found on appeal, the approach of the Tribunal in Mittal 
was fundamentally flawed.337  In its analysis the Tribunal asked how a competition 
authority should approach the question of excessive pricing and in reply stated that “by 
asking ourselves whether the structure of the market in question enables those who 
participate in it to charge excessive prices”.338  This is definitely not an economics or 
effects-based approach, but – as the Competition Appeal Court found – a ‘structural 
test’.339  The Competition Appeal Court found the Tribunal’s preoccupation with the 
“protection of competitive market structures” rather than the real economic issues at 
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play – in particular price levels in the relevant market as indicator of the extent of 
consumer harm occasioned by Mittal’s alleged excessive pricing, to be ill-founded.340  
 
It is appropriate to emphasise here that there is an important distinction in competition 
law discourse between the ‘protection of competitive market structures’, sometimes 
styled as the ‘protection of the competitive process’, and the ‘protection of competition 
as a means to enhance consumer welfare’.  In my view, where the goal of competition 
law enforcement is the advancement of consumer welfare by protecting competition, the 
key, if not the sole, question in abuse of dominance cases, is whether the conduct 
complained of results in consumer harm?  Under this approach it is unnecessary, and 
indeed inappropriate, to enquire, as a primary basis for competition intervention, into 
whether the conduct complained of leads to the removal of a competitor from the 
market.   
 
But where the goal of competition law enforcement is the protection of ‘competitive 
market structures’ or ‘the competitive process’, consumer welfare is not taken into 
account or, at best, takes second stage.  The main obsession of this enforcement 
approach is the preservation of economic opportunities for individual market participants 
in the hope that this will translate into benefit for consumers.  This approach amounts to 
the protection of competitors in the short term in the hope that consumers will gain in 
the long term.341  In Competition Commission and South African Airways (Pty) Ltd342 the 
Tribunal accepted that this enforcement approach, to which it subscribes, is open to an 
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interpretation which may suggest that authorities are more concerned with protecting 
competitors than competition.343   
 
In that decision,344 the Tribunal alluded to the distinction between the protection of 
competitive market structures and the protection of competition as a means to enhance 
consumer welfare.  Here the Tribunal observed that one person’s understanding of 
‘anticompetitive harm’ may mean harm only to consumer welfare, whilst another’s may 
embrace harm to the structure of markets. 345  The Tribunal confirmed that it viewed 
‘anticompetitive harm’ from the perspective of harm to the structure of markets by 
stating that “harm to the market structure is in itself an infringement of the Act, 
regardless of harm to consumer welfare”.346  In other words, the Tribunal views the 
removal of a rival from the market as sufficient primary reason for competition 
intervention, regardless of the absence of consumer harm.   
 
Indeed, the fact that in this case347 the Competition Commission was unable to establish 
any adverse effect on consumers, did not weaken its case, as the Tribunal felt the case 
could be decided solely on the question of whether the exclusionary conduct 
complained of had caused harm to the structure of the market by foreclosing or limiting 
opportunities for rivals. 348   Consequently, the Tribunal found that the effect of the 
conduct complained of on the structure of the market was to inhibit rivals from 
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expanding within the market and decided the matter on this point, while notably also 
holding that it did not need to make any finding on whether there had been harm to 
consumers.349   
 
A similar approach was followed in a related case, Nationwide Airlines Pty Ltd and 
Comair Limited v South African Airways Pty Ltd,350 where the Tribunal found that SAA 
had again contravened the Competition Act by engaging in conduct that resulted in or 
had the potential to foreclose its rivals.351  Here too, the Tribunal found that there was 
‘no need’ for it to determine whether SAA’s conduct had resulted in any harm to 
consumer welfare.352  Some commentators have criticised this approach, arguing that 
blaming and punishing dominant firms for the decline in competition in the market which 
is not accompanied by evidence of consumer harm is too formalistic and unfair towards 
dominant firms.353   
 
Indeed, when SAA appealed the Tribunal’s Nationwide Airlines decision to the 
Competition Appeal Court, in South Africa Airways Pty Ltd v Comair Limited and 
Nationwide Airlines Pty Ltd,354 counsel for SAA castigated the Tribunal for adopting a 
formalistic approach to antitrust enforcement encapsulated in its finding that ‘it was 
unnecessary for it to determine whether there was any harm to consumers’ in the 
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market.355  It was contended on behalf of SAA that absent consumer harm in the form of 
an increase in prices or a reduction in output there had been no breach by SAA of the 
Competition Act.356   
 
However, the Competition Appeal Court dismissed SAA’s appeal and upheld the 
Tribunal’s decision.  After an extensive quotation of the decision of the European 
General Court in Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission,357 the 
Competition Appeal Court declared that the Competition Act was designed “to protect 
the competitive process”.358  The idea of the use of competition law as a tool to ‘protect 
the competitive process’ is very popular in European competition law and, when relied 
upon, has generally produced results which amounted to the protection of competitors 
at the expense of consumers, as demonstrated by Tomra Systems ASA and Others v 
European Commission.359  
 
2.4.4 Summary 
 
Competition policy and law in South Africa arose in response to the historic trend 
towards the creation of monopoly and industrial concentration.  Prior to the adoption of 
the Competition Act, various legislative attempts had been made to regulate monopoly 
and other restrictive trade practices.  However, all these legislative interventions proved 
inadequate.  At the time of political reforms in 1994, the South African economy was still 
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characterised by high levels of industrial concentration.  The new ANC government 
identified a robust competition policy and law as one of the cornerstones for the radical 
transformation of the South African economy in general, and the elimination of high 
levels of industrial concentration in particular.  To this end, it was deemed necessary 
that the new Competition Act must incorporate policies of equity and distribution in the 
public interest.  As a result, the Competition Act includes in its stated objects the 
creation of an enabling environment for small and medium-sized enterprises to 
participate in the economy, as well as the promotion of a greater spread of corporate 
ownership by historically disadvantaged persons. 
 
South African competition authorities generally view their task as that of applying the 
Competition Act to promote and protect competition.  And they have a genuine belief 
that this is exactly what they do.  However, a review of the decisions of South African 
competition authorities has revealed that the process through which they have sought to 
promote and protect competition has tended to have the general effect of protecting 
competitors rather than competition.  This is so because effects analyses of impugned 
conduct have been generally found to be limited, while consumer welfare has also not 
truly found recognition in the decisions of South African competition authorities.  For 
these reasons, the decisions of South African competition authorities have attracted 
considerable criticism.360 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
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The purpose of this Chapter has been to expose the historical contexts in which 
competition or antitrust laws have evolved in the United States of America, Europe and 
South Africa.  The Chapter shows that in all three jurisdictions the origins of competition 
laws can be traced to legislative measures designed to prevent and control incidents of 
monopoly, industrial concentration, and market domination.  The philosophy 
underpinning all these legislative measures was that, if uncontrolled, monopoly, 
industrial concentration, and market domination would result in negative economic 
consequences, such as reduced competition, higher prices, output limitation, inferior 
products, and lack of innovation.  As a result, policy and law makers favoured an 
industrial or market structure comprising several independent and moderately-sized 
enterprises in which no enterprise would possess the ability to control the market to the 
detriment of competitors and consumers. 
 
This philosophy of hostility towards monopoly, industrial concentration, and market 
domination has also received considerable support in the decisions of competition 
authorities and the courts.  For example, in American antitrust law this philosophy has 
led to some court decisions in which dominant corporations were branded an “economic 
and social menace”,361 while in other cases such corporations were broken up.362  As 
Bork has remarked, “American antitrust laws ‘harassed’ successful businesses”.363   
 
                                               
361  United States v Columbia Steel Co supra n 92 at 535-6. 
362  United States v American Tel and Tel Co 552 F Supp 131 Dist Court Dist of Columbia (1982) and 
Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States supra n 9 at 77-82. 
363  Bork supra n 5 at 4. 
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In European competition law the philosophy of hostility towards market domination, 
encapsulated in ordoliberal philosophy, has been responsible for several decisions in 
which the courts have found that the “mere presence of a dominant undertaking in a 
market automatically meant that the degree of competition in that market had been 
weakened”.364  In South African competition law dominant undertakings “are viewed as 
beasts” - against whom competition authorities must forever be vigilant to prevent them 
from impairing the structure of the market by eliminating rivals.365   
 
However, proposals and some efforts have been made in recent law across the three 
jurisdictions to re-align the goal and focus of competition law enforcement.  In particular, 
there has been a renewed commitment to the adoption of an economic or effects-based 
approach to competition enforcement which places significant emphasis on the 
protection of consumers rather than the protection of competitors.  This means the 
philosophy of hostility towards monopolies and dominant firms can no longer be 
regarded as the ‘official’ or ‘expressed’ goal of modern competition law.   
 
America leads the way in this re-alignment of the goals of competition law, by shifting 
emphasis from hostility towards market domination to consumer welfare.  Some 
American decisions, like Trinko,366 have embraced monopoly and even declared it an 
essential part of the free market system whose right of existence will not be challenged 
                                               
364  Hoffmann-La Roche supra n 211 at par 91; Michelin v Commission supra n 213 at par 70; General 
Electric supra n 234 at par 549; British Airways supra n 235 at par 66; and Tomra Systems supra n 236 at 
pars 38 and 206. 
365  Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another supra n 
328 at pars 124 and 127. 
366  Supra n 117. 
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unless accompanied by consumer harm attributable to its conduct.367  However, Trinko 
cannot be relied upon for a general conclusion that anti-monopoly sentiments have 
entirely or even significantly disappeared from American antitrust law.  The reality is that 
the actions of antitrust enforcement agencies, some recent court decisions, and the 
remarks of some influential commentators have shown that a deep mistrust, and 
perhaps resentment, for dominant undertakings subsists in modern American antitrust 
law.   
 
And despite suggestions that the current practice of competition enforcement in 
European and South African law also follows an economic or effects-based approach in 
which consumer welfare is the guiding principle, the opposite has been found to be 
generally true.  No noticeable change in enforcement philosophy or direction can be 
said to exist in practice in these two jurisdictions.  The preservation of economic 
opportunities for individual market participants, encapsulated in the concepts of the 
‘protection of the competitive process’ and ‘protection of competitive market structures’, 
remains the dominant enforcement philosophy in European and South African law.  
How else does one explain the principle that is so entrenched even in recent European 
competition law decisions, that the ‘presence of a dominant firm in a market is bad for 
competition’?368  And further, how does one also explain the description in South African 
competition law of dominant undertakings as ‘beasts’, over whom competition 
                                               
367  Id at 407. 
368  General Electric supra n 234 at par 549; British Airways supra n 235 at par 66; and Tomra Systems 
supra n 236 at pars 38 and 206.  
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authorities must forever be watchful to prevent them from impairing the structure of the 
market by eliminating rivals?369 
 
In this Chapter, I have shown that the philosophical origins of competition or antitrust 
law can be traced back to the historical policy of hostility towards dominant undertakings 
and the protection of small businesses.  I have also shown that attempts in modern 
competition law to refine the practice of competition enforcement, particularly in abuse 
of dominance cases, have not completely succeeded in altering the law’s original, and 
perhaps questionable, motives. 370   It is therefore a strong possibility, as the next 
chapters will show, that dominant undertakings may continue to endure biased and 
discriminatory enforcement of competition rules in the modern era.   
 
                                               
369  Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another supra n 
328 at pars 124 and 127. 
370  Bradley supra n 8.  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 3 
 
A REVIEW OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE PROVISIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMPETITION ACT WITH SPECIFIC FOCUS ON SECTION 8(C) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, I investigate whether the formulation and enforcement of abuse of 
dominance provisions in the South African Competition Act reinforces perceptions of 
bias or prejudice towards dominant firms.  Provisions dealing with exclusionary acts by 
dominant firms under section 8 of the Competition Act are perhaps the most notable 
area in which the likelihood of prejudice towards dominant firms emerges most clearly.1   
 
Of special interest in this Chapter are the exclusionary acts by dominant firms covered 
by section 8(c)2 of the Act.  Section 8(c) has attracted significant commentary from a 
number of observers.  Some authors consider that section 8(c) complaints of 
exclusionary conduct by dominant firms are treated more leniently than other 
                                               
1  As former chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, David Lewis, remarked, the prospect of errors in the 
decisions of competition authorities is most powerfully asserted and most strenuously cautioned against 
in the context of enforcement action against dominant firm conduct.  The proffered reason for this, he 
continued, is that it is in the unilateral actions of dominant firms that the line between conduct that has 
pro‐competitive impact or anti‐competitive impact is said to be most blurred, David Lewis ‘Chilling 
Competition’ at 1 accessed at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Speeches/lewis13.pdf (date of 
last use: 6 July 2016). 
2  Section 8(c) of the Competition Act provides as follows: 
 
“8.  Abuse of dominance prohibited 
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
… 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain; or…”. 
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exclusionary abuses under section 8 of the Act.3  But I argue that section 8(c) of the 
Competition Act potentially disadvantages dominant firms in a number of ways.  One of 
these is the manner in which section 8(c) has been formulated, which increases the 
possibility that almost all dominant firm conduct, including perfectly legitimate conduct, 
will be caught by the provision.  This phenomenon is described in antirust literature as 
‘over-inclusiveness’.4   
 
A notable problem related to over-inclusiveness is over-enforcement, where competition 
authorities overzealously prosecute and prohibit types of market conduct in the belief 
that the conduct is anticompetitive.  The problem of overzealous enforcement is that it 
may result in the outlawing of conduct that is competitive and legal.  The erroneous 
prohibition of competitive market conduct in the mistaken belief that it is anticompetitive 
is described in antirust discourse as a ‘false positive’ error.5   
 
The problems of over-inclusiveness and potential false positives are further exacerbated 
by the fact that section 8(c) leaves considerable discretion in the hands of competition 
authorities to determine the kind of conduct that fits into the broad and catch-all grip of 
the provision.6  There is very little guidance in the Act as to how competition authorities 
must exercise their discretion in determining what conduct falls within the ambit of 
section 8(c).   
 
                                               
3  Martin Brassey et al Competition Law (Juta 2002) at 198. 
4  Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law 7 ed (Oxford University Press 2012) at 193-4 and 
Lewis supra n 1 at 2. 
5  Id. 
6  Nationwide Airlines (Proprietary) Limited and Others v South African Airways (Proprietary) Limited and 
Others Case No 92/IR/Oct00 at 10. 
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As far as the enforcement of section 8(c) is concerned, affected dominant firms are 
therefore at the mercy of competition authorities.  This is because the exact nature and 
description of conduct that falls within the ambit of the provision is generally unknown.  
It is only when the competition authorities, after the conduct has occurred, make a 
determination that a particular conduct falls foul of the provision that the legal 
implications of the conduct are fully understood.  The provision is so vague that it 
deprives affected dominant firms of the opportunity to know beforehand that they are 
engaging in potentially risky behaviour.  With this in mind, affected dominant firms may 
feel entitled to expect that competition authorities will, when enforcing section 8(c), be 
more cautious of the risk of outlawing lawful conduct.   
 
However, given the longstanding and prevailing philosophy of hostility towards dominant 
undertakings in South African competition law, the adjudication of competition disputes 
rarely displays a satisfactory level of caution and impartiality when exclusionary conduct 
is concerned.  Indeed, in our society some of those who pursue a career in competition 
enforcement appear to be motivated by a deep seated desire to ‘go to work every day 
driven by the passion to get the bad guys’ in the market, who invariably are represented 
by dominant firms.7   And those who lack such passion or subscribe to a different 
enforcement philosophy are advised to either ‘stay at home’ or ‘go work for the other 
side’.8  So, in the world of abuse of dominance law enforcement there are sides to be 
taken.  You are either for or against dominant firms.  In this sense, it is not too 
farfetched to suggest that in South Africa competition law enforcement does not 
                                               
7  David Lewis Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) at 130-1. 
8  Id. 
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proceed from an entirely neutral premise.  This increases the prospect that legitimate 
and competitive conduct by dominant firms may be chilled. 
  
In South Africa the problem of chilling competition as a result of inappropriate 
intervention in the market by competition authorities has not received sufficient 
attention.  The few studies that have sought to address this issue have unanimously 
concluded that the prospect of chilling competition in South African competition law is 
remote, given the considerable latitude which dominant firms are given in abuse of 
dominance proceedings, particularly under section 8(c). 9   Indeed, some have even 
contended that certain abuse of dominance provisions, in particular section 8(c), are so 
weak in preventing exclusionary conduct by dominant firms that they need further 
strengthening through appropriate amendment. 10   Although I agree that in many 
respects our abuse of dominance provisions are not a perfect model of good legislative 
drafting, I contend that in its present form section 8(c) already increases the prospect of 
chilling competition.   
 
In my assessment of abuse of dominance under section 8 in general, and exclusionary 
acts under section 8(c) in particular, I include a comparative study of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act in American antitrust law and Article 102 of the Treaty of Europe in 
European competition law.  These two jurisdictions offer valuable lessons on cases of 
                                               
9  Brassey supra n 3 at 197-9; Lewis supra n 7 at 160; Neil Mackenzie ‘Replacing Section 8(d) of the 
South African Competition Act with an “Effects-Based” Exclusionary Abuse of Dominance Provision’ 
Centre for Competition Economics, University of Johannesburg, Working Paper 7/2012 at 9; Anne 
Njoroge ‘Regulation of dominant firms in South Africa’ (2011) MBA dissertation, University of Pretoria at 3; 
and Simon Roberts ‘Administrability and Business Certainty in Abuse of Dominance Enforcement: An 
Economist's Review of the South African Record’ (2012) 35 World Competition 273-300 at 281-2, 286 
and 288. 
10  Lewis supra n 7 at 160.  See also Mackenzie supra n 9 at 13.  
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exclusionary abuse of dominance that may be relevant and helpful to the enforcement 
of exclusionary abuse of dominance provisions under the South African Competition 
Act.  In American antitrust law, problems with the enforcement of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act on allegedly exclusionary conduct by dominant firms have led to research 
by legal and economic experts that revealed that some dominant firm conduct 
presumed exclusionary and anticompetitive, would in fact lead to efficiencies and 
benefit consumers. 11   Similarly, in European competition law there has been an 
acknowledgement that the enforcement of Article 102 may result in instances where 
competition authorities erroneously decide that dominant firm conduct is exclusionary 
and illegal in circumstances where it should not be.12 
 
To outline the structure of my discussion in this Chapter, part 3.2 starts with a general 
review of the structure and content of abuse of dominance provisions in the South 
African Competition Act.  Although the main aim of this Chapter is to conduct a focused 
review of exclusionary acts under section 8(c) rather than a general discussion of abuse 
of dominance provisions, an initial general overview of the structure and content of 
some abuse of dominance provisions in the Act is essential in order to place 
exclusionary acts proscribed by section 8(c) in their proper context, before I deal with 
them more specifically.  In part 3.3 I deal with enforcement problems with exclusionary 
abuse of dominance in foreign law.  Part 3.4 provides the Chapter’s conclusion.   
 
                                               
11  US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act at 1 accessed at http://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-
under-section-2-sherman-act (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
12  Office of Fair Trading The Cost of Inappropriate Interventions/Non Interventions Under Article 82 
(September 2006) Economic Discussion Paper, OFT 864 at par S.3 accessed at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/GiancarloSpagnolo_report.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
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3.2 Abuse of Dominance Provisions in the South African Competition 
Act 
 
As stated in the introduction, an initial general review of the structure and content of the 
abuse of dominance provisions in the Act is essential in order to place exclusionary acts 
proscribed by section 8(c) in their proper context before dealing with them in detail.  In 
particular, the general review of section 8 and its abuse of dominance provisions 
highlights some inherent structural and substantive problems raised by the section 
generally, and further provides an holistic perspective from which section 8(c) and 
challenges facing it can be viewed.   
 
Because section 8(c) is intended to serve as a backup or alternative to other abuse of 
dominance provisions, particularly section 8(d), its review and analysis will constantly 
include references to other abuse of dominance provisions of the Act.  This requires that 
some background regarding other abuse of dominance provisions be provided at the 
outset.  I may also add that the general review of the abuse of dominance provisions in 
the Act will be conducted primarily (though not exclusively) in the order of their 
appearance in the Act rather than on the basis of their substantive or formal 
classification.  
 
3.2.1  A General Review of the Abuse of Dominance Provisions in the 
Competition Act  
 
The majority of abuse of dominance provisions in the South African Competition Act 
relate to exclusionary abuses rather than exploitative abuses.  This means our abuse of 
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dominance provisions are more concerned with dominant firm practices that harm 
competitors, than practices that harm consumers.  The only exploitative practice by a 
dominant firm condemned by the Competition Act is ‘excessive pricing’.13   
 
A major problem afflicting the Competition Act and its abuse of dominance provisions is 
their structure and overlap.  For example, price discrimination is somehow dealt with in 
a section that by its location appears removed from the place where the Act formally 
describes and prohibits other related abusive practices such as excessive pricing.14  As 
Roberts observes, “price discrimination falls under a separate section from the abuse of 
dominance provisions”.15  There is absolutely no reason in practice not to classify price 
discrimination as a form of abuse of dominance.  Although price discrimination may in 
some instances constitute an exclusionary abuse of dominance, it generally has close 
affinity with an exploitative practice such as excessive pricing and should generally be 
treated as such in practice.   
 
When price discrimination occurs, the central issue in the complaint is generally the 
allegation that the complainant is paying ‘more’ than others in equivalent transactions 
for goods or services of like grade or quality.  In this sense, price discrimination appears 
to be just another species of excessive pricing, the only distinguishing factor being that 
in the case of price discrimination there is also the issue of ‘others paying less’.  The 
relationship between excessive pricing and price discrimination was at play in 
                                               
13  Section 8(1) of the Act.  Lewis supra n 7 at 143. 
14  Section 9(1) of the Act. 
15  Roberts supra n 9 at 296.   
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Competition Commission and Senwes Limited.16  Here a vertically integrated dominant 
firm, which provided grain storage services to grain farmers and traders (the upstream 
market) while also engaging in the business of grain trading (the downstream market), 
was alleged to have abused its dominance over the supply of storage to distort 
competition, by raising storage prices (excessively pricing storage) to a level which its 
downstream rivals could not afford, while also charging a significantly lower price to its 
own downstream grain-trading business and farmers (price discrimination).  Another 
example of the link between excessive pricing and price discrimination can be seen in 
Competition Commission v Telkom SA Ltd 17  where Telkom was alleged to have 
engaged in excessive pricing and price discrimination, by charging customers who did 
business with its rivals an excessive price for access to essential facilities, while 
charging a discounted price to customers who did not do business with its rivals.18  
 
The link between price discrimination and excessive pricing can be demonstrated if one 
takes the scenario of ‘others paying less’ in price discrimination and applies it to 
excessive pricing.  The lower price being paid by others may be a useful indicator of the 
price which bears a close resemblance to the economic value of the goods or services 
in question in an excessive pricing complaint. 19   Indeed in arguments before the 
Tribunal and the Courts, Senwes’s downstream competitors argued that they would be 
better able to trade normally if they were charged the same price that Senwes charged 
                                               
16  Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Limited Case No 110/CR/Dec06.  
17  Case No 11/CR/Feb04. 
18  Id at par 2. 
19  Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd 
and Macsteel International BV Case No 13/CR/FEB04 at pars 136-137 and 140-147. 
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its own integrated downstream business and farmers.20  Distilled to its essence, the 
argument by Senwes’s downstream competitors was that the price Senwes charged its 
own integrated downstream business and farmers was the one that, in excessive pricing 
discourse, bore a close resemblance to the economic value of the storage services 
Senwes provided.   
 
So, if there is evidence that the higher of at least the two prices in a price discrimination 
complaint is unreasonable, it would be appropriate to approach such a case as one of 
exploitation and excessive pricing.  This approach may lead to enhanced customer and 
consumer protection, because the Act treats excessive pricing more seriously and 
attaches greater consequences for the offending firm than price discrimination. 21  
Excessive pricing is automatically considered anticompetitive, meaning that no amount 
of haggling or justification can save the practice from condemnation.  A first excessive 
pricing offence may be accompanied by an administrative penalty.  By contrast, price 
discrimination is not automatically considered anticompetitive, as the Competition 
Commission or the complainant is still required to prove that the practice has the effect 
of substantially preventing or lessening competition.  But even if the price discrimination 
may be found substantially to prevent or lessen competition, it may still be condoned if 
the dominant firm advances acceptable reasons or justification for the practice.22  And 
there is no administrative penalty for a first price discrimination offence.   
 
                                               
20  See Senwes Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa (118/2010) [2011] ZASCA 99 (1 June 
2011) at par 27. 
21  See sections 8(a), 9(1)(a) and 59(1)(b).   
22  Section 9(2) of the Act. 
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The separation of price discrimination and excessive pricing in terms of their 
classification and positioning in the Act not only creates problems from a structural point 
of view, but also creates an unnecessary substantive and enforcement gap between 
two almost identical practices.23  And some firms may exploit that gap.  For example, a 
firm that may wish to engage in excessive pricing, but feels uncomfortable with the legal 
consequences of this practice, may disguise it as price discrimination, knowing that the 
latter practice is not prohibited outright and does not carry an administrative penalty for 
a first time offender.   
 
To achieve this, the firm would carefully select both its target customers for an 
excessive price and target customers for a lower price, to make the practice appear 
more like price discrimination.  When one looks at the price discrimination aspects of 
the Senwes24 and Telkom25 cases, for example, it is clear that the excessive prices 
charged to the complaining customers were not accidental: they were planned and 
deliberate acts of exploitation and bullying.  But the fact that in both cases there were 
other customers who paid a lower price than the complainants provided the necessary 
distraction and escape from excessive pricing.  In this way, the two firms were able to 
avoid the obvious consequence that befalls firms that engage in excessive pricing.   
 
The same problem observed above with regard to price discrimination and excessive 
pricing appear to present a common theme when dealing with exclusionary practices by 
dominant firms.  For example, section 8(b) of the Act provides, on the one hand, that a 
                                               
23  Lewis supra n 7 at 144. 
24  Supra n 16.  
25  Supra n 17. 
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dominant firm is prohibited from refusing to give a competitor access to an essential 
facility, “when it is economically feasible to do so” – whatever that may mean!  In terms 
of section 8(b) refusal to give access to an essential facility when it is economically 
feasible to do so is prohibited outright and no pro-competitive justification is required or 
entertained.   
 
On the other hand, section 8(d) of the Act also lists and prohibits certain exclusionary 
practices, among them a refusal to deal.26  In strange contrast, a refusal to deal is not 
prohibited outright.  A refusal to deal can escape condemnation if the respondent firm 
can show that technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains attendant on the 
refusal outweigh its anticompetitive effect.  But in practice one might wonder: what is the 
real difference between a refusal to grant competitors access to an essential facility and 
a refusal to deal?  Commentators have lamented the difference in treatment between 
what they view as essentially exclusionary practices having the same effect in the 
market.27 
 
Another important provision in the area of exclusionary abuse, and the central focus of 
this Chapter and which I analyse in greater detail below, is section 8(c).  Structurally, 
section 8(c) would have looked more coherent had it been the last provision under 
section 8.  This means that in the order of appearance, the contents of section 8(c) 
should have been in the place of the current section 8(d), and vice versa.  In his order of 
discussion and analysis of the Act’s abuse of dominance provisions, Unterhalter starts 
                                               
26  Section 8(d)(iii) of the Act. 
27  Brassey supra n 3 at 197-9 and Lewis supra n 7 at 160.  
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off with section 8(d) and then rounds off with section 8(c), signaling where he too in all 
likelihood feels the provision should have been located in the scheme of section 8.28  In 
my view, when outlining legal rules or prohibitions, it appears more logical to start by 
outlining the more specific ones and end with the general ones.  The more general ones 
will serve an important backup role to the specific ones, by closing loopholes that may 
arise in cases where a practice or conduct does not fit perfectly into predefined or 
specified prohibited conduct.   
 
There are important indications that section 8(c) was intended to serve that important 
backup role to section 8(d).  Section 8(c) clearly refers to and prohibits exclusionary 
acts “other than those listed in section 8(d)’’.  It is a bit odd that the words “exclusionary 
acts other than those listed in section 8(d)’’ appear in section 8(c) in its present form at 
a point where, logically speaking, the contents of section 8(d) are not yet revealed and 
therefore unknown to the reader.  Drafters of the Competition Act envisaged that the 
first provision on which to rely when certain exclusionary acts are alleged to have 
occurred is section 8(d).  Only when the alleged prohibited practice does not fit into the 
list provided in section 8(d), does section 8(c) kick in.29  Indeed, this was the view of the 
Constitutional Court in Competition Commission v Senwes Limited. 30   Here the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that one of the preconditions for the application of 
section 8(c) is that the act which the dominant firm engaged in must fall outside the 
scope of section 8(d).31  
                                               
28  Brassey supra n 3 at 197. 
29  Mackenzie supra n 9 at 10. 
30  2012 (7) BCLR 667 (CC).  
31  Id at pars 26-28. 
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As with several other provisions in the Act, the location and outlook of section 8(c) and 
(d) suggest different enforcement philosophies for the two provisions.  For example, 
with regard to the enforcement of section 8(c), the Competition Commission or the 
private complainant bears the onus of establishing that the conduct complained of is 
exclusionary and has anticompetitive effects.  The complainant must also show that 
there are no pro-competitive benefits attendant upon the conduct.  The Tribunal may not 
impose an administrative penalty for a first time contravention of section 8(c).32  Section 
8(c) contraventions are only punishable with an administrative penalty if the Tribunal is 
satisfied that the contravention is substantially a repetition by the same firm of conduct 
previously found to have been a prohibited practice. 33   
 
With regard to the enforcement of section 8(d), the plain language of the legislature 
clearly suggests that harm to the competitive process is, as a matter of law, generally 
presumed once the complainant proves that the conduct complained of has occurred.34  
In Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Limited35 the Tribunal found 
that it would seem from the manner in which section 8 is drafted, that conduct in section 
8(d) is presumed to be exclusionary, whereas conduct not on the list – which may fall 
under section 8(c) – would still have to be proved to be exclusionary.36  And in Sappi 
Fine Papers (Pty) Limited v The Competition Commission37 the Tribunal also found that 
                                               
32  Section 59(1)(a) and (b). 
33  Section 59(1)(b).  
34  Lewis supra n 7 at 143. 
35  Case No 18/CR/Mar01. 
36  Id at pars 101-105.  See also Competition Commission v Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk Case No 
37/CR/Jun01 at par 95. 
37  Case No 62/CR/Nov01. 
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exclusionary acts listed in section 8(d), in contrast with the general category of 
‘exclusionary acts’ referred to in section 8(c), are presumptively anticompetitive with the 
result that a complainant is not required to allege or prove facts to this effect.38  Section 
8(d), the Tribunal went further, describes acts whose anticompetitive consequences 
have been established by a century of antitrust jurisprudence.39   
 
However, in Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Limited 40  the 
Tribunal also observed that adhering strictly to the language used by the legislature in 
section 8(d), by presuming anticompetitive effects once the occurrence of an 
exclusionary act has been proved, may lead to the outlawing of conduct that has no 
anticompetitive effect because the Act’s definition of an exclusionary act is very broad.41  
The Tribunal then concluded that it is also essential under section 8(d) that the 
complainant not only establish that there has been an exclusionary act, but also that the 
act has an anticompetitive effect.42  Once the complainant establishes anticompetitive 
effects, the burden to show that there are technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gains attendant upon the conduct shifts onto the shoulders of the 
respondent firm.  The Tribunal may impose an administrative penalty for a first time 
contravention of section 8(d).43 
                                               
38  Id at par 40. 
39  Id at par 52. 
40  Supra n 35. 
41  Id at pars 107-108.  Section 1(1)X of the Act provides that an ‘exclusionary act’ “means an act that 
impedes or prevents a firm entering into, or expanding within, a market”. 
42  Supra n 35 at par 111.  Subsequent Tribunal decisions have also followed this approach: Competition 
Commission v Telkom SA Ltd supra n 17 at par 99; Mandla-Matla Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Independent 
Newspapers (Pty) Ltd Case No 48/CR/Jun04 at pars 77-78; and Competition Commission and JT 
International South Africa (Pty) Ltd v British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd Case No 
05/CR/Feb05 at par 296.  See also Mackenzie supra n 9 at 11. 
43  Section 59(1)(a). 
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There are two practical differences in the enforcement of section 8(c) and (d).  Firstly, in 
the case of section 8(c) the complainant must prove both anticompetitive effects and 
lack of efficiency justification for the alleged exclusionary conduct, whereas in the case 
of section 8(d), once the complainant proves anticompetitive effects the respondent firm 
must show that there is efficiency justification for the conduct.  Secondly, under section 
8(c) the Tribunal may not impose an administrative penalty for a first time contravention, 
whereas it may do so for a first time contravention of section 8(d).  Concerns have been 
raised that exclusionary practices under section 8(c) are unjustifiably dealt with more 
leniently than those under section 8(d).44  I shall address these concerns when I deal 
more specifically with section 8(c).   
 
The general review of section 8 and its abuse of dominance provisions above, has 
highlighted some structural and substantive inconsistencies in the formulation and 
enforcement of a number of provisions.  It will be with this background in mind that I 
now review section 8(c).   
 
3.2.2 A Review of Exclusionary Acts under Section 8(c) of the Competition 
Act: The Meaning and Scope of Exclusion. 
 
The main aspects of section 8(c) have already been highlighted in the general overview 
of abuse of dominance provisions in part 3.2.1 above and will not be repeated.  It is 
appropriate merely to state here that section 8(c) prohibits a dominant firm from 
engaging in an exclusionary act, other than an exclusionary act listed in paragraph (d), if 
                                               
44  Brassey supra n 3. 
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the anticompetitive effect of that conduct outweighs its technological, efficiency or other 
pro-competitive gains.  The provision imposes on the Competition Commission or 
complainant the duty to establish the anticompetitiveness of the alleged exclusionary 
act and to show that the anticompetitive effect of that act outweighs any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that may accompany the conduct.45  Below I 
consider reasons justifying the placing of a heavier burden of proof on the complainant 
under section 8(c), in a slightly different manner than under section 8(d).   
 
It cannot be disputed that prior to engaging in the exclusionary acts listed under section 
8(d) the dominant firm is already forewarned and aware of the implications of its 
conduct.  This is because the legislature, relying on antitrust experience, has decided 
that the exclusionary acts listed under section 8(d) are more likely to produce 
anticompetitive results.  As the Tribunal found in Competition Commission v South 
African Airways (Pty) Limited46 “the reason for the differences in treatment between 
exclusionary acts in section 8(c) and (d) is that the exclusionary acts in 8(d) are listed, 
evidencing the legislature’s view that these are the more egregious of the exclusionary 
acts and that firms that are dominant are on notice that they must behave with due 
caution in relation to the listed conduct”.47   
 
Armed with massive financial resources, dominant firms generally have the means to 
engage top experts in the field of antitrust economics and law to advise them on the 
                                               
45  As the Competition Tribunal found in York Timbers, section 8(c) places a considerably heavier burden 
on the complainant than does section 8(d), see York Timbers Limited v South African Forestry Company 
Limited Case No 15/IR/Feb01 at par 100. 
46  Supra n 35. 
47  Id at par 102. 
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antitrust implications of their proposed action.  Should the dominant firm choose to 
continue with its planned conduct, which is also listed in section 8(d), it is reasonable, 
given the stand the legislature has taken regarding those listed exclusionary acts, for 
competition authorities to require the dominant firm to explain the benefit, if any, of such 
conduct to the competitive process.   
 
However, unlike in the case of section 8(d), the dominant firm is not warned about the 
possible antitrust implications of its planned conduct under section 8(c).  As the Tribunal 
observed in Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Limited48 in the 
case of section 8(c) the dominant firm has no advance notice that the conduct is 
deemed exclusionary in nature, which explains the legislature’s decision to place the 
onus in section 8(c) on the complainant.49  When regard is had to conduct that falls to 
be considered under section 8(c), even the advice of competent antitrust counsel may 
not be reliable for dominant firms, given that the provision is supremely vague in its 
description of dominant firm conduct it proscribes.  The only guidance a dominant firm 
has on the scope of section 8(c) is that the provision prohibits ‘exclusionary acts’ other 
than those listed in paragraph (d).  But what in the world are “exclusionary acts other 
than those listed in paragraph (d)”? 
 
The definition of an ‘exclusionary act’ does not help matters.  An exclusionary act is 
defined in section 1 of the Act as “an act which impedes or prevents a firm from entering 
into or expanding within the market”.  But even competitive conduct can have this effect.  
                                               
48  Supra n 35. 
49  Id at par 102. 
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As commentators have remarked, “even the most lawful competition is exclusionary: in 
each sale there is one winner and at least one loser and the loser is to some extent 
excluded”.50  In Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Limited the 
Tribunal admitted that the definition of an exclusionary act is very broad and can lead to 
the outlawing of conduct that has no anticompetitive effect.51  The term ‘exclusionary 
act’, the Tribunal found further, “is therefore not a useful filter for determining whether 
conduct is competitive or anticompetitive, as both sets of conduct can sensibly be 
included in the definition”.52 
  
To avoid engaging in potentially exclusionary conduct under section 8(c), the most 
reliable advice a dominant firm could find would be by seeking an advisory opinion or 
guidance from the Competition Commission on the competition implications of the 
conduct.53  However, this platform may not be a comfortable one for most businesses.  
This is because it risks, despite guarantees of confidentiality, exposing sensitive 
business plans and secrets in an environment where there is no legal obligation to 
divulge them.  In this context, dominant firms may find themselves with no choice but to 
proceed to engage in conduct that may later be deemed exclusionary by competition 
authorities.   
 
                                               
50  Brassey supra n 3.  Philip Sutherland and Katharine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (Online 
Version, LexisNexis, Last Updated: November 2015) at par 7.11.3.1. 
51  Supra n 35 at par 108. 
52  Id at par 109. 
53 Competition Commission ‘Advisory Opinions and Clarifications’ accessed at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/advisory-opinions-and-clarifications/ (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
Provisions that can be relied upon for this procedure are section 79(1) of the Competition Act read 
together with sections 9(1)(d) and 10(4) of the Rules of the Competition Commission.   
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In this regard, the allocation of the burden of proof under section 8(c) to the competition 
commission or complainant rather than the dominant firm serves a legitimate purpose of 
ensuring that competition proceedings are fair and just.  It also takes into account the 
fact that section 8(c) is in general an imperfect provision.  Exclusionary acts covered by 
section 8(c) can take many forms and this increases the likelihood that prohibition under 
the provision may potentially cover conduct not initially envisaged by drafters of the 
Act.54   
 
A ‘widely couched’ and ‘open-ended provision’,55 section 8(c) may, if applied without 
caution or restriction, potentially allow competition authorities considerable powers 
arbitrarily to introduce new concepts of infringement.56  In this regard, the introduction of 
‘margin squeeze’ into our section 8(c) discourse, which the Constitutional Court found 
was unwarranted,57 is a classic example.  Margin squeeze abuse was not originally 
identified in the Act as a form of prohibited conduct through the kind of characterisation 
seen in section 8(d) because this particular form of conduct was not initially understood 
as such.58 
 
It is also appropriate to make some remarks here about section 59(1) of the Competition 
Act, which does not allow the Tribunal to impose an administrative penalty on a first 
                                               
54  Senwes Ltd v The Competition Commission of South Africa Case No 87/CAC/FEB09 at par 53. 
55  Id at pars 51 and 54. 
56   Discretionary powers have sometimes been considered arbitrary powers, see Cora Hoexter 
Administrative Law in South Africa (Juta 2012) at 46.  Evidence of arbitrary introduction of new concepts 
of infringement can be seen in the introduction of the ‘margin squeeze’ concept into our exclusionary 
abuse of dominance discourse in the Senwes case, supra n 16.  
57  Supra n 30 at pars 29 and 44. 
58  Simon Roberts, Javier Tapia & Mario Ybar ‘The Same and the Other: A comparative study of abuses 
of dominance in Chile and South Africa’ Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, 
University of Johannesburg, Working Paper 2/2013 at 21. 
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time offender in the case of section 8(c).59  Some writers contend that sections 8(c) and 
59(1) should be amended to allow the Tribunal to impose an administrative penalty 
even in the case of first time contravention of section 8(c), because as it stands the 
provision has weak deterrent value.60   
 
However, a counter argument can also be made to the effect that in enacting section 
8(c) the legislature might have realised that it was writing into the Act a complicated 
provision which held the potential to wreak significant havoc on dominant firms, unless 
that possibility was ameliorated by giving dominant firms some grace in the case of a 
first time offender.61  It is also pertinent to state that while an administrative penalty may 
in theory hold greater deterrent promise, in practice there is no evidence that the 
majority of companies are deterred from engaging in prohibited conduct by the prospect 
of facing an administrative penalty.  It is a known fact that some of the most egregious 
competition violations have continued to occur in our economy, despite much publicised 
record fines being imposed on some offenders.   
 
Some firms may indeed be unfazed by the prospect of facing an administrative penalty, 
if they have to make a choice between engaging in a profitable prohibited practice while 
facing an administrative penalty, or foregoing a profitable prohibited practice and 
avoiding the penalty.  Indeed, many elect to engage in a prohibited practice and accept 
the administrative penalty as a normal cost of trading, subsequently passing it on to the 
                                               
59  Section 59(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. 
60  Mackenzie supra n 9 at 160.  
61  In South African Airways the Tribunal found that the reason for these differences in treatment between 
section 8(c) and (d) is that the exclusionary acts in 8(d) appears to reveal the legislature’s view that the 
latter are the more egregious of the exclusionary acts, supra n 35 at par 102. 
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consumer.  This has forced policy makers and the legislature to reconsider the 
effectiveness of administrative penalties in preventing anticompetitive practices.  The 
introduction of personal criminal liability and imprisonment in South African competition 
law for business executives who cause, or knowingly acquiesce in, their firms’ 
participation in a prohibited practice,62 is a classic example of declining confidence in 
administrative penalties. 
 
There may indeed be other factors relevant to the enforcement of section 8(c) in its 
current form, which could have a greater deterrent and punitive effect than an 
administrative penalty.  For example, the costs of foregoing a revenue generating 
opportunity, as a result of an inappropriate order or directive by a competition authority, 
may by far outstrip an administrative penalty.  And this is particularly an issue of great 
relevance in section 8(c) situations, where there is no reliable science in establishing 
the competitiveness or anticompetitiveness of the impugned conduct.  As stated earlier, 
this is because the phrase ‘exclusionary act’, which is intended to serve as a guiding 
principle under section 8(c), “is not a useful guide for determining whether conduct is 
competitive or anticompetitive”.63  In addition, negative publicity associated with so-
called ‘penalty-free’ section 8(c) litigation, for first time offenders, may not only cause 
corporate and brand damage to the firm concerned, but may also negatively affect the 
share price for listed companies.  And the cost of protracted litigation, a common 
occurrence in abuse of dominance litigation, may also add to the aggregate losses a 
company facing a section 8(c) complaint may have to endure.   
                                               
62  See section 73A of the Competition Act.  
63  Supra n 35 at par 109. 
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The margin squeeze case between the Competition Commission and Senwes Limited,64 
a case I discuss in greater detail below, illustrates these concerns.  It suffices to state 
that eight years of litigation ranging from the Competition Tribunal, Competition Appeal 
Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and eventually the Constitutional Court must have 
resulted in enormous litigation costs.  But the litigation also revealed the firm’s concern 
over the possibility of revenue loss if the relevant commercial practice was stopped or 
successfully interdicted.  If a complaint under section 8(c) was as untroubling for the 
dominant firm as some observers have suggested, 65  Senwes would have simply 
accepted the complaint and apologised.  Apart from the rare chance of a civil suit by 
firms or persons who suffered harm as a result of the prohibited practice, that would 
have been the end of the matter, as no administrative penalty is levied against a first 
time offender.  However, Senwes’s view of the matter was different.  The option of 
accepting the complaint and settling the matter, even without payment of a fine, was not 
an attractive one, weighed against losing what they believed was a lawful revenue 
generating commercial practice.   
 
3.2.3 Potential Problems in the Enforcement of Section 8(c) of the 
Competition Act 
 
The process of prosecuting exclusionary abuse of dominance cases encompasses a 
significant amount of discretion wielded by competition authorities, as the relevant rules 
                                               
64  Supra n 16. 
65  Brassey supra n 3 and Lewis supra n 7 at 160.  See also generally Mackenzie supra n 9.  
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are unclear.66  Discretionary powers of administrators or administrative agencies, it has 
been observed, “arise when there is no clear legal answer to a problem and the 
administrator is free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction”.67  
That is exactly what happens under section 8(c).  For some observers, a competition 
enforcement regime where abuse of dominance is declared unlawful in broad and open-
ended terms, leaving the task of defining the boundaries of the relevant law to the 
discretion of enforcement agencies, is welcome because it guarantees easy and 
effective enforcement.68  Under such a regime allegations or complaints of an abuse of 
dominance are customarily coached in broad and unspecific terms, to ensure that the 
impugned dominant firm conduct falls within the catch-all grip of the relevant provision.69 
 
But this is unacceptable, and possibly illegal, as it grants antitrust administrators 
uncircumscribed and arbitrary powers, the exercise of which may offend against the 
legality principle.  Accordingly, section 8(c) may, strictly speaking, not be entirely 
consistent with the constitutional principle of legality in that it does not unambiguously 
establish a universally intelligible contravention.  It merely gives competition authorities 
the discretion and power to create a contravention after the fact.  As an observer 
remarked, ‘this vagueness of competition law provisions may raise serious constitutional 
law questions because they deny affected companies the ability to know beforehand 
                                               
66  Mackenzie supra n 9 at 5 and David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla ‘Designing Antitrust Rules for 
Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago Law Review 
73-98 at 80.  
67  Hoexter supra n 56. 
68  Mackenzie supra n 9 at 3. 
69  Nationwide Airlines v South African Airways supra n 6. 
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when the law is being violated.’ 70   There is an increasing level of convergence 
internationally that competition law should use rules that are able to pertinently identify 
and prohibit specific anticompetitive acts, rather than using open-ended and 
unintelligible provisions.71   
 
As the Competition Appeal Court found in Sappi, the Competition Commission has no 
power to prosecute anticompetitive behaviour generally but must prosecute a specific 
contravention in terms of a specific applicable provision of the Act.72  The generic nature 
of exclusionary acts under section 8(c) potentially allows competition authorities to use 
their powers and discretion to craft the law for a particular case, having regard to the 
specific outcome or principle they may wish to emphasise.  In the Netstar decision, the 
Competition Appeal Court warned the Competition Tribunal against initially deciding that 
a particular conduct is anticompetitive and then subsequently formulating reasons for 
that finding.73  The Competition Appeal Court observed that the Competition Tribunal 
appeared to be concerned with moulding evidence before it to fit its theory of harm and 
the legal principles it was seeking to emphasise, rather than adjudicating the case 
before it on its facts and in accordance with the law.74   
 
                                               
70  Harold Demsetz ‘How Many Cheers for Antitrust’s 100 Years?’ (1992) Vol XXX Economic Inquiry 207-
17 at 208. 
71  Eleanor Fox ‘Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of Economics: The US / EU 
Divide’ 2006 Utah Law Review 725-40 at 740; John Vickers ‘Abuse of Market Power’ (2005) 115 The 
Economic Journal F244–F261 at F260; and Mackenzie supra n 9 at 3-4. 
72  Sappi Fine Paper (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa 2003 (2) CPLR 272 (CAC) at 
par 39.  See also Seven Eleven Corporation SA (Proprietary) Limited and Another v Simelane NO and 
Other 2002 (1) SA 118 (T). 
73  Netstar (Pty) Ltd and Others v Competition Commission South Africa 2011 (3) SA 171 (CAC) at par 61. 
74  Id.   
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In a democratic society based on the rule of law, such as ours, over-inclusive legal 
prohibitions and unfettered administrative discretion with no guidelines on how that 
discretion is to be exercised create considerable problems.  As Hoexter remarks, “the 
idea of unfettered, uncontrolled or unguided discretion is hopelessly at odds with 
modern constitutionalism”, 75  as our Constitution requires that there must be some 
control over or guidelines on broad discretionary powers.  Constraints on administrative 
discretion exist not only for the sake of minimising the violation of rights but also, as the 
Constitutional Court has held, “to ensure that those who are affected by the exercise of 
broad discretionary powers will know the legal considerations relevant to the exercise of 
such powers and in what circumstances they are entitled to seek relief from an adverse 
decision”. 76 
 
It is worth remembering that our old competition regime was routinely lambasted for the 
enormous discretionary powers it granted to the relevant Minister in the enforcement of 
the legislation. 77   In the current dispensation, in particular with regard to the 
enforcement of section 8(c), considerable discretion has now been placed in the hands 
of competition authorities.  But, in line with the rule of law, it is essential that the 
discretion granted to competition authorities under section 8(c) must be guided and 
circumscribed.  This is to balance the public interest sought to be achieved by the 
Competition Act and the interests and rights of firms likely to be affected by competition 
proceedings.  As an observer has noted, “the discretion granted to competition 
                                               
75  Hoexter supra n 56 at 47-8. 
76  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at par 54; Janse Van Rensburg NO v 
Minister of Trade and Industry NO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) at par 24; and Affordable Medicines Trust v 
Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) at par 32.  See also Hoexter supra n 56 at 48. 
77  Mackenzie supra n 9 at 7. 
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authorities in enforcing section 8(c) may need to be supplemented by guidelines”, 
clarifying the types of conduct that are likely to be considered exclusionary.78   
 
Such guidelines can be of enormous assistance to administrators in ensuring 
consistency and predictability in the application of policy or law, especially when the 
relevant administrative decision is a complex one, requiring the weighing or balancing of 
many different factors.79  In Armbruster and Another v Minister of Finance and Others80 
the Constitutional Court, per Mokgoro J, cautioned that where broad discretionary 
powers are conferred upon an administrative official or agency by law or regulation, “it 
would be prudent for the appropriate authority to formulate guidelines as best as they 
can to give as much assistance to the officials as possible to ensure that the discretion 
is exercised consistently in a way which reduces error”.81   Guidelines dealing with 
section 8(c) would eliminate the risk of prejudice against dominant firms, which might 
arise from errors in the enforcement of the abuse of dominance provisions of the Act, 
drafted primarily from a pro-SME and anti-dominant firm perspective.  
 
3.2.4 Significant Exclusionary Abuse of Dominance Cases Considered 
under Section 8(c) 
 
Section 8(c) has proved in practice to be a popular provision to rely upon in the 
alternative for the Competition Commission and complainants in exclusionary abuse of 
                                               
78  Id at 13. 
79  Sasol Oil Pty Ltd v Metcalfe NO 2004 (5) SA 161 (W) at 13; MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, 
Environmental and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil Pty Ltd 2006 (5) SA 483 (SCA) at par 19; and BP Southern 
Africa Pty Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environmental and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) 
at 159-60. 
80  2007 (6) SA 550 (CC); 2007 (12) BCLR 1283 (CC). 
81  Id at par 80. 
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dominance complaints before the Competition Tribunal and the Appeal Court.  The 
provision has seldom been relied upon as a stand-alone provision in proceedings.  In 
consequence, where it has been invoked in the alternative, it is not fully considered 
once authorities find that infringement of the main provision relied upon has occurred.82  
This accounts, in some respects, for the dearth of jurisprudence on section 8(c).   
 
The leading case at this stage of the development of our section 8(c) jurisprudence is 
Competition Commission v Senwes Limited,83 and this will be my main focus.  Senwes 
is a vertically integrated firm that was found to be dominant in the upstream market of 
grain storage through its ownership of concrete silos.  It also participated or competed in 
the downstream market for grain trading.  Senwes supplied an essential input, grain 
storage, to its competitors who operated in the downstream market of grain trading.  It 
was alleged that Senwes abused its dominant position through the differential storage 
tariff it applied in favour of its grain trading business and farmers, to the disadvantage of 
grain traders against whom it competed in the downstream market.   
 
The most contentious issue in the matter was that rather than at the outset, but at some 
later stage during the course of the proceedings, the Competition Commission alleged 
that the different tariffs Senwes charged its own trading arm, farmers, and rival grain 
traders, constituted a so-called “margin squeeze”.84  According to Whish and Bailey, a 
margin squeeze can occur where a firm is dominant in an upstream market and 
                                               
82  Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 35 at par 218 and Nationwide Airlines (Pty) 
Limited and Another v South African Airways (Pty) Limited Case No 80/CR/Sep06 at par 181. 
83  Supra n 16. 
84  Id at par 45. 
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supplies a key input to undertakings that compete with it in a downstream market. In 
such a situation, they add, the dominant firm may have discretion as to the price it 
charges for the input, and this could have an effect on the ability of other firms to 
compete with it in the downstream market. 85    As the Tribunal observed, margin 
squeeze is a relatively new concept in abuse of dominance literature and case law.86 
 
Senwes’s conduct, the margin squeeze, was alleged to have contravened section 8(c) 
of the Competition Act.  The Competition Tribunal found,87 and the Competition Appeal 
Court88  and the Constitutional Court89  confirmed on appeal, that Senwes’s conduct 
contravened section 8(c) of the Competition Act.  It is important to state here that 
section 8(c) neither refers specifically in its language to a ‘margin squeeze’ nor provides 
a description of conduct that might be called a margin squeeze.  The provision only 
refers to and prohibits “an exclusionary act”.   
 
Difficulties around the meaning and effect of the phrase ‘exclusionary act’ have already 
been highlighted above.  The phrase is too broad and may result in the outlawing of 
competitive conduct.  The same may also be said of the margin squeeze concept.  Its 
reliability as an infringement concept has been questioned.90  As Sidak remarks, “the 
margin squeeze theory of antitrust liability should be abolished, as it is incompatible with 
                                               
85  Whish and Bailey supra n 4 at 754-5. 
86  Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Limited supra n 16 at par 117. 
87  Id at pars 151 and 305. 
88  Supra n 54. 
89  Supra n 30. 
90  Supra n 54 at par 45. 
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contemporary antitrust jurisprudence and discourages competition and innovation”.91  A 
few weeks after the Tribunal’s decision in Senwes, the United States Supreme Court 
delivered a judgment in Pacific Bell Telephone Co v linkLine Communications Inc,92 
unanimously rejecting the idea that a margin squeeze constituted an abuse of a 
dominant position under section 2 of the Sherman Act.93 
 
The fact that section 8(c) does not unambiguously disclose an intelligible prohibited 
practice also affects the manner in which the Competition Commission has to formulate 
its complaints under the provision.  As seen in the Senwes matter, the terse motivation 
advanced in the referral for the section 8(c) complaint was so devoid of detail as to 
verge on the unconvincing.  The Supreme Court of Appeal was indeed unconvinced 
with the manner in which the complaint was formulated and did not agree with the 
findings of the other courts and accordingly ruled that a proper complaint under section 
8(c) was not made.94   
 
As Froneman J also remarked in his separate judgment in the Senwes Constitutional 
Court matter, “the majority judgment has found, without more, that the complaint referral 
covered the conduct found to violate section 8(c) of the Competition Act”. 95   The 
complaint referral, in his opinion, did not clearly disclose the conduct complained of, and 
                                               
91  J Gregory Sidak ‘Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability’ (2008) 4 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 279-309 at 279.   
92  555 US 438 (2009). 
93  Id at 9-12 and 17.  See also Luke Kelly and Tjarda van der Vijver ‘Less is More: Senwes and the 
Concept of “Margin Squeeze” in South African Competition Law’ (2009) 126 South African Law Journal 
246-55 at 246. 
94  Supra n 20 at pars 25 and 38. 
95  Supra n 30 at par 71. 
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was open to more than one reasonable interpretation.96  A similar problem arose in 
Competition Commission v Media24 (Pty) Ltd,97 where objections were raised that the 
Commission’s case on section 8(c) was vague and embarrassing because it was 
lacking in detail.98  And the Tribunal agreed that the Commission’s case on section 8(c) 
was indeed vague and embarrassing.99  
 
What is beyond doubt is that when the drafters of the South African Competition Act felt 
confident that a particular conduct generally produces anticompetitive effects, they did 
not shy away from listing and prohibiting that conduct outright, or subject to some rule of 
reason assessment.  This approach is not only recommended for ease of administration 
of the relevant provision, but is also a constitutionally sound approach.  When a legal 
provision, such as section 8(c), is of an uncertain meaning and may negatively affect 
rights, it is necessary that if such provision is not struck down completely on 
constitutional grounds, its interpretation and application must be restricted in a manner 
that favors the defendant.  That is clearly the approach the legislature envisaged with 
regard to the enforcement of section 8(c).  This is because the burden of proving 
anticompetitive effects, as well as the absence of any efficiency justification for the 
impugned conduct, rests on the complainant.100  In addition, there is no administrative 
penalty for a first time contravention of section 8(c).101 
 
                                               
96  Id at par 75. 
97  Case No 92/CR/Oct11. 
98  Id at par 15. 
99  Id at pars 37 and 52. 
100  Section 8(c) of the Act. 
101  Section 59(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. 
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An important principle that emerges is that section 8(c) should be applied in a manner 
that favours the defendant and not the complainant.  It is in this sense that reading a 
margin squeeze into a section 8(c) complaint in the course of proceedings, as the 
commission did in Senwes, becomes problematic.  The respondent had not been 
sufficiently warned about the true nature and implications of its conduct well in advance 
in pleadings, in order to enable it to prepare an adequate defence.  Indeed, throughout 
the proceedings before the Tribunal, Senwes adopted the stance that it did not have to 
answer the margin squeeze complaint, as it felt this was not the case made by the 
Commission at the outset.102  
 
A fundamental question that arises from the Senwes case is, therefore, whether it is 
appropriate to view exclusionary abuse allegations against a dominant firm under 
section 8(c) as concerning, generally, any conduct imaginable by a dominant firm, or 
only conduct that can be identified from the outset with some degree of clarity?103  In my 
view, an administrative system operating subject to the Constitution, which emphasises 
the principles of justice and fairness, may not permit the former approach.  There is no 
doubt that the Competition Act and its exclusionary abuse of dominance provisions 
must be applied in a manner that respects affected firms’ fundamental right to just 
administrative action, enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution and in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act.104  This is not to say margin squeeze and other unidentified 
conduct can never fall foul of section 8(c).  If the Commission can develop useful 
                                               
102  Supra n 16 at par 279. 
103  Roberts supra n 9 at 295. 
104  Act 3 of 2000.  The Competition Appeal Court has held that the Competition Commission has no 
power to prosecute anticompetitive behaviour generally but must prosecute a specific contravention in 
terms of a specific applicable provision of the Act, see Sappi Fine Paper (Pty) Ltd v Competition 
Commission of South Africa supra n 72.   
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guidelines on how margin squeeze and other unidentified conduct could be brought 
under the ambit of section 8(c), complaints concerning such conduct would be less 
controversial and in line with the constitutional imperatives of administrative lawfulness 
and fairness.   
 
The Commission needs to conduct research on corporate practices that could 
potentially fall foul of section 8(c) and ensure that these practices are identified and 
publicised.  This way firms will be put on notice about the potential dangers of engaging 
in such conduct, as is the case under section 8(d).  Indeed, competition authorities in 
other jurisdictions have already developed and published useful guidelines on how a 
number of exclusionary practices are to be assessed by the relevant competition 
authority.105  These guidelines have proved useful in some cases.106  The Competition 
Commission could follow this example, by developing guidelines that can be useful in 
section 8(c) enforcement.   
 
In terms of section 79(1) of the Competition Act, the Competition Commission may 
prepare guidelines to indicate its policy approach on any matter falling within its 
jurisdiction in terms of the Act.  The Act also empowers the Commission to review the 
                                               
105  European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) accessed at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01) (date of last use: 6 July 
2016).  Office of Fair Trading, Assessment of Conduct, Draft Competition Law Guidelines for Consultation 
(April 2004) OFT 441a accessed at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_le
aflets/competition_law/oft414a.pdf;jsessionid=03752C1C6A824428EAC844D34327089D (date of last 
use: 6 July 2016). 
106  Genzyme Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 4 and Albion Water Ltd v Director General of Water 
Services [2006] CAT 36.  See also Kelly and van der Vijver supra n 93 at 247. 
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Act and report to the relevant Minister on any anticompetitive conduct that may occur,107 
and to ensure that there is public awareness on matters related to the application and 
enforcement of the Act. 108   In addition, the Competition Act further empowers the 
Commission to conduct general research on any matter concerning the purpose of the 
Competition Act,109 and to report to the relevant Minister on any matter concerning the 
application of the Act.110  Therefore, there is sufficient legal authority in the Act for the 
Commission to conduct research that would lead to the publication of guidelines 
indicating its policy approach on the enforcement of section 8(c).   
 
The guidelines proposed here would greatly enhance the administration and 
enforcement of section 8(c).  The guidelines will also prevent a situation where it takes 
years of actual litigation before dominant firms fully understand the antitrust implications 
of a particular conduct under section 8(c).  Where guidelines have been provided, 
outlining possible conduct that could fall foul of section 8(c), it suffices to say that an 
administrative penalty for a first time offender may be acceptable, given that the 
Commission would have sufficiently warned the offender.   
 
3.2.5 Summary 
 
A review of the abuse of dominance and exclusionary abuse provisions in the 
Competition Act has revealed a number of structural and substantive problems.  The 
manner in which section 8, and section 8(c) in particular, has been formulated increases 
                                               
107  In terms of section 21(1)(k). 
108  In terms of section 21(1)(b). 
109  In terms of section 21(2)(b). 
110  In terms of section 21(2)(a). 
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possibilities that almost all dominant firm conduct, including perfectly legitimate conduct, 
may be found to be exclusionary and anticompetitive.  The prospect of wrongful 
prohibition of legitimate conduct is enhanced by the open-ended definition of an 
exclusionary act in section 1 of the Act.  Indeed, the Tribunal has admitted that the 
definition of an exclusionary act is very broad and can lead to the outlawing of conduct 
that has no anticompetitive effect.111   The term exclusionary act, the Tribunal also 
found, “is not a useful filter for determining whether conduct is competitive or 
anticompetitive, in view of the fact that both competitive and anticompetitive conduct 
can sensibly be included in the definition”. 112   Therefore the prospect of chilling 
competition in South African competition law, through inappropriate intervention, is far 
greater than many are willing to acknowledge.  
 
Another source of concern in abuse of dominance adjudication is that exclusionary 
abuse cases often involve the exercise of considerable discretion by competition 
authorities.  Such discretion arises largely because abuse of dominance provisions, and 
section 8(c) in particular, do not establish a sufficiently clear contravention, leaving 
competition authorities with unlimited discretion and power to decide whether a 
particular dominant firm conduct constitutes a prohibited practice.  In a competition law 
enforcement environment where the mistrust, and even dislike, of big business is 
prevalent, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that perfectly legitimate dominant firm 
conduct may become the target of inappropriate intervention.  
 
                                               
111  Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Limited supra n 35 at par 108. 
112  Id at par 109. 
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The enormous discretion enjoyed by the Competition Commission under section 8(c) 
may be welcome for those who hold the view that the presence of dominant firms in 
markets is a sign of the decline of the state of competition in such markets and favour a 
culture of vigorous antitrust enforcement against suspected abuses of market power.  
However, a system where abuse of dominance is declared unlawful in broad and open-
ended terms and grants unlimited discretionary powers to competition authorities 
arbitrarily to determine the elements of conduct which triggers a prosecution or 
intervention may be contrary to established constitutional principles.  Indeed, “the idea 
of unfettered, uncontrolled or unguided discretion is considered to be at odds with 
modern constitutionalism”,113 as our own Constitution requires that there must be some 
control or guidelines on broad discretionary powers. 
 
It is recommended that the Competition Commission develop guidelines on what type of 
conduct is likely to fall under section 8(c) and how complaints related to such conduct 
will be assessed by the Commission.  These guidelines will ensure the efficient 
enforcement of the provision.  The guidelines will also prevent a trial and error situation 
where it takes years of litigation before dominant firms discover the competition 
implications of particular conduct under section 8(c).  If guidelines have been provided, 
outlining what conduct could fall under section 8(c), an administrative penalty for a first 
time contravention of section 8(c) might also be appropriate. 
 
Unless the Commission takes the initiative and develops such guidelines, the 
enforcement of section 8(c) remains fraught with controversy and uncertainty.  This is 
                                               
113  Hoexter supra n 56 at 47-8. 
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because precedents on our abuse of dominance law emanating from the decisions of 
the Tribunal, which is not bound by its previous decisions, have largely been 
inconsistent and contradictory.  The proposed guidelines can therefore play an 
important role in ensuring legal certainty in an area of law marked by inconsistency.  
Although the Competition Commission and the Tribunal are independent bodies, and 
the Tribunal is consequently not bound by the Commission’s guidelines, these 
guidelines will nevertheless be useful for dominant firms.  They will provide some 
indication as to the types of conduct the Commission views as anticompetitive and will 
refer to the Tribunal for adjudication.  Should the Commission decide, in line with its 
guidelines, not to refer the conduct to the Tribunal for adjudication, because it does not 
view the conduct as anticompetitive, the guidelines will, save in the case of private 
referral to the Tribunal, serve as the final word in the individual cases concerned.   
 
3.3  Enforcement Problems with Exclusionary Abuse of Dominance 
in Foreign Law 
 
3.3.1 Section 2 of the Sherman Act in American Antitrust Law 
 
The philosophy of hostility towards dominant firms has greatly influenced the 
formulation and enforcement of section 2 of the Sherman Act.  In the early development 
of section 2 jurisprudence, antitrust enforcement agencies brought numerous 
monopolization suits and took aggressive positions on a number of alleged exclusionary 
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practices by dominant firms.114  As Fox observed, “the problem with historical American 
antitrust enforcement was that it had no guiding principle” that restrained the aggressive 
enforcement of the law.115   
 
The original and unchanged wording of section 2 of the Sherman Act reveals the US 
Congress’s pervasive discomfort with the domination of markets by a few firms and the 
exclusion from markets of smaller rivals.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it 
unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”.  Section 2, therefore, 
establishes three offences, commonly referred to as ‘monopolization’, ‘attempted 
monopolization’, and ‘conspiracy to monopolize’.116  However, despite the centrality and 
potentially wide implications of the term ‘monopolization’ in section 2, the term is not 
defined in the Act.   
 
The language of section 2 has been described in terms such as ‘broad’, ‘deceptive’, and 
‘unqualified’.117  The Sherman Act does not offer any guidance in identifying conduct 
                                               
114  Herbert Hovenkamp ‘The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act’ (2010) 90 Boston 
University Law Review 1611-65 at 1614. 
115  Eleanor M Fox ‘What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect’ 
(2002) 70 Antitrust Law Journal 371-411 at 372. 
116  Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act supra n 11 at 5 
and Antitrust Modernization Commission ‘Exclusionary Conduct Discussion Memorandum’ (11 July 2006) 
at 4 accessed at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/pdf/meetings/ExclCond%20DiscMemo060711fin.pdf 
(date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
117  Bonny E. Sweeney ‘An Overview of Section 2 Enforcement and Development’ (2008) 2 Wisconsin 
Law Review 231-60 at 232. 
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prohibited under section 2.118  As Bork puts it, “the bare language of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act conveys very little”. 119   As a result, section 2 leaves a considerable 
amount of discretion to enforcement agencies and the courts in determining whether or 
not a particular dominant firm conduct is exclusionary and anticompetitive. 120   It is 
arguable that the vague language of the Sherman Act amounted to a delegation of 
authority to the courts, to develop the law in accordance with the evolving 
understanding of the concept of competition. 121   For over a century, antitrust 
enforcement agencies and the courts have grappled with the meaning and scope of the 
monopolization offence, particularly in the area of exclusionary abuse.122  Different kinds 
of conduct have been found to violate section 2, sometimes in questionable 
circumstances which raised concerns about over-deterrence and chilling competition. 
 
Indeed the seminal 1945 decision in Alcoa, a case which dealt with a dominant firm’s 
decision to increase production capacity in response to increased demand, seemed to 
establish a dangerous precedent, implying that almost every conduct actively 
undertaken by a dominant firm to create a competitive advantage for itself would attract 
antitrust action.123  Following Alcoa, some subsequent cases articulated an extremely 
expansive view on the types of conduct that could be deemed unlawful under section 
                                               
118  Frank H. Easterbrook ‘Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason’ (1984) 53 Antitrust Law Journal 
135-73 at 135-6 and Thomas E Kauper ‘Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards’ 
(2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 1623-44 at 1623. 
119  Robert H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (Basic Books Inc 1978) at 57. 
120  Antitrust Modernization Commission supra n 116 at 7. 
121  Thomas A. Lambert and Joshua D. Wright ‘Response to the Antitrust Marathon: Antitrust (Over-?) 
Confidence’ (2008) 20 Loyola Consumer Law Review 219-31 at 222. 
122  Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act supra n 11 at 
12.   
123  United States v Aluminium Company of America 148 F 2d 416 (2d Cir 1945). 
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2.124  For example, it was held that “monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully 
acquired, may itself constitute an evil that stands to be condemned under section 2 
even though it remains unexercised”, and further that “the use of monopoly power, 
however lawfully acquired, to gain a competitive advantage may be unlawful”.125  In 
general, courts have condemned a number of alleged exclusionary practices that in 
retrospect appear not to have been anticompetitive.126 
 
The most vexing problem in section 2 discourse has always been distinguishing 
between aggressive but lawful competition and anticompetitive exclusionary conduct.127  
This problem was articulated by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
when it remarked in Microsoft128 that “whether any particular act of a dominant firm is 
exclusionary, rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to 
discern and the challenge for antitrust is establishing a general rule to distinguish 
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which 
increase it”.129 
 
As the United States Department of Justice noted in its 2008 Report on Single-Firm 
Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 130  the enforcement of section 2, 
                                               
124  Karen L. Grimm ‘General Standards for Exclusionary Conduct’ Federal Trade Commission Working 
Paper 3 November 2008 at 4-5 and William E. Kovacic ‘The Intellectual DNA of Modern US Competition 
Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: the Chicago/Harvard Double Helix’ (2007) 1 Columbia Business Law 
Review 1-82 at 17. 
125  United States v Griffith 334 US 100, 107 (1948).  See also Grimm supra n 124 at 5. 
126  Timothy J. Muris ‘The FTC and the Law of Monopolization’ (2000) 67 Antitrust Law Journal 693-724 at 
695. 
127  Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act supra n 11 at 
12 and Grimm supra n 124 at 1.  
128  United States v Microsoft Corporation 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir 2001). 
129  Id at 58. 
130  Supra n 11.  
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particularly in cases involving allegations of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, 
has caused great concern among legal and economic commentators.131  This followed 
research that revealed that some dominant firm conduct, presumed exclusionary and 
anticompetitive, would in fact lead to efficiencies and consumer benefit.132  The Report 
made a number of observations, including that: antitrust’s historic hostility to the practice 
of tying is unjustified, as such hostility is inconsistent with modern decisions of the US 
Supreme Court; bundling is a common practice in the market which frequently benefits 
consumers; unilateral and unconditional refusals to deal with rivals should no longer 
play a meaningful role in section 2 enforcement; and some exclusive dealing 
arrangements should not be illegal.133   
 
As far as the application of section 2 to exclusionary abuses is concerned, the Report 
created the impression that American antitrust law had come to embrace and recognise 
the role of dominant firms in a modern and globalised economy.  The report also 
suggested that, given the potential pro-competitive and consumer benefits of some 
conduct alleged to be exclusionary, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust division would 
adopt a more cautious approach to future enforcement actions against dominant firms in 
alleged exclusionary abuse cases.134   
 
                                               
131  Id at 1. 
132  Id. 
133  Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 3 ed (West 
Group 2005) at 299; Einer Elhauge ‘Defining Better Monopolization Standards’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law 
Review 253-344 at 253 and 294-305; Antitrust Modernization Commission supra n 116 at 15-17 and Kelly 
Everett ‘Trust Issues: Will President Barack Obama Reconcile the Tenuous Relationship Between 
Antitrust Enforcement Agencies?’ (2009) 29 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary 727-71 at 758-9. 
134  Hovenkamp supra n 114 at 1613. 
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So, the Justice Department appeared to warm to the emerging sentiment that big is not 
always bad, as classically demonstrated by the 2004 Supreme Court decision in 
Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP. 135   Here, the 
Supreme Court required an antitrust plaintiff to present a much stronger case to 
persuade the Court that a dominant firm violated section 2, by unilaterally refusing to 
deal with a rival.136  The Report recognised that while the policy of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act should remain the prevention of conduct that harms competition, it 
remained essential to guard against overly broad antitrust prohibitions and overzealous 
enforcement that would eventually suppress legitimate competition.137 
 
However, at the end of the Bush administration’s second term and the beginning of the 
Obama administration’s first term in 2009, the new officials at the Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division swiftly made an about-turn on the Single-Firm Conduct Report, and 
immediately withdrew it.138  In its statement announcing the withdrawal of the Report, 
the Department of Justice said that it raised too many hurdles for government antitrust 
enforcement policy, by favouring extreme caution when pursuing exclusionary abuses 
by dominant firms.139  The withdrawal of the Report, it has been observed, “was a shift 
in philosophy, consistent with Obama’s own presidential campaign, and the clearest 
                                               
135  540 US 398 (2004).  
136  The Court found that mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not unlawful, unless the complainant can also prove the existence of anticompetitive conduct, id 
at 407.  See also Hovenkamp supra n 114 at 1630.  
137  Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act supra n 11 at vii 
and 14. 
138   US Department of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law 
(05/11/2009) accessed at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm (date of last 
use: 6 July 2016) and Hovenkamp supra n 114 at 1612. 
139  Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law supra n 138 and Christine A. 
Varney ‘Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era’ Remarks as Prepared for the United 
States Chamber of Commerce 12 May 2009 at 6-7 accessed at  
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
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indication that the Antitrust Division would aggressively be pursuing cases where 
monopolists try to use their dominance in the marketplace to stifle competition by 
excluding rivals and potentially harming consumers”.140   
 
The Justice Department noted that while recognising the right of firms with market 
power to continue to compete, they could not allow them a free pass to undertake 
exclusionary acts as a result of the passive monitoring of market participants espoused 
by the Department’s earlier Report on Single-Firm Conduct.141  Dominant firms were 
accordingly placed on high alert to carefully analyse their practices in light of the 
Department’s new plan to aggressively pursue exclusionary abuses under section 2.142 
 
In support of its decision to pursue a more vigorous enforcement policy towards 
exclusionary practices by dominant firms, the Department relied on some previous 
section 2 cases that highlighted the harmful effects of monopolists’ exclusionary and 
predatory conduct on competition and consumers.  Reliance on such cases was evident 
in a speech prepared for the United States Chamber of Commerce by former Assistant 
Attorney General, Christine A. Varney.143  In her speech, Varney noted that in Lorain 
Journal Co v United States 144  the Court had expressly rejected the idea that a 
newspaper publisher had a right as a private business concern to select its preferred 
                                               
140  Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law supra n 138 and Hovenkamp supra 
n 114 at 1613.  
141  Varney supra n 139 at 14 and Barbara S Steiner et al ‘Assistant Attorney General Varney Withdraws 
DOJ Single-Firm Conduct Report’ 13 May 2009, Jenner & Block, Client Advisory at 2-3 accessed at 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/1901/original/Assistant_Attorney_General_Varney_Withdra
ws_DOJ_Single-Firm_Conduct_Report_05.13.09.pdf?1319753620 (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
142  Steiner supra n 141 at 2. 
143  Varney supra n 139 at 9.  
144  342 US 143 (1951). 
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customers and refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it pleased.145  In Aspen 
Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp146 the Court remarked that “any right of a 
monopolist to refuse to deal with other firms is not unqualified”. 147   The vigorous 
enforcement approach proposed in the statement withdrawing the Report on Single-
Firm Conduct,148 as well as in Varney’s speech, 149 appeared overly-aggressive and 
arguably created a fear of over-deterrence and chilling competition.150   
 
This, of course, is not to say that dominant firms must be allowed a free rein in which 
every aspect of their conduct goes unscrutinised.  The contention here is that there 
must be a reliable principle in terms of which some dominant firm conduct could fall into 
safe harbours and not risk antitrust interference, because such conduct is generally 
competitive and benefits consumers. 151   There may be, on the one hand, some 
instances where a more expansive and vigorous enforcement of section 2 is warranted, 
for example in cases where time and experience have shown unequivocally that a 
particular dominant firm conduct distorts competition and harms consumers.  On the 
other hand, there may be other instances where a more cautious and restricted 
enforcement approach is warranted, for example in cases where considerable doubt 
and uncertainty exist as to the competitiveness or otherwise of the impugned conduct.  
                                               
145  Id at 153-5. 
146  472 US 585 (1985). 
147  Id at 605-11. 
148  Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law supra n 138 and Hovenkamp supra 
n 114 at 1612. 
149  Varney supra n 139 at 9. 
150  Everett supra n 133 at 770. 
151  In order to improve predictability, efficiency, and effective enforcement, it is submitted, the use of safe 
harbours for conduct that is not abusive rather than using presumptions of abuse is essential, 
Competition Law Forum’s Article 82 Review Group ‘The Reform of Article 82: Comments on the DG-
Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 to Exclusionary Abuses’ (2006) 2 European 
Competition Journal 169-75 at 170.  See also Damien Geradin ‘A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-
competitive Conditional Rebates from Anti-competitive Ones’ (2009) 32 World Competition 41-70 at 66-7. 
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The latter scenario is substantially true of a number of forms of dominant firm conduct 
deemed to be exclusionary.   
 
There has never been a satisfactory level of consensus, even within the antitrust 
enforcement community, over what constitutes unlawful exclusionary conduct.  The 
public disagreement between the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division 
of the Justice Department on the norms governing exclusionary conduct illustrates this 
point.152  The decisions of the Courts in Lorain Journal,153 Aspen Skiing154 and Trinko155 
also point the monopolization law on exclusionary practices in diametrically opposing 
directions: while Lorain Journal and Aspen held that the right of a monopolist to refuse 
to deal is not unqualified; Trinko, in contrast, celebrates the right of the monopolist to 
exclude its rivals in the interest of encouraging innovation.156  This suggests that abuse 
of dominance law on exclusionary practices is not settled.  This means a more cautious 
approach in the enforcement of section 2 to a number of dominant firm practices 
considered exclusionary may be appropriate, given the lack of generally accepted 
wisdom in this area. 
 
As Muris convincingly argues, “when we lack confidence that certain practices are 
always or almost always anticompetitive, we should not automatically assume that there 
                                               
152  Jonathan B Baker ‘Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist 
Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement’ (2010) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 605-52 at 606. 
153  Supra n 144. 
154  Supra n 146. 
155  Supra n 135.   
156  Peter C. Carstensen ‘False Positives in Identifying Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: Conceptual 
Error, Business Reality, and Aspen’ 2008 Wisconsin Law Review 295-330 at 295. 
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is an anticompetitive impact from the practice”.157  And, as Muris further observes, 
“there are serious questions as to whether a number of allegedly exclusionary practices 
are in fact exclusionary and anticompetitive”.158  In his opinion anticompetitive single-
firm exclusionary conduct is ‘rare’, or rarely produces tangible results for the 
monopolist.159  
 
The risk of under-enforcement and under-deterrence as a result of a more cautious 
enforcement approach (where the anticompetitiveness of an alleged exclusionary act is 
in doubt) is tolerable and justifiable.  In a society founded on a constitution which 
guarantees due process, the choice, in my view, by antitrust enforcement agencies to 
err on the side of under-enforcement and under-deterrence (where the 
anticompetitiveness of an alleged exclusionary act is in doubt) serves a legitimate 
purpose and is legally and constitutionally defensible.  By contrast, erring on the side of 
over-enforcement and over-deterrence (where the anticompetitiveness of an alleged 
exclusionary act is in doubt) may destroy competition and offend against the principle of 
due process, common in many legal traditions that embrace the rule of law, such as the 
United States.  However, modern American antitrust law enforcement attempts to avoid 
these problems by insisting that alleged exclusionary conduct by dominant firms will 
only be prohibited if it results in consumer harm. 160   This means the exclusion of rivals, 
which can also result from lawful conduct, is not a more decisive factor than harm to 
consumers.  This approach has narrowed down the number of dominant firm conduct 
                                               
157  Muris supra n 126 at 715. 
158  Id.  Fox supra n 115 at 382-3. 
159  Muris supra n 126 at 693. 
160  See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.2.4.  See also Fox supra n 115 at 372 and 378-80. 
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which would be subjected to antitrust intervention and condemnation,161 creating safe 
harbours for lawful conduct.  
 
3.3.2 Article 102 in European Competition Law  
 
Unlike section 2 of the Sherman Act, Article 102 is more explicit about the types and 
nature of dominant firm conduct it considers abusive.  However, despite the provision 
going to some length in giving examples of conduct that might constitute an abuse of 
dominance, the practice in European competition law is to treat the provision as non-
exhaustive in its description of dominant firm conduct it proscribes.162  As in the case of 
section 8(c) of the South African Competition Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
competition authorities in Europe have the authority and discretion to incorporate 
unlimited numbers of dominant firm conduct that they may consider to be abusive and 
exclusionary into the broad framework of Article 102.163  Indeed, a great deal of the 
dominant firm practices that are considered exclusionary in Europe today, are not 
explicitly listed in Article 102, although they fall within the provision’s broad framework 
through interpretation. 
  
With regard to the application of Article 102 to abusive practices generally and 
exclusionary conduct in particular, European competition officials have stated that the 
                                               
161  Kovacic supra n 124 at 3 and 20.  
162  Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission at par 26.  See 
also Whish and Bailey supra n 4 at 193. 
163  Article 102 of the Treaty of Europe, it is submitted, provides a general prohibition against any abuse of 
a dominant position within the Common Market and to this extent there is some similarity between section 
2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102, see Mark N. Berry ‘The Uncertainty of Monopolistic Conduct: A 
Comparative Review of Three Jurisdictions’ (2001) 32 Law and Policy in International Business 263-330 
at 283. 
147 
 
provision is applied to protect competition for the benefit of consumers and not to 
protect competitors.164  However, their argument that Article 102 is applied to protect 
consumers and not competitors does not accurately reflect the reality on the ground.  
European competition authorities and the courts are generally intolerant of market 
conduct that excludes competitors.  Consumer welfare does not appear to be the 
primary or direct focus of European competition law enforcement, particularly in 
exclusionary abuse cases.   
 
The central concern of Article 102 with regard to exclusionary conduct is market 
foreclosure.165  In the much celebrated and often cited Hoffmann-La Roche166 decision, 
the European Court of Justice stated that “a dominant firm commits an exclusionary act 
of the kind prohibited under Article 102 when it engages in behavior designed to, or 
having the effect of, influencing the structure of the market where, as a result of the very 
presence of the undertaking in question in the market, the degree of competition is 
already weakened”.167  This decision, it is submitted, makes it clear that the impugned 
conduct is judged primarily against its ability or potential to foreclose competitors from 
the market rather than its impact on consumers.168   
 
It is clear that the protection of the market structure and the preservation of market 
opportunities for competitors are more important, and indeed the central concern of 
                                               
164  See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.3.2 and DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the Application of 
Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (December 2005) at 17-18 accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (last date of use: 6 July 2016). 
165  Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 supra n 104 at par 6. 
166  Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission. 
167  Id at pars 39 and 90. 
168  Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses supra n 164 at 
18. 
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European abuse of dominance law on exclusionary practices.  Indeed, a dominant firm 
practice is only considered to be exclusionary because, as the name suggests, it 
excludes the dominant firm’s rivals from the market.169  Put differently, exclusionary 
practices by dominant firms do not always or automatically harm consumers, which is 
why dominant firm practices that directly harm consumers are not called ‘exclusionary’ 
but rather ‘exploitative’ practices. 170   In exclusionary abuse of dominance cases, 
European competition authorities and the courts hardly ever consider directly, that is not 
through drawing inferences or presumptions, the possibility of consumer exploitation or 
harm.   
 
Consumer welfare is, therefore, not a primary but an ancillary or secondary goal of 
European competition law enforcement on exclusionary practices.  Indeed, recent case 
law on Article 102 suggests that the main concern of the provision is not the direct 
impact of dominant firm conduct on consumers, but the impact of such conduct on 
competitors, which in turn may affect consumers.171  As Marsden and Gormsen remark, 
“if, by protecting competitors or rivalry, consumers are indirectly protected, then that is a 
bonus because consumer welfare is not the main aim of European competition law on 
abuse of dominance”. 172   Indeed, if consumer welfare was the primary focus of 
                                               
169  Pinar Akman ‘Exploitative Abuse in Article 82 EC: Back to Basics?’ (2009) Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies Working Paper 09-1 at 11 accessed at 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly-fs/1.105848!wp091_exploitative_abuse_in_article82EC_PA.pdf (date of 
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European exclusionary abuse of dominance law, the assessment of the alleged 
exclusionary conduct would be conducted in reverse.  This means instead of initially 
determining whether the conduct forecloses rivals, the first and most important step 
would be to ask whether the conduct harms consumers, similar to how the inquiry is 
conducted in American antitrust law under section 2 of the Sherman Act.173   
 
Evaluating the competitiveness of alleged exclusionary conduct by initially determining 
whether the conduct harms consumers, is clearly more consistent with the philosophy of 
applying the law to protect competition for the benefit of consumers and not 
competitors.  This approach recognises consumer welfare as the central and guiding 
principle of competition law and its enforcement.  It also ensures that the correct type of 
exclusionary and abusive conduct by a dominant firm is eradicated: that is only conduct 
which results in consumer harm.  To achieve this outcome some hard choices would 
have to be made.  This includes deciding to tolerate conduct which may exclude rivals, 
provided there are clear and tangible consumer benefits flowing from the conduct.  The 
reverse option is a regrettable one, and one which, unfortunately, is very common in 
European competition law: that is outlawing conduct that excludes rivals, but which may 
benefit consumers. 
 
The problem of outlawing conduct that excludes rivals but benefits consumers stems 
from the choice of a flawed or inappropriate standard or approach for the assessment of 
unilateral conduct.  Such standard or approach may use ‘triggering facts’ that may be 
present even when the behavior is competitive, resulting in it being declared 
                                               
173  See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.2.4. 
150 
 
anticompetitive.174  An example of such a flawed approach is one which uses rival or 
competitor foreclosure as a primary and dominant triggering fact, potentially bringing 
competitive conduct within the firing line, as competitive conduct has the effect of 
excluding inefficient rivals.  For example, a decision by a dominant firm to reduce the 
price of its product can be a competitive action determined by a reduction in its costs, 
thereby allowing it to increase its market share and profit while also benefiting 
consumers.  However, the same decision can also be deemed to constitute predatory 
pricing designed to eliminate or exclude a major rival.175 
 
When regard is had to the approach for dealing with exclusionary practices in European 
abuse of dominance law under Article 102, it has been established that the risk of 
prohibiting conduct that is beneficial to consumers is high.176  This is because in Europe 
the practice of competition enforcement on exclusionary practices does not draw a clear 
distinction between harm to competitors and harm to consumers.  When applying Article 
102, the European Commission and the courts rely on the assumption that the mere 
existence of dominance creates a presumption of harm to the market structure and by 
extension consumers.177   
 
Indeed, dominant firm conduct which harms competitors is generally regarded as 
injurious to consumers and will be prohibited without seriously and independently 
                                               
174  The Cost of Inappropriate Interventions/Non Interventions supra n 12 at 11.  
175  Id at 8. 
176  Neelie Kroes ‘The European Commission’s Enforcement Priorities as Regards Exclusionary Abuses 
of Dominance - Current Thinking’ (2008) 4 Competition Law International 4-7 at 4-5. 
177  Marsden and Gormsen supra n 171 at 875. 
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interrogating the aspect of consumer harm.178  In British Airways it was held that there is 
no requirement, when applying Article 102, to prove direct harm to consumers.179   
 
This lack of a clear distinction between harm to competitors (or the interests of 
competitors) and harm to consumers (or the interests of consumers) may lead to the 
prohibition of dominant firm practices which exclude rivals, but which also benefits 
consumers.  In practice, consumer and competitor interests do not always mean the 
same thing and in many instances they clash.180  In the event of a clash between the 
interests of consumers and business competitors, it is for the competition authority to 
choose one interest which is more worthy of protection than the other.  It is well 
recognised in competition law that consumer interests will always supersede 
competitors’ interests, because the purpose of competition law is not to protect 
competitors but to promote competition as a means to enhance consumer welfare.  It 
follows, therefore, that in some instances consumer interest can best be served by the 
removal of an inefficient competitor from the market.181  Indeed, the market would be 
better off if competitors who deliver nothing to consumers in terms of price, choice, 
quality, and innovation were to exit the market.182   
 
3.3.3 Summary 
 
                                               
178  Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 supra n 105 at par 22 
and Marsden and Gormsen supra n 171 at 884. 
179  Case C-95/04P British Airways v. Commission at par 107.  
180  Marsden and Gormsen supra n 171 at 878. 
181  Id.  See also Kroes supra n 176 at 5. 
182  Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 supra n 105 at par 6. 
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A review of European competition law on abuse of dominance and exclusionary 
practices has revealed that there is a real risk of the prohibition of competitive and 
perfectly legitimate dominant firm conduct.  This is because Article 102 in European 
competition law has been applied primarily to protect market opportunities for rivals.  
Consumer welfare is treated as a secondary or indirect goal of European abuse of 
dominance law.  The result is a high likelihood that dominant firm practices that might 
benefit consumers but excludes inefficient rivals runs the risk of prohibition.   
 
In this regard the European enforcement approach to exclusionary abuses under Article 
102 is very similar to that under section 8(c), read together with the definition of an 
exclusionary act in section 1 of the South African Competition Act.  In both these 
jurisdictions, the exclusion of rivals is an important triggering factor for prosecution or 
intervention, than harm to consumers.  Indeed, some decisions in South Africa and 
Europe have suggested that it is possible to find harm to competition, even when harm 
to consumers has neither been considered nor established.    
 
However, a study of the application of section 2 of the Sherman Act to unilateral and 
exclusionary practices by dominant firms in American antitrust law has revealed some 
important lessons that South Africa can adopt in the future.  In American antitrust law, 
the relentless reliance on consumer welfare as a guiding and central principle in 
monopolization cases in general and exclusionary practices in particular ensures that 
only dominant firm practices which harm consumers are outlawed.  This means the 
exclusion of rivals, which can also result from lawful conduct, is not a decisive factor.  
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This approach has narrowed down the number of dominant firm conduct which would 
be subjected to antitrust intervention and condemnation,183 creating safe harbours for 
lawful conduct.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has highlighted some structural problems relating to the manner in which 
several abuse of dominance provisions in the Competition Act have been positioned.  
The Chapter has also revealed substantive problems relating to the open-ended nature 
of section 8(c), which creates the risk that almost all dominant firm conduct may be 
deemed to be exclusionary.  This is because the definition of an exclusionary act in 
section 1 of the Act is not helpful in distinguishing between competitive and 
anticompetitive dominant firm conduct.  This may result in competitive dominant firm 
conduct being prohibited as anticompetitive and exclusionary.  The solution to this 
problem could be the adoption of an enforcement approach to section 8(c) that is 
consumer centered, similar to that followed in America.  This approach will ensure that 
the exclusion of rivals, which can also result from lawful conduct, is not a more decisive 
factor than harm to consumers. 
 
I have also shown that the broad and open-ended nature of section 8(c) confers 
uncircumscribed discretionary powers on competition authorities in determining whether 
a particular dominant firm conduct is competitive or anticompetitive.  The provision is so 
                                               
183  Kovacic supra n 124 at 3 and 20.   
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vague that it deprives dominant firms affected by it of the ability to know beforehand that 
their planned action is exclusionary and illegal.  The open-ended and vague nature of 
section 8(c) coupled with its conferral of uncircumscribed discretion on competition 
authorities may be contrary to the Constitution and the rule of law.  Modern 
constitutional traditions eschew the conferral of unfettered discretion to administrative 
bodies and prefer the use of intelligible legal provisions, to ensure that those affected by 
the law are able to consider and plan their actions appropriately.  
 
Given the problems that have occurred and are likely to continue when regard is had to 
the application and enforcement of section 8(c), I recommend that the Competition 
Commission use its powers under the Competition Act to develop guidelines that will 
outline its enforcement policy under the provision.  Indeed, competition authorities in 
other jurisdictions, such as the United States, Europe and the UK, have developed 
similar guidelines outlining their enforcement policy or approach to different 
exclusionary practices by dominant firms.   
 
It is recommended that the Commission’s guidelines on its enforcement policy or 
approach to exclusionary conduct under section 8(c) must provide clarity on the nature 
or types of conduct it is likely to consider anticompetitive under the provision.  The 
guidelines must further indicate the criteria the Commission will use to assess or 
determine the anticompetitiveness of the relevant practices.  These guidelines are 
further necessitated by the inconsistency in the decisions of the Tribunal on the proper 
approach for the treatment of dominant firm conduct in abuse of dominance 
155 
 
proceedings.  So, the guidelines will play an important role in enhancing the effective 
enforcement and administration of section 8(c). 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE LACK OF AN APPROPRIATE COMPETITION LAW FRAMEWORK FOR 
CAUSATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In most jurisdictions, the enforcement of competition law rules is conducted through two 
established channels: either public or private enforcement.  In a public enforcement 
scenario, a competition authority, for example the Competition Commission in our law, 
the Federal Trade Commission in American antitrust law and the European Competition 
Commission in European competition law, assumes responsibility for taking legal action 
against firms that violate competition rules.   
 
In a private enforcement scenario, in some jurisdictions firms directly affected by 
competition law transgressions will institute legal action against the defendant in the civil 
courts and seek damages without the involvement of, or any prior finding by, a 
competition authority that the defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct.  It is 
appropriate to observe here that, in South African competition law, a prior finding by a 
competition authority that the defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct is 
essential before private enforcement, by the pursuit of damages in the civil courts, is 
instituted.1   
 
                                               
1  This is because the civil courts in South Africa have no jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of a 
competition dispute, including the question of whether a transgression of the Competition Act has 
occurred.  See section 65(2) of the Competition Act. 
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In most jurisdictions, the relevance and importance of causation in competition law 
proceedings vary depending on the enforcement channel taken.  Where the route of 
private enforcement is taken and the complainant seeks damages for antitrust injury, 
causation is invariably required.2  However, in the three jurisdictions under review (that 
is, South Africa, Europe and America), where the route of public enforcement is taken, 
the requirement of causation is virtually nonexistent.3  It is this absence of causation in 
public competition law enforcement which is the central focus of this Chapter.  
Causation in private competition law enforcement is therefore not the subject of 
discussion in this Chapter. 
 
It is appropriate to observe at the outset that in different jurisdictions the concept of 
causation has been invoked in public competition law proceedings in different 
circumstances, which suggests that there may be conceptual differences in the 
understanding of this concept.4  For example, in European competition law the concept 
of causation is understood to mean that the complainant must show that a firm has used 
its dominant position as a means or instrument for engaging in anticompetitive conduct.5  
In other words, in European competition law causation refers to the role that a dominant 
position has played in enabling or causing anticompetitive conduct.  However, in 
American antitrust law the concept of causation is understood to mean that the 
complainant must show that anticompetitive conduct has been used as an instrument to 
                                               
2  Mark N. Berry ‘The Uncertainty of Monopolistic Conduct: A Comparative Review of Three Jurisdictions’ 
(2001) 32 Law and Policy in International Business 263-330 at 315 and 320. 
3  Id at 315 and 317. 
4  Luke Meier ‘Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing’ (2011) 80 Fordham Law 
Review 1241-99 at 1241. 
5  Berry supra n 2 at 314. 
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attain or enhance or protect a dominant position. 6   Thus, in contrast to European 
competition law, the concept of causation in American antitrust law refers not to the role 
that a dominant position has played in enabling or causing anticompetitive conduct, but 
to the role that anticompetitive conduct has played in the attainment or enhancement or 
protection of a dominant position. 
 
In South African common-law (in particular civil and criminal law) the concept of 
causation is understood to refer to the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and 
the harmful or unlawful consequences suffered by the complainant or victim.  In the 
context of our competition law causation is relevant when assessing the effect of the 
dominant firm’s conduct on consumers or competitors in the market.  The relevance and 
importance of causation becomes more obvious in those competition cases where 
experience and logic have proved that it is difficult, if not impossible, to classify the 
action of a dominant firm as anticompetitive and illegal, without having thoroughly 
considered its effect on consumers and competitors.7  In this regard, the insistence in 
some of our abuse of dominance provisions and case law that the complainant must 
establish ‘anticompetitive effects’ in order to succeed in a competition complaint, may 
                                               
6  Rambus Inc v Federal Trade Commission 522 F 3d 456 (DC Cir 2008) at 462-4; Broadcom Corp v 
Qualcomm Inc 501 F 3d 297 (3d Cir 2007) at 314; and United States v Microsoft 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir 
2001) at 61-2.  Michael A Carrier ‘A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust Analysis’ (2011) 77 
Antitrust Law Journal 991-1016 at 993-6.  See also Ankur Kapoor ‘What Is the Standard of Causation of 
Monopoly?’ (2009) 23 Antitrust at 38-41. 
7   Office of Fair Trading The Cost of Inappropriate Interventions/Non Interventions under Article 82 
(September 2006) Economic Discussion Paper, OFT 864 at par 1.25 accessed at 
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/GiancarloSpagnolo_report.pdf (date of last 
use: 6 July  2016). 
159 
 
appear to be a step in the right direction towards the development of an appropriate 
causation framework for our competition law. 8   
 
In this Chapter I observe that despite the insistence in some abuse of dominance 
provisions that the complainant must establish ‘anticompetitive effects’ (the so-called 
‘effects approach’), in practice the issue of causation remains of limited importance in 
competition law.  To the extent that causation is considered in abuse of dominance 
proceedings, this usually happens implicitly or indirectly and in a manner that reveals a 
worrying lack of robustness.9  This leads to the absence of a clear and consistent 
framework of causation for competition law.  As Sutherland and Kemp observe, “one of 
the underdeveloped areas of South African competition law concerns how the 
competition authorities determine whether the conduct in question has caused the 
anticompetitive effect complained of”.10  There also appears to be near unanimous 
agreement in European competition law that causation is of limited importance in the 
adjudication of competition disputes.11  An American observer has also noted that in 
American antitrust law “causation is one of the most underexplored areas”.12 
 
In this Chapter I argue that it is necessary from both a theoretical and a practical point 
of view that the issue of causation is recognised and dealt with in competition 
                                               
8  See section 8(c) of the Competition Act.  See also Competition Commission v South African Airways 
(Pty) Ltd Case No 18/CR/Mar01 at par 111. 
9   Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFUE 2 ed (Hart 
Publishing 2013) at 271 and Berry supra n 2 at 314. 
10  Philip Sutherland and Katharine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (Online Version, LexisNexis, 
last updated November 2015) at par 7.11.3.2. 
11  Thomas Eilmansberger ‘How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: in Search 
of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law 
Review 129-78 at par 3.1.  Berry supra n 2 at 317.   
12  Carrier supra n 6 at 991. 
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proceedings as a fundamental legal issue that is central to antitrust liability.13  The 
introduction of causation in competition law will ensure that there is fairness in abuse of 
dominance proceedings.  Causation will ensure that only dominant firm conduct which 
has caused the exclusion of competitors or harm to consumers and is sufficiently close 
to, or is not too remote from, this consequence will attract antitrust liability.  In particular, 
the view taken here is that the adoption of common-law principles of causation may play 
an important role in guiding and shaping the development of an appropriate causation 
framework for competition law in South Africa.   
 
In the discussion that follows, part 4.2 addresses the initial issue that arises in the 
adjudication of all competition disputes, which is evidence showing that the respondent 
has engaged in prohibited conduct, here conduct constituting an abuse of dominance, 
and in particular an exclusionary abuse of dominance.  In part 4.3 I examine some 
challenges that may arise when determining the effect of the alleged abusive dominant 
firm conduct on competition.  Relevant to the determination of the effect of the alleged 
abusive dominant firm conduct on competition is the issue of causation, which I 
consider subsequently in part 4.4.  Here, I outline the principles of common-law 
causation, which, in my view, can play an important role in guiding and shaping the 
development of an appropriate causation framework for competition law.   
 
In part 4.5 I review South African case law on abuse of dominance in which the question 
of causation has been central to the determination of issues.  Here, cases where an 
                                               
13  Netstar (Pty) Ltd and Others v Competition Commission South Africa 2011 (3) SA 171 (CAC) at par 31.  
Berry supra n 2 at 314.  
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incorrect causation approach was adopted are contrasted with cases where the correct 
causation approach was adopted.  Part 4.6 reviews the application of causation 
principles in foreign competition law.  Part 4.7 considers the rise of the ‘effects 
approach’ in modern competition law enforcement and its implications for causation.  
Part 4.8 outlines the main findings and conclusions reached in this Chapter. 
 
4.2 ‘Engagement’ in an Exclusionary Act as an Analytical Concept 
 
The initial hurdle that every complainant or the Competition Commission must deal with 
in the adjudication of competition disputes, is evidence showing that the respondent has 
‘engaged’ in the prohibited conduct complained of.14  As the Competition Appeal Court 
noted in Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission 15  proof of the existence of a 
prohibited conduct is the first issue to be determined in an inquiry into an alleged 
contravention of the Competition Act. 16   In competition disputes, the Competition 
Tribunal regards evidence that an abuse of dominance has occurred as the legal basis 
upon which a complainant may be afforded legal standing in proceedings relating to 
such disputes.17   Where such evidence is lacking, the Tribunal has reiterated in a 
number of cases that it will not entertain the complaint.18 
 
                                               
14  Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 8 at par 138 and Phutuma Networks (Pty) 
Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd Case No 108/CAC/Mar11 at par 11. 
15  Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission supra n 13. 
16  Id at par 28. 
17  This may include the right to interim relief, see Phumudzo S Munyai ‘Interim Relief Jurisprudence in 
South African Competition Law: A Critical Review of the Competition Tribunal’s Approach’ (2011) 23 
South African Mercantile Law Journal 432-47 at 445. 
18  Id. 
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Section 8, particularly section 8(c) and (d), requires proof that the dominant firm has 
‘engaged’ in an exclusionary act.  While the meaning or definition of an ‘exclusionary 
act’ is dealt with elsewhere in this work,19 the meaning and implications of the word 
‘engage’ is considered here.  Logically speaking, ‘engaging’ in something connotes 
actively taking part in, or becoming involved in, a particular activity.  Put differently, it 
generally involves a positive act.  In this regard, an omission would ordinarily not fit in 
this narrow concept of ‘engagement’.   
 
However, the various kinds of exclusionary act recognised under section 8 of the 
Competition Act suggest a much broader meaning for the word ‘engage’.  It seems that 
an omission or inaction may be brought within the ambit of the engagement concept.  
For example, a dominant firm is prohibited from refusing to give a competitor access to 
an essential facility, when it is economically feasible to do so.20  A dominant firm is also 
prohibited from refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those 
goods is economically feasible.21  In both these scenarios, the Act places a positive 
obligation on dominant firms to act in a particular way; failure to do so may attract a 
complaint on the ground that the firm has ‘engaged’ in an exclusionary act. 
 
4.3 An Act that ‘Impedes or Prevents’ other Firms from Entering Into 
or Expanding Within a Market: The Effects Question 
 
Once the complainant has overcome the initial hurdle of proving that exclusionary 
conduct has occurred, the next step is to demonstrate that the conduct complained of 
                                               
19  See Chapter 3 at 3.2.2. 
20  Section 8(b) of the Competition Act. 
21  Section 8(d)(ii) of the Competition Act. 
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has, in the language of the Competition Act, “the effect of substantially preventing or 
lessening competition”’.22  This raises the question of causation embodied in the word 
‘effect’.23  The word effect, as used in the Act in relation to alleged anticompetitive 
conduct, refers to the ‘outcome’ or ‘end product’ or ‘consequence’ of that conduct.  
Considered in the context of causation in the public competition law sphere, the word 
refers to the ‘anticompetitive effect’ or ‘anticompetitive harm’ which can be attributed to 
the conduct of the respondent.   
 
One of the most vexing problems in South African competition law is that the phrases 
‘anticompetitive effect’ and ‘anticompetitive harm’, which are the competition authorities’ 
primary basis for intervention, are not defined in the Competition Act.  And judicial 
pronouncements in South African competition law on the meaning of these concepts 
have not always provided clear direction.24  They cannot, therefore, be said to have any 
absolute meaning.25   
 
                                               
22  A central principle of the Competition Act that permeates all its rule of reason provisions is that the 
prevention and lessening of competition is prohibited only if it is ‘substantial’.  See sections 5 (1), 8(c), 
9(1)(a) and 12A of the Act.  See also Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 8 at par 
138; Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission supra n 13 at pars 28 and 31; and Phutuma Networks 
(Pty) Ltd vs Telkom SA Ltd supra n 14. 
23  Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission supra n 13 at par 31.  But it is appropriate to also observe 
here that not all exclusionary abuse of dominance provisions require the complainant or the Commission 
to demonstrate that the conduct complained of has anticompetitive effects.  In some instances, mere 
proof of the existence of the exclusionary conduct is sufficient for the complainant to be successful.  For 
example, an exclusionary act such as a refusal by a dominant firm to provide competitors with access to 
an essential facility is prohibited outright, see section 8(b) of the Act.  See also Nationwide Poles v Sasol 
(Oil) Pty Ltd Case No 72/CR/Dec03 at par 96.  
24  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 10. 
25  Id at par 7.11.3.1. 
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This may lead to different individuals and institutions having conflicting views on their 
meaning.  In Competition Commission v South African Airways26 the Tribunal alluded to 
the problematic meaning of the concept of ‘anticompetitive harm’ when it noted that, 
“one person’s understanding of the concept of anticompetitive harm may mean only 
harm to consumer welfare, whilst for another the meaning may include harm to 
competitors”.27  The Tribunal pointed out that it viewed the concept of anticompetitive 
harm as embracing harm to competitors and that harm to competitors was in itself an 
infringement of the Act, regardless of harm to consumers.28  Indeed the fact that in this 
case the Competition Commission was unable to establish any adverse effects on 
consumer welfare attributable to the defendant’s conduct, did not jeopardise its case as 
the Tribunal felt the case could be decided on the question of harm to competitors.29   
 
Because it is difficult to prove factually that a dominant firm’s conduct actually caused 
harm to consumers, it is widely accepted that harm to consumer welfare does not have 
to be established, but can be inferred from the impact of the dominant firm’s conduct on 
its competitors.30  This means that harm to competitors is, without more, equated with 
harm to consumers.  The assumption here is that instances of harm or foreclosure to 
the dominant firm’s competitors are almost certainly guaranteed to result in consumer 
harm in the form of reduced output, higher prices, and lower quality products.  As a 
result, in most of our exclusionary abuse of dominance cases the duty of the 
complainant is generally limited to proving that competitors have been put out of 
                                               
26  Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 8.  
27  Id at par 137. 
28  Id. 
29  Id at pars 219 and 220. 
30  Nationwide Poles v Sasol (Oil) Pty Ltd supra n 23 at pars 100-101.  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 10 
at par 7.11.3.1. 
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business or restricted in their growth by the defendant’s conduct.  This means that the 
causation enquiry is limited to the link between the dominant firm’s conduct and the 
exclusion or removal of rivals from the market.   
 
Causation in relation to the link between the dominant firm’s conduct and harm to 
consumers is generally ignored, as demonstrated by the finding of the Competition 
Tribunal in Competition Commission v South African Airways.31  The problem with this 
approach is that it may lead to the outlawing of conduct which harms or excludes 
competitors, but which does not necessarily harm consumers, and may in fact benefit 
them.  In a competition law enforcement regime where the protection of consumer 
welfare is the main goal of the law, one would expect that the aspect of causation in 
relation to the link between the defendant’s conduct and harm to consumer welfare 
would be a non-negotiable requirement.   
 
A further issue that warrants consideration on the subject of causation, arising from the 
requirement to establish the anticompetitive effects of alleged exclusionary conduct, is 
the question: ‘Which anticompetitive effect suffices to attract antitrust action’?  Is it only 
actual effects or are potential or likely effects also included?  One view is that our abuse 
of dominance provisions under section 8 of the Competition Act require a clear 
demonstration of actual anticompetitive effects, as opposed to a mere allegation that the 
conduct is likely to produce anticompetitive effects.32   
                                               
31  Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 8 at pars 137, 219, 220 and 298. 
32  Id at pars 110-111 and 132.  Martin Brassey et al Competition Law (Juta 2002) at 35-6 and 198 and 
Neil Mackenzie ‘Replacing Section 8(d) of the South African Competition Act with an “Effects-Based” 
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This view finds support in the text of the Competition Act.  Exclusionary practices 
prohibited under section 8 are, in terms of the exact words used in the definition of an 
exclusionary act in section 1, “acts which impede or prevent other firms from entering 
into or expanding within the market”.  Section 8, read together with the definition of an 
exclusionary act in section 1 of the Act, makes a glaring omission of the word likely in its 
description of conduct it considers exclusionary and anticompetitive.  With the exception 
of section 9(1) of the Act (which prohibits price discrimination by a dominant firm) and 
our merger provisions, the majority of our prohibited practices and abuse of dominance 
provisions similarly omit any reference to acts which are likely to prevent or lessen 
competition.33  This gives impetus to the argument that most of our prohibited practices 
and abuse of dominance provisions only deal with effects that have actually resulted. 34   
 
The legislature’s deliberate omission of the word likely in abuse of dominance 
provisions, under section 8, and its use of the word in other sections, such as section 
9(1) and the merger provisions, probably signals that the legislature intended that 
different approaches should be applied under these different provisions.  This implies 
that whereas the likely effects of alleged anticompetitive conduct may be relevant under 
section 9(1) and our merger provisions, the same cannot be true of our abuse of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Exclusionary Abuse of Dominance Provision’, Centre for Competition Economics, University of 
Johannesburg, Working Paper 7/2012 at 11. 
33  Brassey supra n 32 at 35-6. 
34  Id at 36. 
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dominance provisions.  The latter provisions appear to cover, as already stated, only 
effects that have actually resulted. 35   
 
The omission of the word likely in our abuse of dominance provisions distinguishes our 
Act from the Canadian Competition Act,36 where section 79(1)(c) of their Act expressly 
provides that an abuse of dominance by a dominant firm is prohibited if “the practice 
has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition 
substantially in a market”.37  In Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Canada Pipe 
Co38 it was found that in terms of section 79(1)(c) of the Canadian Competition Act, the 
effect of a practice on competition is to be assessed by reference to up to three different 
time frames: actual effects in the past or present, and likely effects in the future.39 
 
Despite the glaring omission of the word likely in the formulation of our abuse of 
dominance provisions, some observers and decisions suggest that our abuse of 
dominance provisions must not only cover actual exclusion or foreclosure, but that 
threatened or potential foreclosure of rivals should also attract antitrust intervention.40  It 
would be incorrect, they contend, to insist on a demonstration of actual anticompetitive 
effects in each and every case, as this will force competition authorities to wait for 
obvious anticompetitive effects to arise before they can act, which would in many cases 
                                               
35  Id.   
36  RSC 1985, c C-34. 
37  See section 79(1)(c) of the Canadian Competition Act. 
38  (FCA) 2006 FCA 233. 
39  Id at par 36. 
40  Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 8 at par 129.  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 
10 at par 7.11.3.1 and O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9 at 269. 
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be ineffective and too late.41  In Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) 
Ltd42 the Tribunal stated that a finding of abuse could be arrived at even on the basis of 
evidence of potential foreclosure of rivals in the market.43  In Competition Commission v 
Telkom SA Ltd44 the Tribunal held that, in order to show anticompetitive harm, it is not 
necessary to show that competitors have actually exited the market or that they lost 
market share before harm can be inferred.45  All that is required, the Tribunal found, is 
that the respondent or dominant firm’s conduct is likely to result in the prevention or 
lessening of competition.46   
 
Can the above contrasting views, that section 8 requires a clear demonstration of actual 
anticompetitive effects and that threatened or potential foreclosure of rivals can be the 
basis of antitrust intervention, be reconciled? Can potential, and therefore non-existent, 
anticompetitive effects be sensibly treated as if they are actual or in existence?  Brassey 
addresses this question by resorting to the hypothetical scenario that “an illness 
contracted today might have the effect that I actually cannot go to work the following 
day”.47  He contends that where an act generally has certain immanent consequences, 
the consequences should be treated seriously notwithstanding the fact that their 
manifestation is postponed.48 
 
                                               
41  O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9 at 269. 
42  Supra n 8.   
43  Id at par 129.  See also Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd and Comair Ltd v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 
Case No 80/CR/Sep06 at pars 184 and 190. 
44  Case No 11/CR/Feb04.  
45  Id at par 99. 
46  Id.   
47  Brassey supra n 32 at 36. 
48  Id.   
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But if Brassey’s argument that the postponed or future consequences of an alleged 
exclusionary act can attract antitrust action is valid, another important question that has 
to be asked is how serious or significant must the possibility of foreclosure linked to the 
alleged exclusionary act be to warrant such action?  It is important to note that the 
Competition Tribunal and Appeal Court have expressed the view that an exclusionary 
act has to be “substantially significant in terms of its effect in foreclosing the market to 
rivals”.49  Indeed, the central principle of the Competition Act is that any prevention and 
lessening of competition will only be prohibited if it is ‘substantial’.  But how does one 
reliably measure the substantiality of a potential, but currently non-existent, exclusion or 
foreclosure in the market?   
 
In Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd, Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Competition 
Commission50 the Competition Appeal Court found that the word ‘substantial’ means 
“material or considerable in amount or duration”.51  In Netstar, the Competition Appeal 
Court again expressed the view that the requirement of ‘substantiality’ demonstrates 
that what is required is something that is “neither speculative nor trivial”.52  This shows 
that antitrust intervention on the basis of likely or potential anticompetitive effects can be 
a controversial process, requiring competition authorities to tread with due caution to 
avoid errors.   
 
                                               
49  Competition Commission v South African Airways supra n 8 at par 132 and South African Airways 
(Pty) Ltd v Comair Ltd Case No 92/CAC/Mar10 at par 112. 
50  Case No 55/CAC/Sept05. 
51  Id at par 19. 
52  Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission supra n 13 at par 30. 
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Competition decisions prohibiting dominant firm conduct where the actual effects of the 
conduct have not yet been felt in the market may be less controversial when the nature 
of the relief sought is interim.  Here the risk of competition authorities wrongly forbidding 
potentially lawful conduct or conduct which might not have adverse effects on 
competition may be ameliorated by the fact that the decision is only a provisional or 
interim measure.  However, in some instances the inconvenience suffered by the 
dominant firm as a result of an incorrect interim decision may have lasting or irreversible 
effects.   
 
Where final relief is sought, competition decisions prohibiting dominant firm conduct 
although the actual effects of such conduct have not yet manifested in the market can 
indeed be controversial.  In such instances, the risk of authorities forbidding conduct 
which might not have adverse effects on the market in the future is exacerbated by the 
fact that such decision is final with permanent implications, unless an appeal is made to 
the next eligible authority or court.  This reinforces concerns about the absence of a 
proper causation framework in competition law.  This is because a competition law 
enforcement regime in which likely or potential anticompetitive effects can easily form 
the basis of a complaint in which final relief is sought and may be granted exhibits all 
the signs of a system with a weak or no causation framework. 
 
I suggest that where the complaint is based on likely rather than actual impact of the 
conduct on competition and final relief is sought by the complainant, competition 
authorities must demand a strong causal link between the impugned conduct and its 
171 
 
possible anticompetitive effects.  Indeed, in Schumann (Sasol)(South Africa)(Pty) Ltd v 
Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd53 and Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes v Competition 
Tribunal54 the Competition Appeal Court pointed out that whenever the competition 
authorities conduct an enquiry into whether competition is likely to be substantially 
prevented or lessened in the market, the decision must be based on evidence which is 
actually available before them and not speculation. 55   Although these decisions 
concerned mergers, they have relevance here, as the Competition Appeal Court has 
relied on them in abuse of dominance cases.56  These decisions show that there can be 
a role for common-law causation in competition law adjudications, particularly when the 
anticompetitive effects of alleged exclusionary conduct by dominant firms are assessed.  
I consider the role of common-law causation in competition law adjudications next.   
 
4.4 The Role of Common-law Causation in Competition Law 
Adjudication 
 
It is not the aim of this Chapter to provide a comprehensive discussion on the subject of 
common-law causation.  For a comprehensive discussion on the subject of causation 
readers are directed to appropriate sources. 57   For purposes of this work, it is 
appropriate merely to highlight the fundamental legal principles of causation at 
common-law.  The underlying assumption of this Chapter is that public competition law 
lacks an appropriate causation framework.  I believe that the adoption of common-law 
                                               
53  Case No 10/CAC/01. 
54  Case No 20/CAC/Jun02. 
55  Schumann (Sasol) (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd supra n 53 at 18 and Mondi Ltd 
and Kohler Cores and Tubes v Competition Tribunal supra n 54 at par 38. 
56  Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v Nationwide Poles CC Case No 49/CAC/Apr05 at 38.   
57   See for example, J Neethling and JM Potgieter Neethling-Potgieter-Visser Law of Delict 7 ed 
(LexisNexis 2014) and Max Loubser et al Law of Delict in South Africa 2 ed (Oxford University Press 
2013). 
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principles of causation can play an important role in the development of an appropriate 
causation framework for competition law.  It is appropriate to note that common-law 
causation is already applied extensively in the South African law of unlawful 
competition,58 a branch of law with the closest ties to public competition law.  Indeed, 
the law of unlawful competition seeks to achieve fair competition in the market by 
making use of common-law rules, whereas public competition law seeks to achieve a 
similar result through a statute, the Competition Act.59   
 
It is clear that drafters of the South African Competition Act anticipated that our 
competition authorities would, when enforcing the Act and developing competition rules, 
rely on some common-law principles.60  An important example in this regard is that all 
proceedings under the Competition Act are conducted in terms of the common-law 
standard of proof, namely ‘balance of probabilities’.61  Equally, interim relief proceedings 
under the Competition Act are also dealt with in terms of the standard of proof 
applicable to a common-law application for an interim interdict in the High Court.62   
 
Causation in competition proceedings could be determined in the same manner and 
should serve the same purpose it does under the common-law.63  At common-law, as 
the then Appellate Division noted in the leading case of Minister of Police v Skosana,64 
the first question in any causation analysis is a factual one and relates to whether the 
                                               
58  J Neethling Van Heerden-Neethling Unlawful Competition 2 ed (2008 LexisNexis) at 81-2. 
59  Act 89 of 1998.   
60  Carrier makes a similar argument with regard to the enforcement of the Sherman Act, see Carrier 
supra n 6 at 1004. 
61  Section 68 of the Competition Act. 
62  Section 49C(3) of the Competition Act. 
63  Carrier supra n 6 at 1004. 
64  1977 (1) SA 31 (A).  
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respondent’s act or omission has caused or contributed to the complainant’s harm.  If it 
did not, then no legal liability can arise. But if the respondent’s act or omission has 
caused or contributed to the complainant’s harm, then the second question becomes 
relevant: whether the respondent’s act or omission is sufficiently close to, or is not too 
remote from, the complainant’s harm for legal liability to ensue.65  These two elements 
of common-law causation are generally referred to as factual and legal causation. 
 
Both factual and legal causation can serve an important function in competition law 
generally, and abuse of dominance adjudication in particular.  For example, factual 
causation will ensure that it is demonstrated that the challenged dominant firm conduct 
is responsible for the anticompetitive harm suffered by consumers or competitors in the 
market, whereas legal causation will ensure that the respondent’s act or omission is 
sufficiently close to, or is not too remote from, the complainant’s harm for legal liability to 
ensue.66 
 
4.4.1 Factual Causation 
 
As highlighted above, factual causation is concerned with the question whether the 
defendant’s conduct has caused or contributed to the anticompetitive harm suffered by 
competitors or consumers in the market.67  There can be no question of legal liability if it 
                                               
65  Id at 34-5 and 43-4. 
66  Carrier supra n 6 at 1004. 
67  Neethling supra n 58 at 81. 
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is not established that the defendant’s conduct has been a cause of the anticompetitive 
harm in question.68   
 
Courts and commentators regard the conditio sine qua non or the ‘but-for’ test the most 
important in determining whether a factual causal nexus exits between the defendant’s 
act and the harmful consequences suffered by the complainant.69  However, this is not 
the only test for factual causation, as courts have accepted that there may be situations 
which warrant the development of exceptions or alternatives in accordance with 
common sense and flexibility.70  This is particularly true in cases involving concurrent, 
supervening, or multiple causes.71  In Lee v Minister of Correctional Services72 the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that the process of establishing factual causation 
under the common-law in terms of the conditio sine qua non or ‘but-for’ test has always 
been a flexible and not a rigid one.73  However, the Court did not jettison the conditio 
sine qua non or ‘but-for’ test, but merely emphasised the importance of flexibility when 
applying it.74  Indeed, even those who have advocated the use of other tests for factual 
causation, have tended to use the conditio sine qua non as their point of departure.75 
 
According to the conditio sine qua non theory, the defendant’s conduct must have been 
the precondition or necessary condition (a conditio sine qua non) of the harm suffered 
                                               
68  Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 183 and Loubser supra n 57 at 69. 
69  Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 183 and 185. 
70  Minister of Police v Skosana supra n 64 at 34-5; Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 
1984 (2) SA 888 (A) at 915; Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) at 
par 25; and Minister of Finance v Gore NO 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA) at par 33. 
71  Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank supra n 70.   
72  2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). 
73  Id at pars 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 63 and 73.  Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 193-4. 
74  Alistair Price ‘Factual Causation After Lee’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 491-500 at 497. 
75  Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 183. 
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by the complainant.76  Simply put, the harm suffered by the complainant must have 
resulted from the defendant’s conduct.  The basic theory underlying the conditio sine 
qua non theory is that every event is the result of another prior event, which can 
reasonably be deemed sufficient to cause it.77   
 
In order to determine whether a particular conduct can be regarded as a factual cause 
of the harm suffered by the complainant one applies the ‘but-for’ enquiry.  The essence 
of this ‘but-for’ enquiry was eruditely explained by the then Appellate Division in 
International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley.78  Here, the Court pointed out that the 
enquiry involves a number of elements: the making of a hypothetical enquiry as to what 
probably would have happened absent the conduct of the respondent; the mental 
elimination of the respondent’s alleged unlawful conduct and the substitution of a 
hypothetical course of lawful conduct in the place of the respondent’s alleged unlawful 
conduct; and the posing of the question whether upon such hypothesis the 
complainant’s harm would have remained?79  If it is shown that the complainant would 
have suffered the same fate absent the respondent’s conduct or despite the 
hypothetical lawful conduct, then the respondent’s conduct is not the factual cause of 
the complainant’s harm.80  This ‘but-for’ test can be applied in circumstances involving 
both positive conduct and omissions.81   
 
                                               
76  Minister of Police v Skosana supra n 64 and Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank supra n 
70.  Loubser supra n 57 at 71 and Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 186. 
77  Loubser supra n 57 at 71. 
78  International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A). 
79  Id at 700. 
80  Id. 
81  Loubser supra n 57 at 72. 
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Where positive conduct is involved, a process of elimination is applied, which involves, 
as stated in International Shipping Co,82 mentally eliminating the respondent’s conduct 
from conditions that led to the complainant’s harm and asking whether the 
complainant’s harm would still have occurred.  If the harm would still have occurred then 
the respondent’s conduct was not a necessary condition (conditio sine qua non) for the 
complainant’s harm.83  In exclusionary abuse of dominance complaints, for example 
where the dominant firm is alleged to have engaged in predatory pricing and in so doing 
eliminated competitors unable to match those prices, the process would involve 
mentally eliminating the predatory practice.  Then the next step is to ask the question 
whether the complainant would have remained in the market absent the predatory 
practice.  If the complainant would still have exited the market absent the predatory 
practice, then the practice cannot be regarded as a necessary condition (conditio sine 
qua non) for the exclusion.   
 
Where omissions are involved, a process of substitution is applied, which involves 
mentally substituting or inserting a hypothetical lawful course of conduct as a substitute 
for the omission.84  And if the hypothetically substituted conduct would have prevented 
the harm suffered by the complainant, then the omission was a necessary condition 
(conditio sine qua non) for the complainant’s harm. 85   For example, in abuse of 
dominance cases involving refusal to deal – the effect of which is the effective removal 
or exit from the market of a competitor – the process would involve mentally or 
                                               
82  International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley supra n 78 at 700. 
83  Loubser supra n 57 at 72 and Price supra n 74 at 492. 
84  Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank supra n 70 and S v Van As 1967 4 SA 495 (A). 
85  Loubser supra n 57 at 72. 
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hypothetically incorporating or introducing positive lawful conduct, such as compliance 
with the obligation to deal, as a substitute for the omission or the refusal to deal.  If the 
hypothetical compliance with the obligation to deal would have contributed to the 
retention of competitors, then the refusal to deal was a necessary condition (conditio 
sine qua non) for the exit from the market by the competitor.  Having expounded on the 
elements of factual causation, I turn next to legal causation.   
 
4.4.2 Legal Causation 
 
Unlike the determination of factual causation, which may be relatively straightforward,86 
legal causation poses some serious problems, particularly when the course of events is 
not clear. 87   One particular problem that may arise when assessing the effect of 
dominant firm conduct on competition is that there may be a host of other factors 
operating to undermine competition in the market.  And these other factors may even be 
independent of, or unrelated to, the dominant firm itself or its conduct.   
 
For example, in a competition law complaint in which a dominant firm is alleged to have 
engaged in an exclusionary practice, the effect of which is the removal of an effective 
competitor, or the prevention of a competitor’s ability to grow market share, one is 
always confronted with the reality that even in perfectly functioning markets businesses 
fail every day due to a host of reasons.  Such reasons may include poor planning or 
                                               
86  Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 85. 
87  James Grant ‘The Permissive Similarity of Legal Causation By Adequate Cause and Nova Causa 
Interveniens’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 896-906 at 896. 
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lack of experience, skills, or resources.88  Other factors, such as regulatory challenges, 
general decline in an industry or changing market conditions adversely affecting 
incumbents, high operating costs, and barriers to entry may affect the survival prospects 
of many businesses in a market.  Without legal causation, it is possible that perfectly 
legitimate business practices by dominant firms operating in markets affected by these 
challenges may easily be mistaken as the cause of the exit from the market by 
competitors.89  In these circumstances, the challenge facing competition authorities is to 
separate the alleged effects of the impugned dominant firm conduct on competition, 
from those of other events affecting the market.90   
 
Legal causation plays an important role here, by ensuring that the respondent’s conduct 
is sufficiently close to, or not too remote from, the anticompetitive effects complained 
of.91  Although legal causation still involves aspects of factual causation, the unique part 
of legal causation is that it creates a rule which sets limits on liability, by establishing the 
legal boundary beyond which liability cannot exist.92   
 
                                               
88   O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9.  Bertrand M. Cooper (ed) ‘Causation in Primary Line Price 
Discrimination - Section 2(a) Clayton Act’ (1970) 64 Northwestern University Law Review 128-42 at 142; 
also reprinted as ‘Causation in Primary Line Price Discrimination - Section 2(a) Clayton Act’ (1975) 6 
Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics 489-506 at 505. 
89  This is particularly relevant for the South African domestic airline industry where the collapse of many 
small players in recent years, largely due to higher operating costs and non-profitable routes, has been 
blamed largely on South African Airways as the dominant player. See Amanda Visser and Linda Ensor 
‘Competition Commission Declines to Probe SAA’ (12 November 2012) accessed at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2012/11/12/competition-commission-declines-to-probe-saa (date of last 
use: 6 July  2016). 
90  Carrier supra n 6 at 991. 
91  International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley supra n 78 at 700. 
92  Blaikie v The British Transport Commission 1961 AC 44 at 49; S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) at 40; 
and Ncoyo v Commissioner of Police, Ciskei 1998 (1) SA 128 (CK) at 138. 
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This boundary is essential because in many instances legitimate dominant firm conduct 
can still be remotely connected to the exclusion of competitors from the market.  As 
commentators have remarked, “even the most lawful conduct is potentially exclusionary: 
in each sale there is one winner and at least one loser and the loser is to some extent 
excluded”.93  Legal causation ensures that the defendant’s conduct was the material or 
significant or substantial or dominant cause of the anticompetitive harm suffered by the 
complainant.  Therefore, legal causation involves the delicate act of striking a balance 
between the competing interests of the complainant and respondent.  Judicial 
experience in balancing these competing interests has led to the development of 
various traditional theories or tests for legal causation.94   
 
Given the limited individual influence of the traditional theories for legal causation in our 
law, it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive discussion of all of them.  This is 
because all the traditional theories of legal causation have been subsumed into a 
flexible approach, which seeks to reconcile and balance all divergent approaches to 
legal causation. 95   Following the decision of the then Appellate Division in S v 
Mokgethi,96 it is now generally accepted that the leading test for legal causation is a 
flexible one, in which factors such as reasonable foreseeability, directness, the 
                                               
93  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 10 at par 7.11.3.1. 
94   The best know traditional theories for determining legal causation are the theory of adequate 
causation; the theory of direct consequences or proximate cause; the theory of reasonable foreseeability; 
the theory of novus actus interveniens; the talem qualem theory; and the fault theory of causation, see 
Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 203-20 and Loubser supra n 57 at 94-100. 
95  Neethling and Potgieter supra n 57 at 201 and Loubser supra n 57 at 91. 
96  Supra n 92.   
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presence or absence of a novus actus interveniens, legal policy, reasonableness, 
fairness, and justice all play a part.97   
 
To the extent that the flexible approach to legal causation is guided fundamentally by 
the principles of fairness, justice, and reasonableness, it is submitted that this test can 
be of great assistance in competition law proceedings.  Having regard to the dangers, 
highlighted above, of a weak or non-existent causation framework in our competition 
law, it can be argued that this branch of law requires a causation framework guided by 
the principles of fairness, justice, and reasonableness.  Such a framework will ensure 
that the interests of the state and complainants in competition proceedings to root out 
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct are evenly balanced against the interests of 
respondents not to be held liable for speculative antitrust breaches.   
 
4.4.3 Summary  
 
The introduction of common-law causation principles can play an important role in the 
development of an appropriate causation framework for competition law.98  Common-
law causation principles in competition law proceedings will ensure that only dominant 
firm conduct which has caused the exclusion of competitors or harm to consumers and 
is sufficiently close to, or not too remote from, this effect will attract legal consequences.  
For example, factual causation will help determine whether absent the respondent’s 
                                               
97  Id at 40-1.  International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley supra n 78 at 701 and Standard Chartered 
Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) at 765. 
98  Carrier supra n 6 at 104. 
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conduct anticompetitive harm would have occurred.  The enquiry will not, however, end 
there in the event of a positive answer.  Legal causation will follow.   
 
Legal causation will determine whether the respondent’s act or omission is sufficiently 
close to the anticompetitive harm suffered by the complainant for legal liability to arise.  
In cases involving concurrent or multiple or intervening causes, legal causation will play 
an important role in determining whether the conduct of the respondent was a material 
or dominant or primary or substantial or significant cause of the anticompetitive harm 
suffered by the complainant.  If the answer to this second question is in the affirmative, 
antirust liability has been established.  The incorporation of common-law causation 
principles into our competition law will not be unusual or controversial.  Many other legal 
fields have already successfully borrowed their causation framework directly from the 
common-law in general, and the law of delict in particular, without compromising the 
application and enforcement of the relevant law.99   
 
The introduction of common-law principles of causation into our competition law will not 
have a negative effect on the application and enforcement of our abuse of dominance 
provisions.  On the contrary, as I will demonstrate in my conclusion to this Chapter, I 
envisage that a flexible application of the common-law principles of causation may have 
a positive effect on the adjudication of competition disputes.  Having outlined the 
proposed causation framework that I consider appropriate for competition law, in the 
discussion that follows I consider cases in which causation was central to the 
                                               
99  Id at 105.  In South Africa, our criminal law has borrowed extensively from the causation principles of 
our law of delict.  The seminal case of State v Mokgethi, supra n 92, is a prime example in this regard.   
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determination issues and how it was dealt with by competition authorities and the 
courts.   
 
4.5 A Review of South African Competition Law Decisions where 
Causation was Central to the Determination of Issues 
 
The structural and form-based approach to competition law enforcement in South Africa 
can generally be attributed to the manner in which some of our abuse of dominance 
provisions have been framed.  These provisions do not require the complainant to prove 
that the act complained of has anticompetitive effects, as certain practices are 
prohibited per se. 100   In such cases, mere proof of the existence of the alleged 
exclusionary conduct is sufficient for the complainant to be successful.  This means in 
cases involving practices that are prohibited per se, anticompetitive harm is based on 
presumptions rather than facts, as no investigation is made on the effects of the 
impugned conduct on competition. 101  The final effect of this state of affairs is that 
causation is rendered irrelevant in per se prohibitions, as the complainant is never 
required to show that the respondent’s conduct has caused harm to competitors and/or 
consumers. 
 
Even in those other cases under provisions which require the complainant to 
demonstrate anticompetitive effects, causation is generally dealt with implicitly but not 
                                               
100  For example, an exclusionary act such as a refusal by a dominant firm to provide a competitor with 
access to an essential facility is prohibited outright with no need to prove anticompetitive effects, see 
section 8(b) of the Competition Act.  See also Nationwide Poles v Sasol (Oil) Pty Ltd supra n 23 at pars 
96-97 and Competition Commission v Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk Case No 37/CR/Jun01 at par 95.   
101   O’Donoghue and Padilla, who are familiar with our law and often appear in cases before our 
competition authorities as experts, have also lamented a similar problem in European competition law, 
see O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9 at 272.  It is reasonable to infer that their views would remain the 
same as far as our law is concerned. 
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as a discrete and important element of antitrust liability.  In addition, when competition 
authorities do investigate the effects of the impugned conduct on competition, this 
enquiry is generally limited to the effects of the impugned conduct on competitors.  The 
effects of the impugned conduct on consumers are seldom investigated.  The result is 
scant case law on causation in competition law.   
 
Below I discuss some of the important decisions of our competition authorities in which 
the issue of causation was of great relevance.  I start with the cases in which an 
incorrect causation test was applied and follow this with the cases in which the correct 
causation test was applied. 
 
4.5.1 Cases where an Incorrect Causation Test was Applied 
 
In Nationwide Poles v Sasol (Oil) Pty Ltd,102 it was alleged that a dominant firm, Sasol, 
was involved in the practice of price discrimination which was designed to, or had the 
effect of, increasing the complainant’s cost structure and thereby retarded growth and 
expansion opportunities for the complainant.  There was no debate as to whether the 
complainant was indeed experiencing general growth and expansion challenges in the 
market.  The debate centered rather on the question whether the respondent’s price 
discrimination was responsible for the alleged inability of the complainant to compete in 
the market and to grow its market share.103  Although it was not framed as such, this 
was by implication a question of causation.   
                                               
102  Supra n 23.  
103  Id at pars 113-118. 
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The Tribunal stated that it found it impossible to “identify what the appropriate 
counterfactual would be”.104  In other words, the Tribunal was unable to identify what 
would have been the position of the complainant absent the price discrimination, in line 
with the common-law ‘but-for’ or conditio sine qua non theory of causation.  However, 
despite its inability to determine this, the Tribunal found that the price discrimination had 
disadvantaged the complainant.105  So, the Tribunal found that the price discrimination 
was responsible for the deterioration in the market position of the complainant.  It 
reached this conclusion without any robust determination as to whether the price 
discrimination was a conditio sine qua non for the complainant’s predicament.   
 
It is likely that the price discrimination might have caused or contributed materially to the 
complainant’s troubles, and the Tribunal might have been correct in its finding against 
the respondent.  However, it is disconcerting that the finding itself was made without 
reliance on solid evidence establishing the link between the defendant’s conduct and 
the complainant’s harm.  The Tribunal merely drew an inference of harm, without 
requiring evidence establishing the link between the defendant’s conduct and the 
complainant’s harm.   
 
When the matter went on appeal, in Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd vs Nationwide Poles CC,106 it 
came as no surprise that the decision of the Tribunal was reversed.107  The Competition 
                                               
104  Id at par 117. 
105  Id.   
106  Supra n 56.   
107  Id at 41. 
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Appeal Court found that the determination on whether Sasol’s pricing policy was likely 
substantially to prevent or lessen competition could not rest on ‘an inherent effect of 
Sasol’s pricing policy, without any recourse to evidence demonstrating that the 
impugned conduct is capable of having or is likely to have an anticompetitive effect in 
the relevant market’.108  To support this finding, the Competition Appeal Court relied on 
its previous decisions in Schumann (Sasol) (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Price’s Daelite 
(Pty) Ltd109 and Mondi Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes v Competition Tribunal,110 
where it found that the determination of whether competition is likely to be substantially 
prevented or lessened in the market must be based on evidence which is actually 
available to the competition authority and not speculation.111   
 
In Competition Commission v South African Airways112 the country’s largest domestic 
airline, South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (SAA), had created incentive schemes for travel 
agents which, the Commission argued, had the effect of excluding the complainant, 
Nationwide Airlines, from the market.113  SAA challenged the Commission’s case on the 
effects of the incentive schemes, by arguing that the Commission failed to establish a 
causal link between the schemes and the demise of the complainant.114  While the 
Tribunal agreed that a complainant under section 8(d) of the Act was required to 
demonstrate anticompetitive effects,115 the critical question on the effects issue was 
                                               
108  Id at 38. 
109  Supra n 53. 
110  Supra n 54. 
111  Schumann (Sasol)(South Africa)(Pty) Ltd v Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd supra n 53 at 18 and Mondi Ltd 
and Kohler Cores and Tubes v Competition Tribunal supra n 54 at par 38.   
112  Supra n 8. 
113  Id at par 28. 
114  Id at pars 30 and 229. 
115  Id at pars 110-111 and 132.   
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how far a complainant must go in establishing the anticompetitive effects required by 
the provision.   
 
The Tribunal approached this question by asking “should an abuse of dominance 
provision proscribing exclusionary conduct by dominant firms require the existence of 
evidence of each chain of causation, establishing the links between the act of exclusion 
and competitive harm”? 116   To this question, the Tribunal responded by quoting a 
passage from Areeda and Hovenkamp in which it is stated that “no antitrust authority 
which is seriously concerned about the evil of monopoly would condition its intervention 
strategy solely on a clear and genuine chain of causation”. 117   The Tribunal then 
concluded that there was respectable authority for the proposition that exclusionary 
practices should not be dealt with on a stricter test of causation.118   
 
The reason behind the choice of this approach is that, from an enforcement point of 
view, it is difficult for the Competition Commission and complainants to establish a clear 
and genuine chain of causation in exclusionary abuse of dominance cases.  A less strict 
or weaker test for causation may enable a finding of abuse even in circumstances 
where there may be no conclusive evidence or proof of foreclosure or harm to 
consumers.  While this approach is controversial, it is appealing to competition 
authorities because it enhances the effective enforcement and deterrence effect of the 
Act.   
                                               
116  Id at par 115. 
117  Id.  Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application 2 ed Vol 3 (Aspen Law & Business 2001) at par 651c.  See also Kapoor supra n 6 at 40-41. 
118  Supra n 8 at par 129. 
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Responding to the complainant’s claim that SAA’s incentive scheme was responsible for 
the decline in its fortunes, SAA contended that there were many other factors that might 
have caused, or materially contributed to, the decline in the fortunes of the complainant.  
These included factors such as incidents of overpricing or inappropriate price increases 
by the complainant (admitted to by the complainant), the public/customers’ declining 
confidence in the complainant as a result of bankruptcy rumours, some poor business 
decisions made by the complainant, poor economic conditions, and the SAA’s improved 
competitiveness.119   
 
These defences or alternative explanations of possible causes of a decline in 
competition in the market are both important and very common in exclusionary abuse 
cases.  They must be considered by a competition authority, especially when raised by 
a respondent.120  As Carrier also notes, “the most frequent and important issue in 
resolving exclusionary abuse of dominance complaints is assessing the role played by 
alternative factors in bringing about the harm complained of”.121  As the Competition 
Appeal Court found in Netstar, “where a respondent raises or points to the possibility of 
the intervention or involvement of third parties or other factors that may have had a 
causative effect in bringing about the lessening or prevention of competition, it is 
necessary for a court or competition authority to have regard to these possibilities”.122   
 
                                               
119  Id at pars 229-231 and 236. 
120  ‘Causation in Primary Line Price Discrimination - Section 2(a) Clayton Act’ supra n 88.   
121  Carrier supra n 6 at 996. 
122  Netstar (Pty) Ltd and Others v Competition Commission supra n 13 at par 33.   
188 
 
However, it is clear from the judgment of the Tribunal that these alternative explanations 
as to the possible causes of the decline in the fortunes of the complainant were not 
dealt with in any convincing way.  If these factors were given any serious consideration 
as possible causes of the complainant’s troubles, one would have expected the Tribunal 
to investigate whether the complainant’s troubles would have remained absent the 
incentive schemes.  Alternatively, the tribunal should have considered whether the 
incentive schemes were, regardless of the other contributing factors, the most material 
or significant contributing factors.  But the Tribunal did not consider these issues in a 
satisfactory manner.   
 
The Tribunal justified its approach by stating that cases of exclusionary anticompetitive 
conduct generally create the dilemma that the counterfactual, namely what the market 
would have looked like absent the alleged prohibited practice, is impossible to 
construct.123  But the Tribunal nevertheless felt confident in making the finding that the 
decline in the fortunes of the complainant was causally consistent with the respondent’s 
incentives scheme with travel agents.124  This was despite its own admission that it 
simply could not be sure whether the incentive scheme was indeed the most probable 
cause of the decline in the fortunes of the complainant.125  In defence of its approach, 
the Tribunal argued that it would be a disservice to the enforcement of the Act for it to 
abstain from making a finding of the nature it did against the respondent, merely 
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124  Id at par 237. 
125  Id at par 238. 
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because it had not been conclusively proven that the respondent’s conduct was the 
dominant cause of the anticompetitive harm complained of.126   
 
It may be argued that the Tribunal’s reluctance to engage in a ‘but-for’ or counterfactual 
investigations in both Nationwide Poles and South African Airways deprived it of crucial 
facts and information which would have enabled it to make better decisions.  Indeed, 
engaging in counterfactual analysis may not be as unnecessary and impossible as the 
Tribunal has made it out to be.  Counterfactual analysis or ‘but-for’ tests have been 
traditionally applied in many areas of law, such as delict or criminal law, by asking the 
hypothetical question of how the situation would have been had an act or event not 
occurred, in order to show a causal connection between an act or event that occurred 
and the effects attributed to it.127   
 
In competition law, counterfactual investigations are already applied almost religiously in 
merger cases in all jurisdictions.  The purpose of counterfactual investigations in merger 
cases is to determine whether or not the market will be worse off if the merger were to 
be approved.  This is done by comparing the likely effect of the merger in the market, if 
approved, against the state of competition in the market absent the merger.128  As 
Bavasso and Lindsay further observe, “in determining issues of causation in merger 
control antitrust lawyers and enforcement agencies increasingly engage in 
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127  Kay E. Winkler ‘Counterfactual Analysis in Predation Cases’ (2013) 34 European Competition Law 
Review 410-21 at 410. 
128  Id at 419 and 421. 
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counterfactual analysis to determine the situation that would have arisen in the absence 
of the merger which is the subject of assessment”.129 
 
There is no reason why counterfactual investigations cannot be applied in exclusionary 
abuse of dominance cases.130  In my view, the counterfactual or ‘but-for’ enquiry is a 
central legal requirement implied in all exclusionary abuse of dominance provisions.  In 
cases involving allegations of exclusionary abuse of dominance, the general rule is that 
the respondent’s conduct ought not to be prohibited, unless it is shown that but for that 
conduct competitors would have entered, remained, or expanded within the market.131  
In such cases, an investigation into whether the general characteristics of the relevant 
market were also conducive to new entry and expansion by other firms would be an 
appropriate starting point.132  This means the whole enquiry must not be limited to the 
assessment of the respondent’s conduct as a sole obstacle to competition.  The enquiry 
must also extend to all other possible alternative obstacles that would have confronted 
aspirant entrants to the market.133  Issues such as the availability of capital, the need to 
establish an infrastructure, the availability of suitably qualified staff, and access to 
appropriate technology may all be relevant factors.134   
 
An assessment of the causal role of alternative factors in the prevention and elimination 
of competition is essential not only to ensure that justice is done, but also to ensure that 
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justice is seen to be done.  Competition authorities must guard against appearing to 
have prejudged a case, by failing genuinely to consider – apart from respondent’s 
conduct – all reasonable alternative causes of the prevention and elimination of 
competition.  It is the duty of a competition authority to consider these alternative 
causes to determine what role, if any, they have had in bringing about the 
anticompetitive effects complained of.  If, for example, a competition authority in its 
determination finds that the alternative factors proffered by the respondent had no role 
or only a limited role in preventing or eliminating competition, it must then rule that the 
respondent’s conduct is either the sole or dominant or material or significant cause of 
the loss of competition.   
 
Where a competition authority finds that the alternative causes were the dominant or 
material or significant cause of the loss of competition, it must absolve the respondent 
of antitrust liability, because the causal link between the respondent’s conduct and the 
loss of competition in the market is either too weak or nonexistent.  This is the 
appropriate causation approach for competition law and was followed by the 
Competition Tribunal in Competition Commission and JT International South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd135 and the Competition Appeal 
Court in Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission.136  I shall now discuss these two 
cases in greater detail.   
 
4.5.2 Cases where the Correct Causation Test was Applied 
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In British American Tobacco South Africa,137 the Tribunal took a different and indeed the 
correct approach to the issue of causation.  However, it is important to note that here 
the issue of causation was also dealt with implicitly rather than explicitly, as is common 
with most, if not all, decisions of the Tribunal.  In this case the Competition Commission 
and JT International South Africa (Pty) Ltd (JTI) laid a complaint in respect of alleged 
contraventions of sections 8(c) and 8(d)(i) of the Competition Act by British American 
Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd (BATSA).  BATSA and JTI competed in the South 
African market for the sale of manufactured cigarettes.  It was alleged that certain 
exclusivity agreements concluded between BATSA and selected retailers incentivised 
retailers to promote, market, and sell BATSA brands in a manner that made it 
impossible for competitors to promote, market, and sell their products through these 
retailers and that this resulted in their foreclosure. 
 
In terms relevant to the principle of causation, the Tribunal outlined that “not only must 
foreclosure of rivals or consumer harm be shown, they must also be shown to have 
flowed from the respondent’s alleged anticompetitive conduct and not other factors”.138   
This meant that where competitive harm could reasonably be found to have resulted 
from events or factors other than the respondent’s conduct, it could not readily be 
concluded that the respondent’s conduct was the cause of the antitrust harm 
complained of.  This caution was found to be particularly relevant in this case because 
there was an eminently reasonable possibility that harm to the structure of the cigarette 
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market might have been caused significantly by comprehensive regulatory 
interventions.139  The marketing, sale, and the consumption of cigarettes in South Africa 
has been highly restricted and negatively affected by the Regulations pursuant to the 
Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act.140   
 
The critical issue for the Tribunal in this case was therefore to choose the most 
significant causal factor for the alleged anticompetitive harm, between the exclusivity 
agreements between BATSA and the retailers and the Regulations emanating from the 
Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act.141  The Tribunal noted that where there are 
two or more likely sources of anticompetitive harm, it would require a demonstration that 
the anticompetitive harm allegedly generated by the conduct of the respondent was, on 
its own and independent of the second source, sufficiently significant for antitrust liability 
to follow.142  Having considered the merits of the arguments for all the possible causes 
of harm to the structure of the market, the Tribunal concluded that the most significant 
cause of foreclosure was the Tobacco Regulations and not the conduct of the 
respondent.143 
 
The Tribunal emphasised that, having regard to the evidence before it, it would be 
impossible for it to conclude that the most significant cause of the alleged foreclosure 
was the conduct of BATSA rather than the decisions by the legislature, whose manifest 
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intent was indeed to limit and possibly eliminate the promotion of cigarette sales.144  
Indeed, part of the complainant’s business where foreclosure was more evident, ie the 
marketing and promotion of cigarettes, happened coincidentally to be the one most 
affected industry-wide by the Tobacco Regulations. 145   The Tribunal observed that 
because marketing, advertising and sponsorship were overwhelmingly the most 
significant mode of promotion in this market, the abrupt proscription of these activities 
by the Regulations was bound to impact on growth in the overall market as well as on 
the complainant’s market share.146 
 
In Competition Commission v Netstar (Pty) Ltd & Others 147  the central issue was 
whether standards set by an industry association in the stolen vehicle recovery market 
established barriers that prevented competitors, who were not members of that 
association, from entering the market and competing with association members.  The 
evidence before the Tribunal overwhelmingly suggested that it was actually insurance 
companies, who were themselves customers of the association members, who 
demanded and drove the setting of the standards. 148   Despite this evidence, the 
Tribunal found that the setting and implementation of the standards was the result of an 
agreement or concerted practice between the association members, the purpose and 
effect of which was to prevent competition from non-members.149   
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When the matter went on appeal, 150  the Competition Appeal Court’s major 
preoccupation was the issue of causation.  It was concerned with the question of who, 
between the association members and the insurance companies, was responsible for 
the establishment of these standards, found by the Tribunal to have had the effect of 
substantially preventing and lessening competition in the stolen vehicle recovery 
market.  This was a question of causation and the Competition Appeal Court explicitly 
recognised it as such.151   
 
The Court adopted the ‘but-for’ or conditio sine qua non test.152  It stated that the 
appropriate approach would be to ask whether, ‘but-for’ the respondent’s conduct, the 
prevention and lessening of competition in the market would have occurred.153  And, if 
the answer is in the affirmative, the Court further remarked, then the respondent’s 
conduct is not the cause of the decline in competition in the market.154  This, the Court 
found, is the same enquiry conducted in relation to factual causation in other areas of 
the law, such as the law of delict.155  However, the Court found further that a negative 
answer to the ‘but-for’ question would also not finally dispose of the matter.156  Legal 
causation, the Court found, would have to follow.157   
 
The Court observed that a market is a complex concept with many factors capable of 
influencing what happens in it, with the result that factors other than the respondent’s 
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conduct may be a dominant cause of the prevention or lessening of competition.158  In 
such circumstances, the duty of the court and the competition authority is to find the 
dominant or primary or substantial cause of the prevention or lessening of 
competition.159  The Court found that liability in competition law should arise only where 
the substantial prevention or lessening of competition is closely connected with, or is the 
direct and predominant consequence of, the respondent’s conduct.160  Having regard to 
the leading or dominant role played by the insurance companies, as major customers in 
the stolen vehicle recovery market, in bringing about the standards complained of, the 
Court found that any agreement between the association members, or their conduct, 
could not be regarded as the legal cause of the prevention of competition in the 
market.161   This is the correct approach to causation and should be applied in all 
exclusionary abuse of dominance cases where the demonstration of anticompetitive 
effects is essential.  However, there is little evidence in practice to suggest that the 
Appeal Court’s Netstar decision has been fully embraced by the Tribunal and 
Commission.   
 
4.5.3 Summary  
 
The enforcement of some of our abuse of dominance provisions is based on form rather 
than substance.  This is because some of these provisions do not require the 
complainant to establish anticompetitive effects, because certain practices are 
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prohibited per se.  Here, prohibition is based on a general theory of harm which is in 
turn based on presumptions rather than proven facts.  In cases involving the 
infringement of per se provisions, causation is, therefore, nonexistent.  In addition, in 
cases under other provisions requiring a complainant to demonstrate anticompetitive 
effects, causation is generally dealt with implicitly and not as a discrete and important 
element of antitrust liability.  For these reasons, causation is one of the most 
underdeveloped areas of South African competition law.  Some of the decisions of the 
Tribunal, such as Nationwide Poles and South African Airways, have further negated 
the role of causation in competition law, by failing to engage in ‘but for’ or counterfactual 
investigations, in order to determine whether the respondent’s conduct is the cause of 
the anticompetitive effects complained of.   
 
However, recent decisions of the Tribunal in British American Tobacco South Africa and 
the Competition Appeal Court in Netstar espouse the correct approach to the issue of 
causation in competition law and should be followed.  It, however, remains to be seen 
whether any important legal principle will emerge from these cases, as there is little 
evidence in practice to suggest that the decisions are being consistently followed.  It 
must be emphasised that the importance of these two decisions does not lie so much in 
their eventual outcomes, which saw the dismissal of complaints against dominant firms, 
but in their emphasis on common-law principles of causation.  These principles ensure 
fairness and justice, by requiring that in prohibited practices and abuse of dominance 
cases where the demonstration of anticompetitive effects is essential, respondent firms 
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should not be found liable in the absence of a causal link between their conduct and the 
anticompetitive effects complained of. 
 
4.6 The Role of Causation in Foreign Competition Law 
 
As stated earlier, in different jurisdictions the concept of causation has been invoked in 
different legal contexts in public competition law proceedings.  This suggests that there 
may be conceptual differences in the understanding of this concept in different 
jurisdictions.  For example, in European competition law the causation requirement is 
understood to mean that a complainant must show that a firm has used its dominant 
position as a means or instrument of engaging in anticompetitive conduct.  In American 
antitrust law this requirement is applied in a somewhat reverse fashion, requiring a 
complainant to show that anticompetitive conduct has been used as a means to attain, 
enhance or protect market power.  In both jurisdictions, the intention of the dominant 
firm appears to be a relevant factor in their causation analyses.   
 
4.6.1 Causation in European Competition Law  
 
In European abuse of dominance law some cases and commentators have suggested 
that, because abuse of dominance presupposes the initial existence of dominance and 
dominant firm conduct amounting to an abuse of such position, a causal link between 
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the dominant position and conduct constituting the abuse must be established.162  In 
Continental Can v Commission 163  it was argued that the expression ‘abuse of a 
dominant position’ suggests that the position of dominance in the market is used as an 
instrument to inflict the abuse.164  In Tetra Park International v Commission II165 the 
European Court of Justice found that Article 102 presupposes “a link between the 
dominant position and the alleged abusive conduct”.166  In United Brands Company and 
United Brands Continental BV v Commission167 a similar view was expressed.168  
 
O’Donoghue and Padilla consider this to be an essential principle in abuse of 
dominance adjudication.  They contend that it fulfils the important requirement of legal 
causation under Article 102 of European competition law.169  They argue that certain 
abusive conduct, such as excessive or predatory pricing, depends expressly or implicitly 
on the connection between the dominant position and the abusive conduct, as non-
dominant firms cannot successfully carry out such practices.170  Eilmansberger also 
contends that ‘because the central objective of Article 102 is to safeguard the 
competitive process from distortions stemming from, or associated with, market power, 
market dominance should be a constitutive, or at least a formative, element of the 
concept of abuse’.171  He supports this contention by making reference to the definition 
                                               
162  Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission at par 27.  O’Donoghue and Padilla supra 
n 9 at 263 and Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law 7 ed (Oxford University Press 2012) at 
203-04.  
163  Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission. 
164  Id at 254.  Whish and Bailey supra n 162 at 203 and O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9 at 263. 
165  Tetra Park International v Commission supra n 162. 
166  Id at par 27. 
167  Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission. 
168  Id at par 249. 
169  O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9 at 263 and 265. 
170  Id at 264-5. 
171  Eilmansberger supra n 11 at 142. 
200 
 
of dominance proffered by the Court in Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission,172 
which placed emphasis on the role of dominance in enabling a dominant firm to prevent 
effective competition in the market.173  
 
However, the majority of European competition law decisions and commentators have 
rejected this proposition. 174   As Whish and Bailey argue, “the scope of abuse of 
dominance provisions would be severely reduced if the authorities could only apply 
such provisions to practices which can constitute the instrumental use of dominance as 
a tool to perpetrate the abuse”.175   They contend that ‘abuse of dominance’ is an 
objective concept and the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position may be 
regarded as abusive in the absence of any fault on its part and irrespective of the 
intentions of the undertaking.176  Put differently, their argument, which I support, is that 
abusive conduct must be judged by its effect on competition rather than on the intention 
of the dominant firm.   
 
4.6.2 Causation in American Antitrust Law 
 
In American monopolization law a slightly different approach is followed.  The causation 
requirement is understood to mean that a complainant must show that anticompetitive 
conduct has been used as a means to attain, enhance or protect market power.  In 
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terms of this requirement, intent is a central element of the concept of causation.  
Indeed, in American antitrust law liability for monopolization requires the ‘willful’ 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power in the relevant market, as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen or 
historical accident.177 
 
In United States v Microsoft178 the Court accepted that there must be a reasonable 
connection between the defendant's monopolizing conduct and the resulting monopoly 
power.179  In its Rambus opinion, the Federal Trade Commission adopted this principle, 
holding that Rambus’s conduct “significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly 
power”.180  However, the Federal Trade Commission’s Rambus opinion was reversed 
on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, because 
the Commission did not show the Court that Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct, 
and thereby acquired its monopoly power in the relevant markets unlawfully. 181  In 
Broadcom Corp v Qualcomm Inc182 the Court found that conduct will fall foul of antitrust 
laws, if there is an increased likelihood that the conduct will confer monopoly power on 
the defendant.183   
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However, it is also appropriate to state here that this causation requirement has proved 
to be of limited importance in the majority of American monopolization cases.  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in United States v 
Microsoft,184 “there is limited authority, if any, supporting the proposition that a plaintiff in 
a monopolization case must show that a defendant’s monopoly power is precisely 
attributable to anticompetitive conduct”.185  There are, as a result, a limited number of 
monopolization cases in which American courts and competition authorities have 
insisted on this requirement.   
 
4.6.3 Summary  
 
The proposition, supported by some courts, competition authorities and commentators 
in European competition and American antitrust law, that there must be a relationship 
between dominance and anticompetitive conduct and between anticompetitive conduct 
and monopoly power, respectively, places significant emphasis on the firm’s motives or 
intentions when engaging in such conduct.  It does not really relate to the common-law 
concept of causation, as it is generally known and applied in our law of delict in South 
Africa.  Common-law causation deals with the causal link between the respondent’s 
conduct and the complainant’s harm.  It is not concerned with the question whether the 
social or economic position of the respondent made the successful engagement in 
wrongful conduct possible.  Neither is it influenced or affected by the defendant’s 
intentions or motive for engaging in wrongful conduct.  But these differing contexts and 
                                               
184  United States v Microsof supra n 6. 
185  Id at 79.  Carrier supra n 6 at 993.   
203 
 
the manner in which the concept of causation may be invoked in competition 
proceedings show that causation is a ubiquitous term whose conceptual understanding 
varies in different legal fields and jurisdictions.186 
 
It is possible that where it is clear that a firm has purposefully relied on or used its 
dominance to commit an abuse, this could be a relevant factor when determining an 
appropriate penalty.  However, from an ‘effects-based’ antitrust enforcement point of 
view, the role of intent in determining liability should be of limited importance.  Conduct 
should be judged primarily on its effect on competition rather than its intended outcome.  
As Brassey has contended, ‘good intentions cannot rescue conduct whose effect is 
demonstrably bad, in much the same way that bad intentions cannot condemn conduct 
whose effect is inherently and intrinsically good’. 187   Indeed, the dominant view in 
modern antitrust enforcement is that the quality of dominant firm conduct should not be 
judged by the intentions or motives of the firm, but by its effect on competition.188  I turn 
next to consider the implications of effects analyses on causation, having regard to the 
rise of the ‘effects approach’ in modern competition law enforcement.   
 
4.7 The Rise of the Effects Approach in Modern Competition Law 
Enforcement and its Implications for Causation 
 
Enquiries into the effects of the alleged abusive conduct on competition in abuse of 
dominance and monopolization cases are a perfect analogy of the causation enquiry 
that takes place in civil claims for damages in tort or delict law.  The causation enquiry 
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in tort or delict law seeks to establish the link between the conduct of the defendant and 
the damage or loss suffered by the plaintiff.  Similarly, effects analysis in competition 
law seeks to establish the link between the respondent’s conduct and the prevention or 
lessening of competition in the market.  Effects analysis plays an important role in 
ensuring that antitrust liability is based on evidence demonstrating the link between the 
conduct of the respondent and the prevention and lessening of competition in the 
market.  In this regard, the rise in prominence of the ‘effects approach’ in modern 
competition law enforcement may appear like a step in the right direction towards the 
development of an appropriate causation framework for competition law. 
 
While causation is clearly implied in effects analysis, there is, however, a lack of a clear 
and consistent framework for causation in effects analysis. 189   Effects analyses in 
competition law are conducted in a manner and at a level that cannot satisfactorily meet 
the requirements of factual and legal causation.  In most cases, effects analyses are 
limited to asking two basic factual questions: has the conduct complained of occurred; 
and has there been prevention and lessening of competition in the market?   
 
There is no robust inquiry as to whether the prevention and lessening of competition is 
reasonably or sufficiently linked to the conduct of the respondent.  The enquiry on the 
causal link between the conduct of the respondent and the prevention and lessening of 
competition in the market is considered irrelevant and unnecessary.190  This is because 
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causation is deemed a substantial departure from the relatively modest and settled 
standard for abuse of dominance adjudication, which demands far less than is required 
in the delict or tort context. 191  The argument is that, if causation were to be required, 
“the complainant would be put in an unfair, unenviable, and impossible position” of 
having to establish the counterfactual: proof that the outcome in the market would have 
been different absent the defendant's conduct.192   
  
In the absence of counterfactual analysis, the conclusion that the respondent’s conduct 
is responsible for the anticompetitive effects complained of is not based on proven facts, 
but on the assumption that the relevant conduct is considered capable of producing 
those effects.193  As Narayen observes, “the general approach in antitrust enforcement 
is to require only that anticompetitive consequences are likely to flow from conduct as 
opposed to the fact that they are certain to flow from such conduct”.194  In this sense, 
effects analyses, as currently conducted, may not necessarily reflect facts as they are in 
the real world.  They may at best be described as a ‘laboratory conclusion’ arrived at 
through the interpretation of economic data in line with economic theories and 
assumptions.195 
 
In all jurisdictions under review, competition authorities appear to be not particularly 
keen to undertake the arduous task of counterfactual analysis, to establish the causal 
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link between the alleged abusive conduct and anticompetitive effects. 196   There is 
apprehension among antitrust officials that engaging in counterfactual analysis in 
exclusionary abuse of dominance cases would severely limit the scope of abuse of 
dominance provisions, potentially excluding most, if not all, types of anticompetitive 
conduct.197  As an observer has remarked, ‘competition authorities who wish to address 
abuses of dominance in the market do not wish to burden themselves with the task of 
establishing a causal link between the conduct of the respondent and harm in the 
competitive process’.198  As Areeda and Hovenkamp put it, “no antitrust authority which 
is seriously concerned about the evil of monopoly would condition its intervention 
strategy solely on a clear and genuine chain of causation”. 199   As a result, other 
commentators have concluded that causation does not exist in competition law.200 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to investigate whether an appropriate causation 
framework exists in competition law.  In my view, causation is essential and should be 
an important element of antitrust liability, particularly in those exclusionary abuse of 
dominance cases where the establishment of anticompetitive effects is vital.  The 
conclusion reached here is that, despite the rise in prominence of the ‘effects approach’ 
in modern abuse of dominance adjudication, the issue of causation has not been 
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sufficiently addressed.  To the extent that causation is dealt with in abuse of dominance 
adjudication, this generally happens implicitly or indirectly in a manner that reveals a 
worrying lack of robustness.201  As a result, respondents in competition proceedings 
may be found liable for market distortions which cannot satisfactorily be traced back to 
their conduct.   
 
To remedy this problem, I propose an approach by which the issue of causation could 
be dealt with in competition law.  In terms of this approach, causation must be 
recognised and dealt with in competition proceedings as a fundamental principle that is 
central to antitrust liability.202  I submit that the adoption of common-law principles of 
causation may play an important role in guiding and shaping the development of a 
causation framework appropriate for competition law. 
 
The proposal for the adoption of common-law causation principles in abuse of 
dominance adjudication may not be welcome from an enforcement perspective.  It 
raises the question of how far competition authorities or complainants must go in 
establishing the link between alleged exclusionary conduct and anticompetitive 
effects.203  The underlying reason for the reluctance to apply common-law causation 
principles in competition law is the apprehension that the introduction of such principles 
would severely limit the scope of abuse of dominance provisions.204   
 
                                               
201  O’Donoghue and Padilla supra n 9 and Berry supra n 2 at 314. 
202  Netstar (Pty) Ltd and Others v Competition Commission supra n 13 and Berry supra n 2 at 314. 
203  Whish and Bailey supra n 162 at 208. 
204  Id.  Eilmansberger supra n 11. 
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On close examination, these concerns are unfounded.  For many years, the common-
law requirement of causation has been part of our law of delict.  In delict, it has never 
been established that the causation requirement prevents claimants from successfully 
proving their claims.  Experience in delict shows that the causation requirement is not a 
bar to the successful establishment of civil claims by plaintiffs.  Indeed, plaintiffs with 
well-founded civil claims are able to sue successfully every day in our civil courts, 
despite the existence of this time-honoured principle.  This is because at common-law 
the principle of causation is not applied rigidly, but in a flexible manner that takes into 
account the principles of fairness and justice.205  Its introduction in competition law is 
therefore not likely to prevent effective enforcement of the Act and its abuse of 
dominance provisions.  A flexible application of the common-law principles of causation 
may in fact have a positive effect on the adjudication of competition disputes.   
 
Flexibility in the application of common-law principles of causation in competition law 
will ensure that a complaint is not dismissed merely because it does not meet a rigid 
test for causation. 206  By the same token, a flexible application of the common-law 
principles of causation, which espouses the principles of fairness and justice, would also 
ensure that liability on the part of the dominant firm would not arise, unless a reasonable 
link between its alleged abusive conduct and the anticompetitive effects attributed to it is 
                                               
205  Minister of Police v Skosana supra n 64 at 34-5; Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank supra 
n 70; S v Mokgethi supra n 92 at 40-1; International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley supra n 78 at 701; 
Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd supra n 97; Minister of Safety & Security v Van 
Duivenboden supra n 70; Minister of Finance v Gore NO supra n 70; and Lee v Minister of Correctional 
Services supra n 72 at pars 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 63 and 73.  See also Neethling and Potgieter supra n 
57 at 193-4 and 203. 
206  Carrier supra n 6 at 1007. 
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established.207  This means causation should be applied in a manner that balances the 
interests of the complainant and respondent, in line with the principles of fairness and 
justice.  Accordingly, where fairness and justice become the guiding standards in the 
application of common-law principles of causation in competition proceedings, it is 
difficult to conceive of the possibility that the enforcement of our abuse of dominance 
provisions will be significantly compromised.   
                                               
207  Kapoor supra n 6 at 39. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY’ AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
‘SUPER-DOMINANCE’ IN THE LAW OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: A CRITICAL 
REVIEW 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The general purpose of this Chapter is to evaluate critically the unique nature of some 
obligations imposed on dominant firms in modern competition law.  Particular attention 
will be given to the constraints on the market conduct of dominant firms occasioned by 
the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance.  The ultimate 
goal of this Chapter is to establish whether such constraints perpetuate the historical 
philosophy and practice of hostility towards dominant firms in modern competition law 
enforcement.   
 
My general point of departure is that, by its very nature, abuse of dominance law 
involves at its core the selective application of competition rules to the market conduct 
of firms on the basis of their market share or market power.  The bigger the firm’s 
market share or market power, the higher the likelihood that its market conduct will 
attract antitrust action.  This becomes more apparent when regard is had to the fact that 
the same market conduct will not be actionable under abuse of dominance law or 
competition law in general, if performed by a firm whose market share or market power 
is below the average required for dominance.   
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As far as the concept of ‘abuse of dominance’ is concerned, an issue that remains 
puzzling is that competition law has not as yet found a neutral infringement concept that 
places emphasis on the quality of the conduct of a firm rather than its size.  The need 
for such a neutral infringement concept has long been apparent because antitrust 
observers have recognised that it is ultimately the firm’s conduct that matters, not its 
market size or identity.  Lack of will to develop the law in this regard has meant that in 
all cases involving allegations of abuse of dominance, proof that the defendant firm is 
dominant in the relevant market is invariably a non-negotiable pre-condition for any 
abuse of dominance complaint to be sustainable.  As a result, attention is unnecessarily 
deflected away from the conduct of the firm, because in most cases the complainant’s 
ability to establish dominance is almost sufficient to prove wrongdoing on the part of the 
dominant firm.   
 
This singling out of dominant firms for special treatment under abuse of dominance law 
may, at the very least, suggest that dominant firms have an implied special 
responsibility or duty under the law to act or not act in a particular manner.  However, in 
some instances this special responsibility of dominant firms has also been recognised 
expressly in the decisions of competition authorities and the courts. 
 
This Chapter proceeds from the general premise that abuse of dominance law, by its 
very nature, involves the giving of special attention to the actions of dominant firms 
because of their special position in the market, suggesting that dominant undertakings 
have an implied special responsibility of some sort under the law.  However, the specific 
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focus of the Chapter is on the special responsibility of dominant firms expressly 
recognised in the law and/or in the decisions of competition authorities and the courts.  
The reason for this selection is practicality and ease of research, because in the case of 
express recognition there is no ambiguity or uncertainty about the existence of such a 
special responsibility resting on dominant firms.   
 
Having regard to the selection made above, American law will not play an important role 
in this Chapter.  Although it may be argued that the special responsibility or duty of 
dominant firms is implied in section 2 of the Sherman Act, particularly in cases involving 
the ‘willful’ acquisition or maintenance of monopoly,1 American competition authorities 
and the courts have not expressly recognised the existence of any special responsibility 
or obligation on the part of dominant firms. As observers have noted, ‘courts in the 
United States have held that a monopolist has no special duties under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act with respect to other market participants’.2  The high regard in which 
                                               
1  In American antitrust law the willful and intentional acquisition or maintenance of an overwhelming 
market share, even by means of perfectly legitimate business conduct that does not involve exclusionary 
practices, may be deemed unlawful under section 2 of the Sherman Act, unless the firm concerned can 
show that the high market share was an accidental consequence of its superior product, business 
acumen or historical accident. See United States v Aluminium Company of America 148 F2d 416 (2d 
Ci.1945) at 428-32; United States v Microsoft Corp 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir 2001) at 50; Verizon 
Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP 540 US 398 (2004) at 407; and Rambus Inc v 
FTC 522 F 3d 456 (DC Cir 2008) at 463.  See also Joel M. Wallace ‘Rambus v FTC. in the Context of 
Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up Problem’ (2009) 24 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 661-93 at 681 and Heike Schweitzer ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying 
Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ paper presented at the 12th Annual Competition 
Law and Policy Workshop, Robert Schuman Centre, 8-9 June 2007, EUI, Florence at 6 accessed at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Schweitzer.pdf 
(date of last use: 6 July  2016).   
2   Dieter De Smet ‘The Diametrically Opposed Principles of US and EU Antitrust Policy’ (2008) 29 
European Competition Law Review 356-62 at 357; Jochem Apon ‘Cases Against Microsoft: Similar 
Cases, Different Remedies’ (2007) 28 European Competition Law Review 327-36 at 333; David Howarth 
and Kathryn McMahon ‘Windows Has Performed an Illegal Operation: The Court of First Instance's 
Judgment in Microsoft v Commission’ (2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 117-34 at 130 and 
Kathryn McMahon ‘Interoperability: "Indispensability" and "Special Responsibility" in High Technology 
Markets’ (2007) 9 Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 123-72 at 167. 
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freedom of trade, efficiency, and consumer welfare are held in American antitrust law 
discourages ill-conceived constraints on the ability of dominant firms to compete on 
merit.3  In Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP4 the US 
Supreme Court found that possession of monopoly power is an important part of the 
free market system and will not be tampered with unless accompanied by harm to 
consumer welfare.5   
 
European competition law will feature prominently in this Chapter because, more than in 
any other jurisdiction, the special responsibility of dominant firms has been recognised 
expressly in the decisions of competition authorities and the courts.  Because the 
existence of the special responsibility of dominant firms is dependent upon the size of 
the firm, a related concept that also developed in European competition law alongside 
the principle of special responsibility and merits consideration here is the doctrine of 
super-dominance.   
 
The doctrine of super-dominance emerged in the context or as an extension of the 
principle of special responsibility where the more dominant the firm, the more 
obligations or responsibilities are imposed on it.  The development of the doctrine of 
super-dominance in European competition law was based on the logic that if a firm that 
barely meets the minimum requirements for dominance has a special responsibility, it 
                                               
3  Per Jebsen and Robert Stevens ‘Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of 
Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union’ (1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journal 443-516 at 491.  
4  Supra n 1. 
5  Id at 407.  Although this Supreme Court decision is not universally accepted in the United States, as 
some writers, antitrust enforcement agencies, and lower courts have criticised it and advocated a different 
approach, it remains of great significance in American monopolization law given the higher ranking of the 
Supreme Court in the United States judicial system, see discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.2.4. 
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goes without saying that a firm that enjoys a near monopoly degree of dominance must 
have much more onerous responsibilities.   
 
The principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance, as applied 
in European competition law, appear consistent with their traditional form-based and 
structural approach to competition law enforcement.  This enforcement approach places 
significant emphasis on achieving a market structure where no undertaking has 
sufficient market power to influence and control the market unilaterally.  The principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance are also in line with the 
traditional European ordoliberal philosophy.  In terms of this philosophy, dominant firms 
were viewed as undesirable in markets, because their presence was seen as indicative 
of the decline of competition in the market.6  To secure competitive market structures or 
competitively structured markets, where opportunities for other enterprises are also 
preserved, the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance 
impose constraints on the market conduct of dominant firms.  This has the effect of 
limiting the ability of dominant firms to compete freely and to maintain and grow their 
market shares.   
 
The operation of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-
dominance may be inconsistent with an effects-based approach to competition law 
enforcement, where consumer welfare is the main priority.7  Indeed, under the effects 
approach dominant firms are allowed to compete vigorously on merit, without overly 
                                               
6  Jebsen and Stevens supra n 3 at 503. 
7  McMahon supra n 2 at 165.   
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constraining their market conduct in the manner in which the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance seem intended to achieve.  
Restrictions on dominant firm conduct are considered rational and necessary only if the 
conduct in question produces harmful effects for consumers.  An effects-based 
approach to competition law enforcement embraces the important role that large 
corporations can play in enhancing consumer welfare and economic development.8   
 
South African competition authorities have attempted to follow the European approach 
by adopting the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance 
in some decisions.  As well as the competition concerns that may generally arise with 
regarded to the operation of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of 
super-dominance in European law, the adoption of these concepts in South African law 
may evoke other significant legal and constitutional concerns.   
 
Given that neither of these concepts forms part of the legal vocabulary of our 
Competition Act, it can be argued that there is no legal basis for introducing them into 
our law, as doing so may offend against the principle of legality.  Because the principle 
of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance may constrain the ability of 
dominant firms to compete freely and effectively in markets, whereas non-dominant 
firms are not affected by the same constraints, this may also offend against the 
constitutional principles of fairness, freedom of trade, equality, and non-discrimination.   
                                               
8  Indeed, economic experience has shown over the years that competitive dynamics can function very 
well even if the market has some very large players.  See James Kavanagh, Niel Marshall and Gunnar 
Niels ‘Reform of Article 82 EC-Can the Law and Economics Be Reconciled?’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed) Article 
82 EC: Reflections on its Recent Evolution (Hart Publishing 2009) at 3.  See also Schweitzer supra n 1 at 
16. 
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In the discussion that follows, part 5.2 explores in detail the development of the principle 
of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance in European competition 
law as well as their competition implications.  Attempts by South African competition 
authorities to introduce the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-
dominance in our law will also be discussed in part 5.3.  In part 5.4 I shall highlight 
some potential legal and constitutional problems that may result from the adoption of 
these concepts in our law, although an in-depth discussion of the constitutional issues is 
beyond the scope of this work.  For readers with a greater appetite for constitutional 
law, appropriate sources, which will be provided as the discussion progresses and 
issues are raised, will need to be consulted.  In part 5.5 I highlight the exceptional 
circumstances that may justify the application of the principle of special responsibility 
and the doctrine of super-dominance.  Part 5.6 considers the feasibility of using the 
principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance as a corporate 
social responsibility policy.  Part 5.7 provides a summary of the main findings and 
conclusions of the Chapter.   
 
5.2 The Principle of Special Responsibility and the Doctrine of Super-
Dominance in European Competition Law      
   
 
The most fundamental legal principle that has emerged in the application and 
enforcement of Article 102 of the Treaty of the European Union is that a dominant 
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undertaking has a special responsibility to the market.9  Article 102 does not define the 
concept of dominance.  In practice, as case law suggests, a firm is considered to be 
dominant when it enjoys a position of economic strength in a market enabling it “to act 
anticompetitively to an appreciable extent independent of its competitors, customers, 
and consumers”.10  A firm with a market share of at least 50 per cent is, in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances pointing to the contrary, presumed to be in such position 
of economic strength and therefore dominant.11 
 
Connected to the concept of dominance and the principle of special responsibility, is the 
notion that some dominant firms can be super-dominant. 12   The super-dominance 
doctrine developed as a supplementary concept to the principle of special responsibility, 
where the more dominant the firm the more obligations or responsibilities are imposed 
on it.  As a result of this interconnection between the two concepts, a proper 
understanding of the doctrine of super-dominance may be gleaned from cases that deal 
generally with the principle of special responsibility.  A key characteristic of these two 
concepts is that their application has the potential to hamstring the ability of dominant 
                                               
9  David Wood ‘EU Competition Law and the Internet: Present and Past Cases’ (2011) 7 Competition Law 
International 44-9 at 44 and Erika Szyszczak ‘Controlling Dominance in European Markets’ (2010) 33 
Fordham International Law Journal 1738-75 at 1755. 
10  Cases 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission at par 65 
and 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission at par 39. 
11  Cases 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission at par 60; T-57/01 Solvay SA v Commission at par 279; 
T-340/03 France Télécom SA v Commission at par 100; and T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v Commission at 
par 243.  See also Whish and Bailey Competition Law 7 ed (Oxford University Press 2012) at 182-3. 
12  Giuliano Amato Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History 
of the Market (Hart Publishing 1997) at 70-1; Heike Schweitzer ‘The History, Interpretation and 
Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel 
Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2007 - A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart 
Publishing 2008) at 141; and Szyszczak supra n 9 at 1756. 
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firms to engage in standard market conduct, despite the fact that such conduct would be 
unobjectionable when adopted by non-dominant firms.13   
 
The combined effect of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-
dominance is that a dominant firm is treated as ‘the proverbial bull in the china shop’, 
whose actions must be restricted to prevent it from inflicting further damage on its 
already fragile surroundings.14   These concepts are in keeping with the ordoliberal 
tradition that has dominated the application of Article 102 from its inception.  They 
continue the European competition law tradition of protecting competitors at the 
expense of competition.15  
 
5.2.1 The Principle of Special Responsibility  
 
It is important to observe that Article 102 of the Treaty of the European Union, unlike 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, is very explicit about the types and nature of dominant 
firm conduct it proscribes.  By the same token, a first read of Article 102 clearly reveals 
the basic obligations or legal responsibilities it imposes upon dominant undertakings.  
However, it is also important to note that the practice in European competition law 
                                               
13  Christian Ahlborn, David S Evans and A Jorge Padilla ‘Competition Policy in the New Economy: Is 
European Competition Law Up to the Challenge?’ (2001) 22 European Competition Law Review 156-67 
at 162.  
14  Gunnar Niels and Helen Jenkins ‘Reform of Article 82: Where the Link Between Dominance and 
Effects Breaks Down’ (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 605-10 at 605 and Duncan Sinclair 
‘Abuse of Dominance at a Crossroads - Potential Effect, Object and Appreciability Under Article 82 EC’ 
(2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 491-501 at 493. 
15  Szyszczak supra n 9 and Ian Rose and Cynthia Ngwe ‘The Ordoliberal tradition in the European 
Union, its influence on Article 82 EC and the IBA's Comments on the Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3 Competition 
Law International 8-12 at 8. 
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enforcement is that Article 102 is not regarded as exhaustive in its description of the 
dominant firm conduct it proscribes and, by extension, the legal obligations or 
responsibilities it imposes upon dominant undertakings.   
 
An expansive or non-exhaustive reading of the provision may, on the one hand, enable 
competition authorities to apply and enforce Article 102 against conduct that, though not 
directly contravening the letter of the law, nevertheless fundamentally offends against its 
spirit and purport.  Indeed, as Subiotto observed, ‘new practices which may not have 
been adequately covered by Article 102, but which European competition authorities felt 
needed to be regulated, have prompted the European Court of Justice to rule that such 
practices must be covered by the provision’.16   
 
Undeniably, conduct and practices which, though not explicitly covered by the 
regulation, nevertheless offend against its spirit and purport may in some instances 
constitute a more serious violation of competition principles than specifically prohibited 
conduct.  For example, though predatory pricing, price discrimination, and tying may 
contravene the letter of the law, these practices have been proven to benefit rather than 
harm consumers in some instances.  And competition authorities have found a 
backhand strategy to accommodate these practices, by insisting that they be tolerated if 
they do not substantially prevent or lessen competition, or if they have certain 
procompetitive gains or benefits.17  Therefore, the possibility that originally unimagined 
                                               
16   Romano Subiotto ‘The Special Responsibility of Dominant Undertakings Not to Impair Genuine 
Undistorted Competition’ (1994) 18 World Competition 5-30 at 5.  
17  European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) at pars 28-31 
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anticompetitive practices are also covered by Article 102 may be taken as a positive 
aspect of European abuse of dominance enforcement, as this prevents anticompetitive 
conduct from escaping prohibition, merely because the drafters of this legislative 
provision did not stretch their imaginations sufficiently far ahead. 
 
However, an expansive reading of Article 102 may, on the other hand, also have the 
unintended effect of creating unlimited and excessive constraints on the market conduct 
of dominant firms.  It is important to state here that Article 102 does not even refer to or 
mention the issue of ‘special responsibility’ that may attach to dominant undertakings.  
The first European competition law decision which stressed the importance of the 
special responsibility of dominant undertakings was Michelin v Commission.18  In this 
decision, the Court found that “a dominant undertaking has a special responsibility not 
to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the market”.19  The 
Michelin decision has been followed by numerous subsequent decisions, to such an 
extent that the special responsibility of dominant firms has become an important 
principle in European abuse of dominance law.20 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
accessed at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01) (date of last 
use: 6 July  2016).  See also Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 210-12.   
18  Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission. 
19  Id at par 57. 
20  Cases T-65/89 BPB Industries Plc and British Gypsum Ltd v Commission at par 67; Joined cases T-
24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 and T-28/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v 
Commission at pars 19 and 106; C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission at par 24; Joined 
cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P. Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Dafra-Lines A/S v 
Commission at pars 37 and 85; T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v. European Commission at pars 5 and 112 ; C-
280/08 P Duetsche Telekom AG v Commission at par 176 and C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera 
Sverige at par 24.   
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It is the expansive reading of Article 102 which has resulted in the special responsibility 
of dominant firms becoming an important part of the provision.  It is common in most 
jurisdictions, particularly in the common-law world, when applying and interpreting a 
complex legislative provision such as Article 102, to develop some ancillary rules and 
principles in order to provide clarity on its proper meaning and effect.  However, the 
development of the principle of special responsibility in Article 102 discourse appears to 
raise more questions than it answers.   
 
The first question is: To whom is the dominant firm responsible?21  Other questions that 
may be asked include whether the principle of special responsibility creates new 
species of prohibited conduct and additional responsibility for dominant firms?22  If it 
does so, what are the guidelines to determine when a company is subject to this special 
responsibility?23   For example, does the special responsibility principle apply to all 
dominant firms or only dominant firms with certain attributes?   
 
If the principle does not create new species of prohibited conduct and additional 
responsibility for dominant firms, does this mean then that the principle is mere rhetoric 
                                               
21  Maher M. Al-Dabbahb ‘Conduct, Dominance and Abuse in "Market Relationship": Analysis of Some 
Conceptual Issues under Article 82 EC’ (2000) 21 European Competition Law Review 45-9 at 46. 
22  Once a firm is deemed dominant it finds itself subject to some extra duties under the principle of 
special responsibility, see Oluseye Arowolo ‘Application of the Concept of Barriers to Entry Under Article 
82 of the EC Treaty: Is There a Case for Review?’ (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 247-57 
at 251.  The special responsibility principle creates an obligation for a dominant firm to behave in a certain 
way towards its competitors, see Burton Ong ‘Building Brick Barricades and Other Barriers to Entry: 
Abusing a Dominant Position by Refusing to Licence Intellectual Property Rights’ (2005) 26 European 
Competition Law Review 215-24 at 216.  See also Pinar Akman ‘To Abuse, or Not to Abuse: 
Discrimination Between Consumers’ (2007) 32 European Law Review 492-512 at 493. 
23   Rafael Allendesalazar ‘Can we finally say farewell to the “special responsibility” of dominant 
companies?’ paper presented at the 12th Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Robert 
Schuman Centre, 8-9 June 2007, EUI, Florence, at 4 accessed at  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007(pdf)/200709-COMPed-Allendesalazar.pdf (date of 
last use: 6 July  2016). 
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that refers to nothing more than the original duties imposed on all dominant firms by 
Article 102?24  And if the principle amounts to nothing more than ‘ambiguous rhetoric’, 
as a commentator has described it,25 why was its development found essential if it adds 
nothing but uncertainty to the proper understanding of Article 102?26   
 
In the modern antitrust climate, where antitrust violations may be visited with mind-
boggling fines, it is essential for dominant undertakings to know in advance the extent of 
their legal responsibilities and obligations so as to minimise their exposure to liability.  
However, the special responsibility principle has far reaching implications, as it 
potentially covers endless situations in which competition authorities may instinctively 
feel that a firm should be restrained from acting in a particular manner.27    
 
The flexibility gained by European competition authorities in pursuing all possible 
abuses of dominance, perhaps even in the most trivial of cases, under Article 102 may 
be outweighed by the legal uncertainty created by the principle of special 
responsibility.28  As one observer has remarked, “the principle of special responsibility 
neither helps in determining when conduct will be considered abusive, nor explains why 
                                               
24  Indeed, in a narrow sense, it is argued, the principle of special responsibility can be interpreted as 
reiterating the same obligations that Article 102 already imposes on dominant firms, which by contrast are 
not imposed on non-dominant firms, see Christian Ahlborn and Jorge Padilla ‘From Fairness to Welfare: 
Implications for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2007 - A Reformed Approach to 
Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2008) at 71. 
25  Reza Dibadjt ‘Article 82: Gestalt, Myths, Questions’ (2006-2007) 23 Santa Clara Computer & High 
Tech Law Journal 615-42 at 622 footnote 38. 
26  Indeed, some have questioned its continued relevance in European completion law as, they contend, it 
provides no reliable standard for determining essential competition law questions under Article 102, 
Howarth and McMahon supra n 2.   
27  Subiotto supra n 16 at 6 and Donald I. Baker ‘An Enduring Antitrust Divide Across the Atlantic Over 
Whether to Incarcerate Conspirators and When to Restrain Abusive Monopolists’ (2009) 5 European 
Competition Journal 145-200 at 171. 
28  Subiotto supra n 27.  
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it will be prohibited”. 29   A well-functioning system of competition law enforcement 
requires legal certainty in order to deter anticompetitive conduct and encourage 
competitive practices.30   
 
A review of the principle of special responsibility reveals that it is in keeping with the 
ordoliberal big-business bias that has been part of European competition law since its 
inception.31  Viewed and understood from the context of ordoliberalism, the principle of 
special responsibility may constrain the ability of dominant firms to engage in a wide 
range of competitive actions, even if such actions would generally be unobjectionable if 
adopted by non-dominant firms.32  The fact that dominant firms are not allowed to act in 
the same manner as other non-dominant market participants means that there is 
effectively one law for dominant firms and another for non-dominant rivals.33  However, 
the special responsibility principle fails spectacularly to provide a rational explanation for 
this discriminatory and unequal treatment of firms, where sound commercial practices 
that are common in the marketplace become illegal only when adopted by dominant 
firms.34  As a result, the special responsibility principle has been variously described as 
                                               
29  Allendesalazar supra n 23 at 5. 
30  Ahlborn and Padilla supra n 24 at 83. 
31  Id at 56, 70 and 72.  Rose and Ngwe supra n 15 at 8-9 and Philip Marsden and Liza Lovdahl Gormsen 
‘Guidance on abuse in Europe: The Continued Concern for Rivalry and a Competitive Structure’ (2010) 
55 The Antitrust Bulletin 875-914 at 892. 
32  Marsden and Gormsen supra n 31 and Robert E. Bloch et al ‘A Comparative Analysis of Article 82 and 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act’ (2006) 7 Business Law International 136-83 at 142. 
33  John Vickers ‘Abuse of Market Power’ (2005) 115 The Economic Journal F244–F261 at F246. 
34   Ioannis Lianos ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’ (2013) 
University College London, Centre for Law, Economics and Society, Working Paper Series 3/2013 at 34 
and Allendesalazar supra n 23. 
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‘a burden on dominant firms’,35  ‘a political choice’,36  and ‘an unhelpful and unclear 
concept which prevents competition on merit’.37 
 
Accordingly, calls have been made for the special responsibility principle to be toned 
down or even abandoned altogether.38  Indeed, it is submitted, if European competition 
law is to fulfill its aim of following a truly consumer welfare oriented standard in its 
application and enforcement of Article 102, this will require abandoning the special 
responsibility principle.39 
 
5.2.2 The Doctrine of Super-Dominance  
 
The doctrine of super-dominance first appeared in European competition law in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v Commission,40 in the written opinion of the 
Advocate General.41  Although the Court in Compagnie Maritime Belge did not itself use 
the term, other variations of it such as ‘quasi-monopoly’, ‘overwhelming dominance’, 
‘dominance approaching monopoly’, ‘dominance verging on monopoly’ and ‘extensive 
                                               
35   Fernando Diez Estella ‘Abusive Practices in the Postal Services? Part 1’ (2006) 27 European 
Competition Law Review 184-96 at 188. 
36  Smet supra n 2 at 358. 
37  Adrian Majumdar ‘Whither Dominance?’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 161-5 at163. 
38  Rossella Incardona ‘Modernisation of Article 82 EC and Refusal to Supply: Any Real Change in Sight’ 
(2006) 2 European Competition Law Journal 337-69 at 367. 
39  See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.3.2 and Ahlborn and Padilla supra n 24 at 57. 
40  Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P supra n 20.  Szyszczak supra n 9 at 1757. 
41  Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P supra n 20 at par 
137. 
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dominance’ have been used on various occasions by European competition authorities, 
the courts, and commentators.42   
 
However, in Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited and Subsidiaries v Director General 
of Fair Trading43 the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal cited the Compagnie Maritime 
Belge case and explicitly referred with approval to the doctrine of super-dominance, 
when it found that “super-dominant firms may have particularly more onerous 
responsibilities than other dominant undertakings”. 44   In Konkurrensverket v 
TeliaSonera Sverige45 the European Court of Justice acknowledged that the doctrine of 
super-dominance has become part of European abuse of dominance law, adding that 
“an undertaking’s degree of dominance in the market is relevant to the assessment of 
the lawfulness of its conduct”.46 
 
It is important to note that Article 102 does not distinguish between the behavior of 
super-dominant and other dominant undertakings.  The provision does not refer to 
degrees of dominance or different responsibilities for dominant undertakings.47  But the 
doctrine of super-dominance and other concepts associated with it clearly suggest that 
there may be varying degrees of dominance and, as a consequence, possibly different 
                                               
42  Tetra Pak v Commission supra n 20 at pars 28, 31 and 48; Irish Sugar plc v Commission supra n 20 at 
par 185; and European Commission Decision on Microsoft of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft) at pars 435, 526, 770 and 1065.  See also Szyszczak supra n 9 at 1757; Stephen Kon and 
Sarah Turnbull ‘Pricing and the Dominant Firm: Implications of the Competition Commission Appeal 
Tribunal's Judgment in the Napp Case’ (2003) 24 European Competition Law Review 70-86 at 76; Mark 
Furse ‘On a Darkling Plain: the Confused Alarms of Article 82 EC’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law 
Review 317-19 at 317 and Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 188. 
43  Case No 1001/1/1/01 [2002] CAT 1. 
44  Id at par 219. 
45  Supra n 20.   
46 Id at par 81.  See also Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 189. 
47  Szyszczak supra n 9 at 1758. 
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legal obligations for super-dominant and other dominant firms.  Whish and Bailey allude 
to this potential distinction in legal responsibilities and obligations between super-
dominant and other dominant firms when they observe that “if an ordinarily dominant 
undertaking has a special responsibility, a super-dominant firm should have an even 
greater responsibility”.48  Indeed, as Geradin has argued, the definition of dominance 
developed by the courts does not necessarily preclude the existence of different levels 
or degrees of dominance and accompanying obligations.49  An interesting question that 
arises is how many species of dominant firms may exist? 
 
As Whish and Bailey further observe, there may be differing degrees of dominance: “a 
monopolist, at one end of the spectrum, and a firm with no or only imperceptible market 
power, at the other”.50  But between these two extremes, they submit further, “there 
could also be firms with ‘some’ or ‘appreciable’ or ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ market 
power”.51  While a dominant firm can generally be viewed as a firm with ‘substantial’ or 
‘significant’ market power, it is not illogical, another observer has argued, to suggest 
that there may be different levels of ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ market power. 52  A firm 
may be regarded as super-dominant whenever it has unconstrained or near monopoly 
market power, enabling it to adopt unilateral commercial practices capable of producing 
                                               
48  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 189.  See also Jennifer Skilbeck ‘Carter Holt Harvey Building Products 
Group Ltd v Commerce Commission [2004] UKPC 37; [2005] 2 LRC 320’ (2005) 31 Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 187-96 at 191 
49  Damien Geradin et al ‘The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law’ (July 2005) at 7 accessed 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=770144 and http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.770144 (date of last use: 6 
July 2016). For the definition of dominance as developed by the courts see nn 10 and 11 in this Chapter.   
50  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 180. 
51  Id.   
52  Geradin supra n 49.   
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anticompetitive effects.53  The rationale behind super-dominance is that if a firm with a 
50 per cent market share is dominant, as is standard practice in European competition 
law,54 then a firm with a 90 per cent market share is likely to be even more dominant.55  
It is possibly for this reason that European competition authorities and courts have 
developed a term over and above dominance, which they call ‘super-dominance’.56 
 
While identifying a super-dominant firm in any market may not pose significant 
challenges in practice, it may be a complicated process to identify, and distinguish 
between, all other possible kinds or levels of dominance.  This is particularly true when 
regard is had to Article 102, which does not refer to degrees of dominance or distinguish 
between the behavior of different dominant firms.  What is the threshold for separating 
all potential species of dominant firm from each other, in order to allocate to each a 
responsibility commensurate with its size?  In describing an ordinary or normal 
dominant firm, that is a firm that barely meets the requirements for dominance,57 should 
we call it “a firm with substantial market power with an ability to adopt unilateral 
commercial practices capable of producing anticompetitive effects, but not to the same 
extent as a super-dominant firm”?  But if such a firm has substantial market power with 
an ability to adopt unilateral commercial decisions capable of producing anticompetitive 
effects, would such anticompetitive effects not have nearly the same harmful impact on 
consumers as in the case of a super-dominant firm?   
                                               
53  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 187 and Geradin supra n 49.  See also Joined cases C-395/96 P and 
C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA supra n 20 at par 136. 
54  See all sources at n 11 above.  
55  Geradin supra n 49. 
56  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 189. 
57  Carl Wetter, Olle Rislund and E Pitt ‘Geographical Pricing in the Postal Sector - the Swedish Zone 
Price Case’ (1999) 20 European Competition Law Review 240-4 at 242. 
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And in describing types of dominant firm, other than the types discussed above, should 
we call them ‘firms with substantial market share but with no ability to adopt unilateral 
commercial decisions capable of producing anticompetitive effects’?  But then, the latter 
species of dominant firm is in effect a non-dominant firm, given that despite its 
substantial market share it does not have the ability to act unilaterally and to cause any 
harm to competitors, customers, and consumers.  Indeed, at the heart of the legal 
definition of dominance is the undertaking’s ability to behave independently of 
competitors, customers, and consumers.58  However, this basic legal definition of the 
concept of dominance in European competition law has become unreliable, due largely 
to the emergence of the concept of super-dominance and the various possible levels of 
dominance that this concept suggests may exist.59 
 
This, in turn, highlights the superfluous nature of the concept of super-dominance, as it 
potentially causes blurring of the lines between the actions not only of various dominant 
firms, but non-dominant firms as well.  By creating various levels of dominance, a thin 
dividing line is created not only between different dominant firms among themselves, 
but also between dominant firms that barely meet the minimum requirements for 
dominance and non-dominant firms.  This increases the possibility that non-dominant 
undertakings may be treated as if they are dominant, when in fact they are not.60  This is 
what happened in Tetra Pak.61   Here, the actions of a firm which was clearly not 
                                               
58  Arowolo supra n 22.   
59  Dibadjt supra n 25 at 622-3 and Al-Dabbahb supra n 21 at 45. 
60  Szyszczak supra n 9 at 1756. 
61  Supra n 20.  See also Subiotto supra n 16 at 7 and 9.  
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dominant in the relevant market were dealt with under Article 102, as if the firm was 
dominant in that market. 62   The Court adopted this approach because it felt that, 
although Tetra Pak was not dominant in the relevant market, it was nevertheless 
dominant in a separate but associated market.63   
 
It is controversial to suggest that a firm’s actions in a market in which it is clearly not 
dominant can be dealt with under Article 102. 64   This is because Article 102 is 
specifically limited to firms that are dominant in the relevant market.  As Whish and 
Bailey point out, the legal expression ‘dominant position’ “is a binary term: either an 
undertaking is dominant in the relevant market and therefore subject to Article 102 or it 
is not dominant, in which case its unilateral actions are not subject to the Article 102 
scrutiny at all”.65  The decision in Tetra Pak, therefore, demonstrates a regrettably poor 
grasp and application of this fundamental principle of abuse of dominance adjudication.   
 
The notion that some dominant firms may be super-dominant also offers no tangible 
assistance in determining whether the unilateral actions of a dominant firm may lead to 
consumer harm, in line with the effects-based approach to abuse of dominance 
enforcement.66  Neither does it establish a reliable standard for treating dominant firms 
in a fair and impartial manner that recognises their role in the economy. 67   The 
                                               
62  Tetra Pak supra n 20 at pars 28-31.  
63  Id at pars 29-31. 
64  Subiotto supra n 16 at 10.  
65  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 180. 
66  Ahlborn and Padilla supra n 24 at 56 and Rafael Allendesalazar ‘Can We Finally Say Farewell to the 
"Special Responsibility" of Dominant Companies?’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) 
European Competition Law Annual 2007 - A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2008) 
at 319. 
67  McMahon supra n 2 at 170. 
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obsession with dominance by European competition authorities has resulted in their 
complete disregard or lack of interest in an enforcement regime which emphasises 
consumer welfare as a fundamental or controlling principle.68   
 
A classic example of this obsession with dominance is United Brands.69  Instead of 
enquiring, as a basic point of departure, whether the dominant firm conduct complained 
of had any anticompetitive effects, the European Court of Justice entertained irrelevant 
questions.  The Court asked whether United Brands “made use of the opportunities 
arising out of its dominant position”, as a primary means through which it abused its 
dominance.70  Had the Court simply enquired whether the conduct complained of had 
any anticompetitive effect, the issue of dominance would have become a mere formality 
and less central to the determination of liability.71  As the UK’s former Office of Fair 
Trading (now the Competition and Markets Authority) had remarked, if the enforcement 
of competition law was more effects-based, with consumer welfare as its main priority, 
the relevance of the concept of dominance could seriously be questioned.72   
 
The doctrine of super-dominance, like the principle of special responsibility, is 
manifestly more aligned with the traditional European ordoliberal and form-based 
approach to competition law enforcement, which places considerable emphasis on the 
                                               
68  Szyszczak supra n 9 at 1773. 
69  Supra n 10.   
70  Id at par 249. 
71  McMahon supra n 2 at 162. 
72  Office of Fair Trading, The Cost of Inappropriate Interventions/Non Interventions Under Article 82 
(September 2006) Economic Discussion Paper, OFT 864 at 15 accessed at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_r
esearch/oft864.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
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preservation of ‘competitive market structures’.73  In terms of the current framework of 
Article 102, firms with substantial market shares are considered inimical to the ideal of 
free and effective competition, as their mere presence in markets is seen as preventing 
the entry into and expansion within such markets by competitors.74   
 
As Niels and Jenkins observe, “the notion that the mere existence of dominant firms is 
dangerous for competition is still deeply embedded in European competition law”.75  
Under this enforcement approach, the more a firm enjoys significant market share the 
higher the likelihood that some aspect of its conduct may be deemed anticompetitive.76  
The doctrine of super-dominance therefore suggests that the identity of the firm and not 
the quality of its conduct is more important in the evaluation of abuse of dominance 
cases.77   
 
In Michelin,78 Allendesalazar observed, the Court appeared generally to have been 
more focused on Michelin’s dominant status in the market and less so on the alleged 
abusive conduct that was at issue and its impact on consumers.79  As Appeldoorn 
                                               
73  Julia Heit ‘The Justifiability of the ECJ's Wide Approach to the Concept of "Barriers to Entry"’ (2006) 27 
European Competition Law Review 117-23 at 123 and McMahon supra n 2 at 164 and 170.  However, 
Bavasso argues that the notion of a dominant undertaking having a special responsibility is not 
inconsistent with the principle that efficient behavior ought to be promoted and only prevented when it 
gives rise to exclusion of a competitor which is likely to produce consumer harm, see Antonio Bavasso 
‘The Role of Intent Under Article 82 EC: From "Flushing the Turkeys" to "Spotting Lionesses” in Regent's 
Park’ (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 616-23 at 620. 
74  Sinclair supra n 14 and Lianos supra n 34 at 27. 
75  Niels and Jenkins supra n 14.  
76  European Commission’s Guidance on the Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 supra n 17 at 
par 10  
77  Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFUE 2 ed (Hart 
Publishing 2013) at 207-08.  See also Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of 
Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2006) at 168. 
78  Supra n 18. 
79  Allendesalazar supra n 23 at 1. 
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further observes, in other major abuse of dominance cases such as Microsoft ,80 where 
large market shares were identified, the European Competition Commission imposed 
duties on the undertaking based on its dominance and not its behavior.81   
 
This appears to suggest that dominance and super-dominance on their own are 
illustrative of the extent of the firm’s transgression in the market.82  This fascination with 
size increases the possibility that in abuse of dominance cases proof of dominance or 
super-dominance is almost sufficient to establish an abuse. 83   Remarking on the 
European Commission’s Microsoft84 decision, a commentator struck a chord when he 
observed that “it was generally predictable that once Microsoft was found to have 
enjoyed some position of dominance, a finding of abuse of dominance was most likely 
to occur”.85 
 
Because of the implications that a finding of dominance or super-dominance may have, 
it has become customary for defence counsel appearing for defendant firms in abuse of 
dominance proceedings to deny vehemently that the firm is dominant in the relevant 
market.86  This is because once a firm’s dominance or super-dominance is established, 
its scope of market conduct is threatened by endless constraints, while non-dominant 
                                               
80  European Commission Decision on Microsoft supra n 42.   
81  J F Appeldoorn ‘He Who Spareth his Rod, Hateth his Son? Microsoft, Super-dominance and Article 82 
EC’ (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 653-58 at 656-58. 
82  Allendesalazar supra n 23 at 5. 
83  Id at 4.  Miguel de la Mano ‘The dominance concept: new wine in old bottles’ (March 2007) FTC/DOJ 
Hearings on single-firm conduct, Washington DC accessed at http://www.justice.gov/atr/dominance-
concept-new-wine-old-bottles (date of last use: 6 July 2016).   
84  European Commission Decision on Microsoft supra n 42. 
85  Smet supra n 2 at 362. 
86  Mark Furse ‘Caught Napping: DGFT and Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd’ (2001) 22 European 
Competition Law Review 477-81 at 481. 
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firms are not restricted in a similar manner.87  In this regard, the enforcement of Article 
102, it is submitted, has been fashioned in a manner that creates a market advantage 
for non-dominant firms and conversely a disadvantage for dominant and super-
dominant firms.88   
 
This hostile treatment of dominant undertakings has made dominance distinctly 
unenjoyable for successful corporations, even in instances where such success may 
have been achieved legitimately without breaking the law. 89   As Arowolo observes, 
“there are serious disincentives to the acquisition and maintenance of dominance”, in 
view of the manner in which Article 102 rules have been applied by European 
competition authorities.90  Indeed, the market disadvantage with which dominant firms 
are confronted as a result of the doctrine of super-dominance may equate to punishing 
businesses for their commercial success. 91   Therefore, the assurances given by 
European competition authorities that dominant firms will not be punished for their 
success, but will be allowed to compete vigorously on merit,92 can be viewed as nothing 
more than empty rhetoric.93   
 
                                               
87  Heit supra n 73 at 122. 
88  Id.  See also Giuliano Amato and Valentine Korah ‘Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of 
Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market’ (1998) 19 European Competition Law Review 263-4 at 
264; Smet supra n 2 at 360 and McMahon supra n 2 at165. 
89  Subiotto supra n 16 at 6.  
90  Arowolo supra n 22.   
91  Nicolas Petit and Norman Neyrink ‘Industrial Policy and Competition enforcement: Is There, Could 
There and Should There Be a Nexus?’ (February 2013) Paper prepared for the 2012 GCLC Annual 
Conference at 10 accessed at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225903 and 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225903 (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  See too Jebsen and Stevens 
supra n 3 at 504. 
92  European Commission’s Guidance on the Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 supra n 17 at 
pars 1 and 6.   
93  Subiotto supra n 16 at 6.  
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As Allendesalazar observes, European competition authorities have declared perfectly 
sound commercial practices by dominant firms illegal without even establishing their 
anticompetitive effects.94  European courts have also made decisions the effect of which 
has been to prevent dominant firms from pursuing commercial practices that are 
perfectly standard in the market.95  Other decisions have also precluded dominant firms 
from aligning their prices to meet competition from their non-dominant competitors.96  As 
Gal contends, ‘if the rights of dominant firms to protect their commercial interests when 
threatened are not properly recognised, dominant firms would have to compete with 
their hands tied to their back, limiting their ability to compete, thereby harming the very 
process that competition law is meant to protect’.97   
 
5.2.3 Summary 
 
The principle of special responsibility can be divided into two crucial parts.  The first is 
clear and uncontroversial and amounts to stating the obvious: dominant firms are 
prohibited from distorting competition by engaging in anticompetitive conduct.  The first 
part is therefore a restatement of the basic principle embodied in Article 102, in terms of 
which dominant firms are proscribed from engaging in conduct deemed to constitute an 
                                               
94  Allendesalazar supra n 23 at 5. 
95   See Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v 
Commission at pars 1105-1127.  Other standard market practices that may be prohibited if adopted by a 
dominant firm include loyalty discounts and rebates, see generally Hoffman-La Roche v Commission 
supra n 10; Michelin v Commission supra n 18; and BPB Industries Plc and British Gypsum Ltd v 
Commission supra n 20.  
96  AKZO v Commission supra n 11 at pars 70-71 and 133 – 134; France Télécom SA v. Commission 
supra n 11 at pars 171, 179, 182 and 187; and Tetra Pak International SA v Commission supra n 20 at 
par 41.  See also European Commission DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (2005) at pars 82-83 accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
97  Michal S Gal ‘Below-cost Price Alignment: Meeting or Beating Competition? The France Télécom 
Case’ (2007) 28 European Competition Law Review 382-91 at 382-3.   
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abuse of dominance and therefore illegal.  The second is the unwritten and 
controversial part, which encompasses the essence of the ‘special’ obligations imposed 
on dominant firms: dominant firms are required to be always careful and to some extent 
refrain from engaging in standard market conduct, even if such conduct would be 
unobjectionable when adopted by non-dominant firms.  The second part is in line with 
the well-established principle of European competition law, that the presence of a 
dominant firm in a market is incompatible with the ideal of free and effective 
competition.  Whenever dominance is found to exist in a market it triggers the 
presumption that competition in that market has been weakened.98   
 
The doctrine of super-dominance strengthens the principle of special responsibility, by 
adding that the more dominant the firm the more onerous will be the obligations 
imposed on it.  The combined effect of the principle of special responsibility and the 
doctrine of super-dominance is that the ability of dominant firms to engage in standard 
market conduct and to compete effectively on merit is severely compromised.  
Constraints on the market conduct of dominant firms occasioned by the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance are consistent with the 
ordoliberal philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings that has been part of 
European competition law from its inception.   
 
5.3 The Principle of Special Responsibility and the Doctrine of Super-
Dominance in South African Competition Law 
                                               
98  Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission supra n 10 at par 91; Michelin v Commission supra n 18 
at par 70; Case T‑210/01 General Electric v Commission at par 549; Case C-95/04P British Airways v 
Commission at par 66; and Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA and Others v Commission at pars 38 
and 206. 
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While some provisions of the South African Competition Act have an undeniably local 
flavor, others have been largely influenced by foreign law.  As Unterhalter puts it, “our 
legislature doffs its cap to the very considerable debt our Act owes to the competition 
laws from other jurisdictions”.99  But this borrowing from other jurisdictions has not been 
limited to the drafting stage of our Competition Act, it is also evident in the day-to-day 
enforcement of the Act.  Indeed, our case law is replete with generous quotations from 
foreign, particularly European, competition law decisions.  As our Competition Appeal 
Court found in Senwes Limited v Competition Commission, 100  the theoretical 
foundations of European competition law “are more congruent with those of our own 
Competition Act”. 101   This has enabled our competition authorities to borrow from 
principles and concepts of European origin, such as ‘special responsibility’ and ‘super-
dominance’, which were previously unknown in South African competition law. 
 
The legal basis for importing foreign principles into our law stems from section 1(3) of 
our Competition Act, which permits any person applying and interpreting the Act to 
consider ‘appropriate’ foreign and international law.  The recognition by our legislature 
that foreign and international law may be turned to for guidance when interpreting the 
Act and developing our competition jurisprudence accords with the general 
understanding that South African economic and competition challenges may not 
                                               
99  Martin Brassey et al Competition Law (Juta 2002) at 180. 
100  87/CAC/Feb09. 
101  Id par 54.  See also Phumudzo S Munyai ‘The Interface Between Competition and Constitutional Law: 
Integrating Constitutional Norms in South African Competition Law Proceedings’ (2013) 25 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 323-41 at 326-7. 
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necessarily be unique, but part of global commercial trends for which reliable solutions 
may have been found elsewhere.   
 
However, it is also important to note that section 1(3) does not permit our competition 
authorities to copy foreign competition principles slavishly.102  This is the implication of 
the word ‘appropriate’ in section 1(3) of the Competition Act.  It sets limits on the foreign 
and international competition principles that can be consulted, by suggesting that 
‘inappropriate’ foreign and international principles should not be consulted.  In view of 
the fact that some foreign competition principles and the theories that underpin them 
may have develop from unique and country-specific economic and historical settings,103 
any slavish copying of such foreign principles may be inappropriate.  In this Chapter,104 I 
argue that the importation of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of 
super-dominance into our law is inappropriate, because it violates the principle of 
legality and the equality clause in section 9 of our Constitution.  As section 1(2)(a) of the 
Competition Act requires, the Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with 
the Constitution.   
 
5.3.1 The Principle of Special Responsibility  
 
As in the case of Article 102 of the Treaty of the European Union, none of the provisions 
in Part B of the South African Competition Act, which deal with abuse of a dominant 
                                               
102  Brassey supra n 99. 
103  Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Another 
(70/CAC/Apr07) at pars 26-27.  
104  See par 5.4 below.  
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position, make any reference to a ‘special responsibility’ that may attach to a dominant 
firm.  But the abuse of dominance provisions of the Act clearly impose legal obligations 
on dominant firms that are absent on non-dominant firms.  So, can these obligations or 
responsibilities imposed on dominant firms be termed ‘special’ simply because 
dominant firms have responsibilities that do not exist for non-dominant firms? 
 
For example, it may be argued that there is something special or unique about a rule 
that prohibits a firm with substantial market share from charging excessive prices to the 
detriment of its customers, whereas no such prohibition applies to the pricing decisions 
of a non-dominant firm, regardless of possible customer exploitation.105  However, the 
principle of special responsibility encompasses far more than a rule that prohibits a 
dominant firm from engaging in conduct in which non-dominant firms may easily 
engage.  Rather, the operation of this principle suggests even stricter constraints on the 
actions of dominant firms than those allowed under the Act.  As stated earlier, the effect 
of the principle of special responsibility is to limit the ability of dominant firms to compete 
effectively in the market and to maintain or grow their market share, beyond the 
standard obligations or constraints imposed by the Act.   
 
The operation of the principle of special responsibility may fit into the historical and 
philosophical reasons for which competition law was originally conceived in South 
Africa.  In South Africa, competition policy and law developed in response to the 
                                               
105  Brassey supra n 99 at 181. 
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historical trend towards industrial concentration and the creation of monopoly.106  There 
is a longstanding perception in South African society that industrial giants, particularly 
those which are privately owned, are against the common interest of the majority of 
citizens.107  For this reason, the concentration of economic power in the hands of private 
corporations owned and controlled by a minority has been singled out as a major 
example of the prevailing inequality in wealth and income distribution in South African 
society.  And in the discussion papers and policy documents that preceded the adoption 
of the Competition Act, it was also clear that these factors were among the most 
important socio-economic ills the legislation was intended to cure.   
 
Since the coming into force of the Competition Act, South African competition 
authorities have on several occasions made decisions that, while not explicitly referring 
to the special responsibility of dominant firms, have had an effect similar to that 
observed under the principle of special responsibility in European law.  In particular, the 
effect of such decisions has been to discriminate against dominant firms, by overly 
constraining their ability or right to compete freely and unhindered.  As commentators 
observe, some of the decisions of the South African competition authorities in abuse of 
dominance cases have appeared to be unfairly biased against dominant firms.108   
 
                                               
106  D V Cowen ‘A Survey of the Law Relating to the Control of Monopoly in South Africa’ (1950) 8 South 
African Journal of Economics 124-47 at 124.  See also EE Bekker Monopolies: Review of the Role of the 
Competition Board (Rand Afrikaans University 1992) at 13 and EE Bekker ‘Monopolies and the Role of 
the Competition Board’ 1992 Journal of South African Law 618-44 at 625. 
107  Bork also observed a similar problem in American society, Robert H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A 
Policy at War With Itself (Basic Books Inc 1978) at 5. 
108   Simon Roberts, Jonathan Klaaren and Kasturi Moodaliyar ‘Introduction to Special Section of 
Competition Law and Economics’ (2008) 11 South African Journal of Economic Management and 
Science 247-8 at 248. 
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The decision of the Competition Tribunal in Nationwide Poles v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd109 
clearly suggests that the presence of dominant firms in markets is inconsistent with the 
ideal of a ‘level playing field’, in which small firms can also compete freely as required 
by the Competition Act.110   Although the Tribunal’s Nationwide Poles decision was 
overturned on appeal by the Competition Appeal Court due to lack of evidence of a 
substantial prevention and lessening of competition in the market,111 it is important to 
note that the Appeal Court did not interfere with the Tribunal’s reasoning and findings on 
the importance attached to the protection of small business interests under the Act.  
Indeed, the Competition Appeal Court emphasised that its decision did not seek to 
minimise the weight which the legislature has given to the need to ensure that small and 
medium-sized enterprises are protected under the Act.112  In Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another,113 a case which 
dealt with a complaint of excessive pricing against a dominant firm, the Tribunal 
described dominant firms in less than flattering terms: as ‘beasts’.114  This description of 
dominant firms aptly sums up the prevailing hostility towards them, perhaps not only in 
South African competition law circles, but also in South African society at large.   
 
It is important to state here that the principle of special responsibility has not been 
explicitly recognised in the majority of the decisions of our competition authorities.  But 
this is neither surprising nor unusual, given the limited number of abuse of dominance 
cases that have been decided to date.  The first South African competition decision to 
                                               
109  Case No 72/CR/Dec03. 
110  Id at pars 81 and 89. 
111  Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v Nationwide Poles CC Case No 49/CAC/APRIL05 at 38-41. 
112  Id at 41. 
113  Case No 13/CR/FEB04. 
114  Id at pars 124 and 127. 
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explicitly refer to the special responsibility of dominant firms is that of the Tribunal in 
Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd.115   
 
In this case, the Tribunal cited with approval a passage from the European decision in 
Michelin,116 in which it was found that “a dominant firm had a special responsibility not 
to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the market”. 117  
Following Michelin, the Tribunal found that South African Airways bore this ‘special 
responsibility’ towards the market.118  It is interesting to note that in this particular case 
South African Airways, as the Tribunal observed,119 appeared to be unsure of its status 
as a dominant firm in the relevant market at the time the impugned conduct took place 
and as a result lacked an appreciation of its ‘special responsibility’ towards the 
market. 120   However, the Tribunal insisted that South African Airways ought 
nevertheless to have been alert to any possible dangers inherent in its conduct as a 
dominant firm having this special responsibility.121   
 
The Tribunal’s stance against South African Airways sent a strong message that it will 
be uncompromising in enforcing this special responsibility against dominant 
undertakings.  It may be argued that in this case the Tribunal was very harsh or 
                                               
115  Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd Case No 18/CR/Mar01. 
116  Supra n 18. 
117  Id at par 57.  Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd supra n 115 at par 302. 
118  Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd supra n 115 at par 303.  Ryan Hawthorne 
‘Has the Conduct-based Approach to Competition Law in South Africa Led to Consistent Interpretations of 
Harm to Competition?’ (2008) 11 South African Journal of Economic Management and Science 292-305 
at 303. 
119  Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd supra n 115 at par 303.  Part of this 
confusion had to do with the approach the Competition Commission adopted in defining the relevant 
market which South African Airways disputed, see pars 50, 51 and 57 of the decision.   
120  Id at par 303. 
121  Id.   
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unreasonable towards South African Airways, in view of the fact that South African 
Airways was unaware that it was subject to any special responsibility.  And it would be 
unfair to characterise South African Airways’s claim that it lacked an appreciation of its 
‘special responsibility’ towards the market as disingenuous for two reasons.   
 
Firstly, the South African Competition Act makes no mention of a special responsibility 
that attaches to dominant firms.  Secondly, at the time the South African Airways 
decision was made, no other competition decision in South Africa had referred to this 
special responsibility.  In this context, South African Airways was justified to argue not 
only that it was unaware of this special responsibility, but also that, when the 
responsibility was spelled out to it, compliance with it essentially required it 
‘irresponsibly’ to desist from commercial activities which were standard practice in the 
market, in which its competitors also freely engaged.122  
 
Another South African Competition decision, and perhaps the most prominent, which 
has explicitly recognised the special responsibility of dominant undertakings towards the 
market is Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa 
Ltd and Another.123  In this case the Tribunal observed that the principle of special 
responsibility, which applies to the ‘privileged status’ of dominance, is well recognised in 
scholarly work and in the decisions of foreign competition adjudicators.124  The Tribunal 
then cited with approval the UK competition decision in Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings 
                                               
122  Id at pars 303-304.  
123  Supra n 113.   
124  Id at par 96. 
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Limited125 where the Competition Appeal Tribunal emphasised the principle that “the 
more dominant the firm the more onerous responsibilities it attracts”.126 
 
There is a decided lack of academic commentary on the application of the principle of 
special responsibility in South African competition law.  What does exist appears to be 
sympathetic to its introduction into our law.127  As one has commentator remarked, ‘the 
imposition of a special responsibility on dominant firms in South African competition law 
is justified, as it is consistent with the idea that in the presence of dominant firms 
competition in the market is already weakened and that any interference by the 
dominant firm with the market structure may eliminate all competition’.128    
 
Another observer has gone so far as to suggest that “the South African Competition Act 
may need to be amended in order to ensure that it explicitly imposes a special 
responsibility on dominant firms to maintain genuine undistorted competition in the 
market”.129  She further submits that this is particularly necessary when regard is had to 
the historical South African market context and prevailing hostile market structures that 
are not conducive to free and effective participation in the economy by small and 
medium-sized enterprises.130 
 
                                               
125  Supra n 43. 
126  Id at par 219. 
127  Hawthorne supra n 118.   
128  Anne Njoroge ‘Regulation of dominant firms in South Africa’ (2011) MBA dissertation, University of 
Pretoria at 3 accessed at http://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/25618 (date of last use: 6 July 2016).   
129   Kim Kampel ‘Competition Law and SMEs: Exploring the Competitor/Competition Debate in a 
Developing Democracy’ (2004) Centre on Regulation and Competition, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
109, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester at 25. 
130  Id.   
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5.3.2 The Doctrine of Super-Dominance  
 
Like Article 102 of the Treaty of the European Union, the South African Competition Act 
does not explicitly or directly define the concept of dominance.  However, in an attempt 
to achieve certainty, the Competition Act improves on Article 102 by providing guidance 
in the determination of dominance.  The Act does so by providing a simple description 
of the various circumstances in which dominance may exist in a market.131  The most 
central factors in the determination of dominance under the Act are market share and 
market power.  Market power is defined in the Act as “‘the power of a firm to control 
prices, or to exclude competition or to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, customers or suppliers”.132   
 
The definition of market power in our Act borrows significantly from the definition of 
dominance provided by the European Court of Justice in the United Brands133 and 
Hoffmann-La Roche 134  decisions, where dominance was defined as “a position of 
economic strength in a market enabling an undertaking to act anticompetitively to an 
appreciable extent independent of its competitors, customers, and consumers”.135  In 
this regard, it becomes clear that the definition of market power effectively refers to or 
describes the state or condition of dominance.  For this reason, market power and 
dominance are sometimes used in practice as synonyms.  But, strictly speaking, the two 
                                               
131  See section 7 of the Competition Act generally.   See also Minette Neuhoff et al A Practical Guide to 
the South African Competition Act (Lexis Nexis 2006) at 107. 
132  Section 1(1)(Xiv) of the Act. 
133  Supra n 10.   
134  Id.   
135  Brassey supra n 99 at 188-9. 
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terms do not necessarily have identical meanings.  For example, some firms are 
considered to be dominant purely on the basis of their market share,136 without any 
reference to their market power.  But, generally, where a presumption of dominance is 
made purely on the basis of market share, the assumption is also that the firm already 
has market power.  It is, therefore, safe to conclude that no firm can be considered to be 
dominant unless it has been legally presumed or factually proven that it has market 
power. 
 
Section 7 of the Competition Act tells us that a firm is dominant if “it has at least 45% 
market share”.137  It states further that, a firm can also be dominant if “it has between 
35% - 45% market share, unless the firm concerned can show that it does not have 
market power”.138  Lastly, section 7 further provides that a firm can be deemed to be 
dominant if “it has less than 35% market share, but has market power”.139   
 
What emerges from the provisions of section 7 of the Competition Act is that a firm with 
at least a 45 per cent market share is regarded as automatically or statutorily dominant 
and no amount of argument to demonstrate that it lacks market power will assist it.140  
However, a firm with a market share of between 35 and 45 per cent attracts a rebuttable 
presumption of dominance.  If the firm can adduce evidence to show that it lacks market 
                                               
136  This is in the case of firms which satisfy the minimum requirement for market share based dominance.  
In South African competition law that is 45% market share according to section 7(a) of the Competition 
Act.   
137  Section 7(a) of the Competition Act. 
138  Section 7(b) of the Competition Act. 
139  Section 7(c) of the Competition Act. 
140  Brassey supra 99 at 189; Neuhoff supra n 131 at 108 and Philip Sutherland and Katharine Kemp 
Competition Law of South Africa (LexisNexis, Online Version, Last Updated: November 2015) at par 
7.7.6.1. 
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power, the presumption of dominance falls away.141  Similarly, a firm with a market 
share of less than 35 per cent may attract a rebuttable presumption of dominance.  
However, in this scenario, in order for the presumption of dominance to stand, it is the 
complainant or the Competition Commission that must adduce evidence to show that 
the firm concerned has market power.142   
 
The concept of dominance adopted by the South African Competition Act is somewhat 
unusual, when compared with the practice in other jurisdictions.143  The Competition 
Act’s approach for establishing dominance has been criticised and labeled 
‘mechanical’. 144   Indeed, some problems and inconsistencies may arise from this 
approach.  To start with, the Act’s use of what in general appears to be a low market 
share as evidence of dominance is quite unusual. 145   Other jurisdictions, such as 
America and Europe, have generally adopted the sensible approach that a market 
share of at least 50 per cent is essential for a finding of dominance.146  In this regard, 
the Act’s classification of a firm with at least a 45 per cent market share as outright or 
automatically dominant is puzzling.   
 
The classification of a firm with at least a 45 per cent market share as outright dominant 
is also contrary to the Act’s own definition of dominance, echoed in the definition of 
market power in section 1 of the Act.  For example, the definition of market power, and 
                                               
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id at par 7.7.6.5 and Brassey supra n 99 at 189. 
144  Brassey supra n 99 at 143. 
145  Id at 190.  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 140 at par 7.7.6.5.   
146  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 145 and Brassey supra n 99 at 190. 
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by extension dominance,147 places considerable emphasis on “the ability or power of a 
firm to control prices or exclude competition or to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers”.148  Unlike the description of 
dominance in section 7(a) of the Act, section 1 clearly does not elevate ‘market share’ to 
the point where it becomes the sole deciding factor in determining dominance.  And 
there are good reasons for this.   
 
Market share, in particular a 45 per cent market share, does not reliably prove 
dominance, although it is an important part of the enquiry.149  This is particularly true of 
the South African economy, characterised by many markets dominated by a few large 
firms.  In markets dominated by a few firms, when one firm has a 45 per cent market 
share there is still a reasonable possibility that a significant portion of the remaining 55 
per cent market share balance could be held by one or two other firms.  In this context, 
the ability or power of a firm with a 45 per cent market share to control prices or exclude 
competition or to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers or suppliers is severely compromised.  For this reason, it is always important 
to take into account the size and number of other firms in the market as well as their 
market power before rushing to conclude that one firm is dominant purely on the basis 
of its market share.150   
 
                                               
147  This is because dominance and market power essentially mean the same thing: a dominant firm is 
basically a firm that has market power.   
148  Section 1 xiv. 
149  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 180-1 and Brassey supra n 99 at 189. 
150  Brassey supra n 149 and Sutherland and Kemp supra n 140 at par 7.7.6.5. 
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The statutory classification of a firm with at least a 45 per cent market share as 
dominant is also inconsistent with the formula used in defining dominance in the case of 
two other species of dominant firm in terms of section 7(b) and (c): these are firms with 
market shares of between 35 and 45 per cent and below 35 per cent.151  Dominance in 
these two instances is inseparably linked to market power.152  However section 7(a) 
breaks away from this tradition, by discounting the relevance of market power in its 
definition of dominance.   
 
My contention is not that a firm with a 45 per cent market share can never be dominant 
simply because such market share is low.  The argument is that such a low market 
share, by general standards, would without an element of market power be unreliable 
and even unfair to the firm concerned.  For this reason, competition authorities and 
courts in other jurisdictions have adopted definitions of dominance based on actual 
market power and avoided making irrebuttable presumptions of dominance based on 
percentage market share. 153 
 
The simplicity and certainty which the South African legislature sought to achieve 
through section 7(a), by creating an irrebuttable presumption of market power for 
companies with a market share of at least 45 per cent, has come at the cost of accuracy 
and fairness.154  This state of affairs increases the possibility of non-dominant firms or 
firms without market power being found to be dominant when in fact they may not be.  
                                               
151  See section 7(b) and (c) of the Competition Act. 
152  Id. 
153  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 140 at par 7.7.6.5. 
154  Id at par 7.7.6.1.  Brassey supra n 99 at 189. 
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This may have a negative impact on competition, because firms with significant market 
share, but without sufficient market power, may be forced to cut back on perfectly 
competitive business practices for fear of attracting the attention of competition 
authorities. 155 
 
The reliance in section 7(a) on market share, as low as 45 per cent, as the sole 
indicator of dominance is, however, consistent with the historical and philosophical 
reasons for which our law of competition was born: to control and eliminate market 
domination.  This reliance on market share is also in line with the form-based and 
structural approach to competition law enforcement in South Africa, where companies 
with large market shares are considered a threat to the maintenance of genuine and 
undistorted competition. 156   This approach contradicts the widely-held view that 
competition law must serve consumer interest as its primary and ultimate goal. 157  
Regardless of the repercussions for consumers, a central theme that runs through the 
core of this approach is that dominant firms are singled out for special treatment, 
designed to weaken their position of strength in the market.158   
 
And, to limit the power of firms with substantial market share, the law and those tasked 
with enforcing it must be vigilant and act decisively to prevent such firms from inflicting 
                                               
155  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 140 at par 7.7.6.5 and Brassey supra n 154. 
156  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 140 at par 7.7.7 and Brassey supra n 155. 
157  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 156. 
158  Carina Smit ‘The Rationale for Competition Policy: A South African Perspective’ paper presented at 
the biennial ESSA Conference, 7-9 September 2005, Elangeni Holiday Inn Hotel, Durban, South Africa at 
8 accessed at http://econex.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/econex_researcharticle_10.pdf (date of 
last use: 6 July 2016). 
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further damage to what is perceived to be an already fragile business environment.159  
Indeed, that is what an exaggerated definition of dominance seeks to achieve.  If a firm 
with a 45 per cent market share is outright or automatically dominant, and no amount of 
persuasion can rebut this presumption, what then of a firm with a market share of 90 per 
cent?  This is, in terms of section 7(a) of the South African Competition Act, a firm which 
sits in the higher echelons of industrial domination, for whom a concept over and above 
dominance would have to be found. 160   And what of ‘super-dominance’ or 
‘overwhelming dominance’?  Most South African competition decisions in which 
substantial market shares have been involved have adopted the concept of 
‘overwhelming dominance’,161 which has the same meaning as super-dominance.   
 
The concept of ‘super-dominance’ entered the annals of South African competition law 
jurisprudence through the decision of the Competition Tribunal in Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another.162  The Tribunal 
found Mittal Steel South Africa to be not only dominant, but – as stated earlier – also a 
‘beast’163 that had become ‘super-dominant’.164  Referring to the obligation imposed on 
Mittal Steel South Africa as a super-dominant firm not to charge excessive prices to its 
customers, the Tribunal found that when devising its pricing policies, Mittal Steel South 
                                               
159  Id.  See also Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and 
Another supra n 113 at par 124. 
160  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 189. 
161  Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another supra n 
113 at pars 96 and 109; Competition Commission and Another v British American Tobacco South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd (05/CR/Feb05) at pars 4 and 38; Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Others v Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Limited supra n 103 at par 77; and Competition Commission v South African Breweries 
Limited and Others 2015 (3) SA 329 (CAC) at pars 1, 52 and 53. 
162  Supra n 113. 
163  Id at pars 124 and 127. 
164  Id at pars 121 and 164. 
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Africa was to “leave a certain amount of money on the table” by keeping its prices 
reasonable.165   
 
To demonstrate the extent to which the Tribunal embraced the concept of super-
dominance, it used the term more than 40 times in this decision.166  When this is taken 
into account, it is clear that the introduction of the doctrine of super-dominance into 
South African competition law did not occur through some casual remarks of the 
Tribunal made in passing.  It was based on a genuine belief on the part of the Tribunal 
that the doctrine is of fundamental relevance and importance to South African abuse of 
dominance law.   
 
On appeal, in Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Others v Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Limited and Another,167 the Competition Appeal Court observed that section 8 
of the Competition Act makes no reference to the term ‘super-dominance’ and 
discouraged the use of the term. 168   However, the Court also appeared to be 
sympathetic to why the Tribunal used the term.  The Competition Appeal Court found 
that “in holding that a firm is ‘super-dominant’, the Tribunal was indicating that the firm 
concerned was able to exercise market power as if it were a monopolist”.169  The 
Appeal Court also found that Mittal Steel South Africa had failed to adduce any 
evidence to show that it was not ‘super-dominant’ or ‘overwhelmingly dominant’.170  
                                               
165  Id at par 131.  
166  Id at pars 37, 47, 61, 84, 106, 108, 112, 117, 121, 126, 129, 131, 132, 133, 143, 152, 154, 163, 164, 
175, 189, 194, 195 and 196. 
167  Supra n 103.   
168  Id at par 30. 
169  Id at par 19.   
170  Id at par 77. 
252 
 
Crucially, the central point on which the Competition Appeal Court eventually overturned 
the Tribunal’s decision was not the use of the concept of ‘super-dominance’ by the 
Tribunal, but the Tribunal’s own failure to evaluate Mittal Steel South Africa’s pricing, in 
order to determine whether there had been excessive pricing.171  Having regard to the 
above, it can be argued that the concept of ‘super-dominance’, which means the same 
thing as ‘overwhelming dominance’, remains part of South African competition law.  This 
argument is also fortified by the fact that the doctrine of super-dominance does not 
stand alone but is an extension of, and gives effect to, the principle of special 
responsibility, which enjoys significant support in our competition law.    
 
5.3.3 Summary  
 
The majority of observations made with regard to the principle of special responsibility 
and the doctrine of super-dominance under European competition law will equally be 
true, mutatis mutandis, of their application in South African competition law.  But an 
issue that requires special emphasis as far as South African competition law is 
concerned, is that the operation of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine 
of super-dominance impacts negatively on the ability of dominant firms to compete 
freely and effectively in the market.  Dominant firms are viewed as beasts, whose range 
of competitive conduct must be restricted to prevent them from maintaining and growing 
their market share, as a means to create and open up market opportunities for small 
and medium-sized enterprises.   
 
                                               
171  Id at pars 28 and 75. 
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While the objective of the Competition Act to promote opportunities for small and 
medium-sized enterprises is laudable and cannot, without more, be faulted, the problem 
arises when other market participants, dominant firms in particular, are treated as if they 
are less worthy of protection by law.  In a society such as ours, which is committed to 
the rule of law and guarantees certain fundamental freedoms to all persons, including 
juristic persons, the adoption of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of 
super-dominance may raise considerable legal and constitutional concerns.  I consider 
this issue next.   
 
5.4 Legal and Constitutional Problems Associated with the Principle 
of Special Responsibility and the Doctrine of Super-Dominance: A 
South African Perspective 
 
From a South African legal point of view, the principle of special responsibility and the 
doctrine of super-dominance raise a number of legal and constitutional concerns.  One 
of the most striking issues to have emerged in the evaluation of the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance is that once a firm is found to be 
dominant, it finds itself subject to additional obligations, the effect of which is to restrict 
its ability to compete freely and effectively in the market.172  And the more dominant the 
firm, the more restricted are its actions and the more limited are its options in the 
market.   
 
Yet nothing in the Competition Act justifies the imposition of ‘additional responsibility’ on 
dominant firms on the basis of their superior market share or market power.  Although 
                                               
172  Arowolo supra n 22. 
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the Act refers to different instances where dominance may exist, a close examination of 
the scheme of the Act clearly demonstrates that it mandates a unified distribution of 
duties or obligations to all dominant firms, no matter how overwhelming the degree of 
one firm’s dominance might be in comparison with others.  The Act does not refer to the 
‘special responsibility’ of dominant firms or the concept of ‘super-dominance’.  In this 
context, the adoption of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-
dominance in South African competition law may run contrary to the principle of legality 
and rule of law.   
 
Another disconcerting issue is that the operation of the principle of special responsibility 
and the doctrine of super-dominance may have the effect of restricting the ability of 
dominant firms to engage in conduct that is common or normal among all other market 
participants.  In this regard, the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of 
super-dominance can be seen as creating an advantage for smaller or non-dominant 
firms and a disadvantage for dominant firms. 173   This is clearly contrary to the 
constitutional principles of fairness, freedom of trade, equality, and non-discrimination, 
to which dominant firms are also entitled.174  This makes the importation of the principle 
of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance into our law inappropriate 
in terms of section 1(3) of the Competition Act. 
 
5.4.1 The Principle of Legality 
                                               
173  Smet supra n 2 at 360; Heit supra n 73 at 122; Amato and Korah supra n 88; and McMahon supra n 2 
at 165. 
174  Section 8(4) of the Constitution.  AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 (4) 
BCLR 31 (E) at 38; 1995 (1) SA 783 (E) at 790; and Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: 
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at par 57. 
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In the first ten years of the enforcement of the Competition Act there was little 
constitutional scrutiny of competition proceedings.  This enabled our competition law to 
evolve with scant regard for some of the fundamental constitutional principles applicable 
to the resolution of disputes through the application of law.175  It was during this moment 
of constitutional ‘off-guard’, so to speak, that the principle of special responsibility and 
the doctrine of super-dominance entered our case law.  However, there is recognition 
among observers that if our competition law enforcement is to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, much needs to change.176   
 
The fact that our competition authorities have adopted alien principles and doctrines 
that are not, or should not, form part of our law clearly raises legal concerns related to 
the principle of legality or lawfulness.  The principle of legality or lawfulness requires 
that those exercising public power or authority must act in accordance with and within 
the limits of the law and must not overextend their authority or act ultra vires.177  In 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council178 the Constitutional Court emphasised these principles, holding that “public 
institutions are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law”.179  Indeed, in the case of 
                                               
175  Munyai supra n 101 at 324. 
176  Id.  Heathrow Romeo Kariga ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place? A Closer Look at the Competition 
Appeal Court’ paper prepared for the Fifth Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy in South Africa 
Conference, 04-05 October 2011, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park at 24 accessed at http:// 
www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fifth-Annual-Conference/Between-a-rock-and-ahard-place-
PAPERfinal-Submitted-version.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016).   
177  Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (Juta 2012) at 253. 
178  1999 (1) SA 374. 
179  Id at par 58. 
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competition authorities, who are themselves creatures of statute without any inherent 
powers to develop the law, but must operate within the strict confines of their 
empowering legislation, the principle of legality becomes even more important.   
 
The principle of legality affirms the rule of law, which is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional democracy.180  Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Constitution is 
the supreme law of the Republic and that any law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid.  Indeed, our courts have been unanimous and unambiguous in affirming this 
principle.  In Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd and Another v Competition Commission181 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with section 2 of the Constitution and the rule of law.182   
 
Section 33 of the Constitution, amplified by the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act,183 provides that everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, among 
others.  It is common cause that competition proceedings are administrative 
proceedings.  The constitutional right to an administrative action which is lawful is 
therefore applicable to competition proceedings and obliges competition authorities to 
respect the rights of firms in such proceedings.184  In Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
                                               
180  Hoexter supra n 177 at 254. 
181  2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA). 
182  Id at par 10. 
183  Act 3 of 2003.  
184  Section 8(1), (2) and (4) of the Constitution.   
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Africa185  the Constitutional Court held that “many universally accepted fundamental 
rights will only be fully realised if also afforded to juristic persons”.186 
 
In order to comply with the principle of legality or lawfulness and the rule of law, it is 
imperative for competition authorities to stop using language and concepts that do not 
have a basis in the Competition Act.  In Competition Commission of South Africa v 
Senwes Limited the Constitutional Court warned competition authorities against 
inventing or using alien substantive terms or language, in this case the term ‘margin 
squeeze’, as a basis for establishing infringement of the Act.187  In Mittal Steel South 
Africa Limited and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Another188 the 
Competition Appeal Court also observed that section 8 of the Competition Act did not 
use the term ‘super-dominance’ and that the Tribunal’s use of this term may therefore 
go against the principles of statutory interpretation. 189   Sutherland and Kemp also 
contend that “there is no reason to adopt the language or concept of super-dominance 
in South African competition law”, as the concept is not found anywhere in the 
Competition Act.190 
 
5.4.2 The Principle of Equality 
 
                                               
185  Supra n 174.   
186  Id at par 57. 
187  Competition Commission v Senwes Limited 2012 (7) BCLR 667 (CC) at pars 29 and 44.  
188  Supra n 103.   
189  Id at par 30.   
190  Sutherland and Kemp supra n 140 at 7.7.7.  See also Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Others v 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Another supra n 103 at par 30. 
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The main goal of competition law is to secure free and competitive markets as a means 
to promote consumer welfare.191  Free markets are secured by imposing constraints on 
the conduct of market participants.  However, these constraints are aimed almost 
exclusively at dominant firms, while non-dominant firms are ignored.  Now, if the goal of 
competition law remains to secure free and competitive markets, the relevant question 
is for whose benefit are such free markets sought?  It is clearly not for the benefit of the 
most innovative and successful firms, whose investment and industry may set a 
standard that may be hard to follow by competitors and thereby set them apart from the 
rest of other market participants.   
 
Neither are consumers the true beneficiaries of this system.  In some instances, 
consumers are in fact losers.  This usually happens when conduct by a dominant firm 
that enhances consumer welfare is declared anticompetitive and illegal due to its 
exclusionary effect on rivals.  Another instance of consumer welfare loss would be when 
a non-dominant firm charges an excessive price to its customers but such conduct is 
not prohibited, as it would have been had the firm been dominant.  Indeed, as Tor 
observes, there are many types of conduct by non-dominant firms which may cause 
significant consumer harm.192   
 
                                               
191  Section 2 of the South African Competition Act provides that the purpose of the Act is, among others, 
to expand opportunities for domestic and international competition for South African companies and to 
promote the participation of historically disadvantaged persons in the economy, by increasing their 
corporate ownership stakes. 
192  Avishakom Tor ‘Unilateral Anticompetitive Acquisitions of Dominance or Monopoly Power’ (2010) 76 
Antitrust Law Journal 847-72 at 849-50.  See also generally Susan A Creighton et al ‘Cheap Exclusion’ 
(2005) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 975-95.   
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But the structure of the Competition Act makes the scenario of competitive harm and 
consumer exploitation arising from the actions of non-dominant firms appear a non-
issue, as the scheme of the Act does not cater for this eventuality.  It is only the 
unilateral conduct of dominant firms that falls to be considered under the Act’s abuse 
provisions.  However, by contrast, other comparable consumer protection legislation 
protects consumers against exploitation, such as excessive pricing, on the basis of 
general rules that apply regardless of the identity of the exploiter and exploited.193  
 
An economist might feel the urge to inform us, as lawyers with limited knowledge of 
economics, that it would be suicide for a non-dominant firm to engage in the practice of 
excessive pricing because of the prospect of customers switching to other producers.  
Although this economic argument may be persuasive, it fails to take into account the 
plight of customers of a non-dominant firm who, while having some ability to switch to 
other producers or sellers, nevertheless decide to stay with the non-dominant firm for 
various reasons, such as the financial and time costs, as well as the general 
inconvenience of switching to other producers.  To illustrate this point, a factory 
employee working in a plant that is located only a few kilometers or minutes away from 
a local town or shopping center and who regularly takes smoking breaks, may still opt to 
buy his cigarette pack from the factory’s only tobacco point of sale, the vending 
machine, at nearly twice the standard price.  He might pay more for his cigarette pack, 
despite the fact he could still purchase it from a nearby town or supermarket at a much 
                                               
193  See section 100(2) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and section 48(1)(a) of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
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lower price, merely to save time and petrol and to avoid the inconvenience of driving or 
walking to a nearby town or supermarket.   
 
An antitrust economist may argue that the exploitation of the factory employee in the 
above scenario is too insignificant or insubstantial to warrant antitrust concern or action.  
Indeed, a fundamental principle of the Competition Act, in terms of which competition 
authorities will intervene to restore normal market conduct, is that the impugned conduct 
must have ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ anticompetitive effects.194  This, by implication, is 
a statement to the effect that antitrust is incapable of devising a rule that, in accordance 
with the dictates of fairness and equality, will protect all consumers against all 
exploitation, by consistently prohibiting the actions of all sellers or producers, not only 
some, which impacts negatively on consumer welfare, regardless of whether that impact 
is substantial or insubstantial.   
 
For, what is the meaning of ‘insubstantial’ or ‘insignificant’ consumer harm in a country 
where the majority of consumers are living below the poverty line and source most of 
their consumer goods from small and isolated supermarkets, tuck-shops, and spaza-
shops, that would generally escape antitrust scrutiny of their actions due to their inferior 
market size?  The uneducated and uninformed consumer will, without recourse to 
antitrust law’s protection, have to live with these unscrupulous operators who may, as a 
block, constitute the biggest distribution channel for most consumer products, dispelling 
the myth that consumer harm in this segment of the market is insignificant.  Indeed, 
                                               
194  ‘Substantiality’ in the prevention and lessening of competition is one of the core threads pervading 
almost every aspect of the South African Competition Act, from horizontal restrictive practices, vertical 
restrictive practices, abuse of dominance, and merger control provisions, see Brassey supra n 99 at 259. 
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some manufacturers of popular consumer goods have come to understand and define 
this particular market segment as the ‘main market’.195  This is consistent with the 
general view that there are more small and informal businesses in South Africa than 
there are dominant and multinational corporations.  In this regard, the overall level of 
consumer harm at the hands of these small-time operators may be too great to ignore.   
 
Even when one accepts the argument of the antitrust economist, in the example above, 
that it would be suicide for a smaller or non-dominant firm to engage in excessive 
pricing, the conspicuous omission of a legal provision from our Competition Act dealing 
with the possibility of consumer exploitation at the hands of non-dominant firms is 
legally indefensible.  Perhaps in economic theory one may get away with this omission.  
But law is different.  While technical economic assumptions may have helped inform the 
provisions of the Act, the law must avoid replicating economic theories which may 
offend against fundamental constitutional principles, such as the right of legal subjects 
to fairness, equal treatment, and non-discrimination.196  For, unlike economic theory, 
legal rules can only be legitimate if they are of general application and are fair and 
just.197   
 
Legal provisions must, while avoiding the risk of being vague, endeavor to root out the 
ills they were designed to cure in all or a variety of contexts, for the sake of 
                                               
195  Competition Commission and Another v British American Tobacco South Africa supra n 161 at pars 
216 and 260. 
196  See Richard A. Posner Antitrust Law 2 ed (University Of Chicago Press 2001) at vii–x and US 
Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act at 15 accessed at http://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-
section-2-sherman-act (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
197  Id.  
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completeness and inclusivity.  This generic and inclusive character of the law is also 
essential in order to avoid the unfairness and naivety of a rule which penalises particular 
conduct in one situation but does not follow through by penalising the same conduct in 
another.  This problem is particularly perplexing when the effect of the impugned 
conduct remains the same under different circumstances, regardless of a slight change 
in the facts of the matter.   
 
In this regard, the principle developed by the Constitutional Court in Masiya v Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Another 198 may be of relevance here.  In this case, the Court 
found that the common-law definition of rape, which only included non-consensual 
penile penetration of a vagina but excluded non-consensual anal penetration, was not in 
complete harmony with the spirit, purport, and objects of the Constitution.199  Extending 
the common-law definition of rape to include non-consensual female anal penile 
penetration, the Court found that there were no rational grounds on which this act 
should not be regarded as rape.200   
 
The principle emanating from Masiya is that where the same conduct produces identical 
or substantially similar results in different but related circumstances, the law must 
uniformly prohibit and punish the conduct in both situations to avoid injustice.  There is 
no reason to think that the victim of non-consensual anal penetration experiences less 
pain, trauma, and health risk than the victim of non-consensual vaginal penetration.201  
                                               
198  2007 (5) SA 30 (CC); 2007 (8) BCLR 827. 
199  Id at pars 27 and 39. 
200  Id at pars 39, 45 and 74(5). 
201  Id at par 39. 
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Equally, the extent of exploitation suffered by the factory worker, in the example above, 
at the hands of a non-dominant cigarette seller in the relevant geographic market, the 
vending machine operator, may not be less significant than that suffered by another 
cigarette buyer in a different situation, where the excessive cigarette price is charged by 
a large or dominant supermarket chain. 
 
Although the hypothetical scenario of the factory worker used above may look too trivial 
to drive any significant antirust message home, the scenario may also have relevance in 
complex and larger commercial transactions, where the economic impact and extent of 
customer exploitation could be substantial.  For example, a local customer of a locally 
based manufacturer of industrial equipment or machinery operating in a globally 
competitive market may, despite the higher local costs, still opt to buy the machinery or 
equipment from the local manufacture in light of time constraints, shipment and 
insurance costs, and other logistical and bureaucratic issues associated with sourcing 
the cheaper overseas equipment or product. 
 
Indeed in Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa 
Ltd and Another,202 the cornerstone of Mittal’s defence was that the prospect of import 
competition constrained its pricing power in the South African market.203  The Tribunal 
also admitted that there were a number of instances where Mittal’s local flat steel 
customers could have sourced flat steel products and other end products for which steel 
                                               
202  Supra n 113. 
203  Id at par 55. 
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is an essential input from producers in other parts of the world. 204   However, the 
Tribunal crucially observed that Mittal was severely protected from international price 
competition by its considerable distance from other international competing producers of 
flat steel products.205   The Tribunal also found that the scale of transport costs involved 
in the importation of a commodity like steel into South Africa, with estimated 
transportation costs as high as 47 per cent of the cost of the imported product, were 
prohibitively too high to make it an attractive option for Mittal’s local customers. 206  
Ultimately, Mittal’s South African customers were stuck with its prices, despite the fact 
that there might have been other options available to them.   
 
The omission from our Act of provisions dealing with the unilateral actions of non-
dominant firms, such as excessive pricing, which might result in the exploitation of their 
customers, while focusing attention exclusively on the same conduct when performed 
by dominant firms, might result in inequality and amount to discrimination from the 
perspective of customers exploited by non-dominant firms.  Inequality is evident from 
the viewpoint that customers that are exploited by non-dominant firms are not afforded 
the same legal protection offered to customers exploited by dominant firms.   
 
It is also discriminatory that dominant firms are prevented from engaging in conduct that 
non-dominant firms can easily engage in without restriction or fear of attracting antitrust 
attention.  This may raise serious constitutional problems.  Clearly, several fundamental 
                                               
204  Id at pars 64 and 68. 
205  Id at pars 55 and 60. 
206  Id at par 59. 
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rights to which juristic persons are also entitled are applicable in competition law.207  
Indeed, Chapter 2 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, applies to all law, including 
competition law. 208   In Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd and Another v Competition 
Commission209 the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised that the Competition Act must 
be interpreted in a manner that least impinges on the fundamental rights of affected 
firms.210  The fundamental rights relevant to the field of competition law may include, but 
are not limited to, the right to fairness, freedom of trade, equality, and non-
discrimination.211  In AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and Security212 the Court 
held that “it is difficult to appreciate why a corporation should not be entitled to enforce 
the Bill of Rights, in particular the equality clause, where an executive or administrative 
functionary blatantly treats it unequally from all other persons”.213 
 
5.4.3 Summary  
 
The Competition Act does not impose any ‘additional responsibility’ on dominant firms, 
other than that expressly spelled out in the Act, on the basis of their superior market 
share or super-dominance.  On the contrary, the Act mandates a unified distribution of 
legal obligations to all dominant firms, regardless of the degree of one firm’s dominance 
in comparison with that of others.  In this sense, the ‘additional responsibility’ that 
                                               
207  See section 1(2)(a) of the Competition Act.  See also J Neethling Van Heerden-Neethling Unlawful 
Competition 2 ed (Lexis Nexis 2008) at 12-13.  
208  Section 8(1) of the Constitution.  
209  Supra n 181.   
210  Id at par 10. 
211  J Neethling and BR Rutherford ‘The Law of Competition and the Bill of Rights’ in JA Faris Law of 
South Africa, Annual Cumulative Supplement, Second Edition, Vol 2(2) (Lexis Nexis Online 2015) at par 
233 and Neethling supra n 203.   
212  Supra n 174.  
213  Id at 38; 790. 
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attaches to dominant firms as a consequence of the adoption of the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance in South African competition law 
runs contrary to the principle of legality and rule of law.  Constraints imposed selectively 
on the market conduct of dominant firms by operation of the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance, to which non-dominant firms are not 
subject, are also contrary to the constitutional principles of fairness, freedom of trade, 
equality, and non-discrimination.  Overall, this makes the importation of the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance into our law inappropriate in 
terms of section 1(3) of the Competition Act. 
 
5.5 Exceptional Circumstances that may Justify the Application of the 
Principle of Special Responsibility and the Doctrine of Super-
Dominance 
 
There may be exceptional circumstances where the application of the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance are justified.  This may 
particularly be the case where state-owned or public enterprises are involved.  Most of 
these enterprises are largely funded by the state as main or sole shareholder with 
money coming directly from public coffers.  In theory, taxes collected by the state from 
taxpayers, including rival private enterprises that are in direct competition with the state-
owned enterprise, may also end up funding the operations of the latter to compete 
against the former.  Backed by these massive public resources, many state-owned 
corporations also own or control massive facilities and infrastructure that may be 
indispensable to existing and potential competitors in their respective markets.   
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In the era where there is greater recognition of the role of competition and a strong 
private sector in driving economic development, it has become normal for governments 
to expect or require state-owned enterprises to allow competitors access to the facilities 
under their control.  State-owned enterprises are sometimes required to sacrifice profit 
maximisation in order to pursue the state’s social, industrial, and developmental 
objectives.  Indeed, public enterprises in the transport, telecommunication, and energy 
sectors in Europe and South Africa have long been required by their governments to 
undertake activities in which they would not engage were they guided solely by 
commercial considerations.  Given the broader mandate of some state-owned 
enterprises to facilitate economic growth in their respective industries, one might expect 
them to act less aggressively toward their competitors than would private profit 
maximising firms.214 
 
The origin of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance 
can be traced to a time in Europe when governments had an increased role to play in 
the economy, through state-owned enterprises, which controlled most of the national 
markets.215  The need to grow economies necessitated encouraging the development of 
private enterprises, whose participation in the economy was to be enhanced by placing 
an obligation on state-owned enterprises to allow these private enterprises access to 
the public facilities or infrastructures under their control on reasonable commercial 
terms.   
                                               
214  David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak ‘Competition Law For State Owned Enterprises’ (2003-
2004) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 479-523 at 479. 
215  Eleanor M. Fox ‘What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect’ 
(2002) 70 Antitrust Law Journal 371-411 at 393. 
268 
 
 
In European competition law, most cases in which access to essential facilities has 
been ordered by competition authorities and the courts have been instances where the 
facility was owned or controlled by a state-owned enterprise.  Dominant firms have been 
ordered to grant competitors access to essential facilities and infrastructures such as 
ports, airports, rail networks, telecommunication infrastructure, gas pipelines, and postal 
networks. 216   These are undoubtedly areas of the economy largely controlled or 
dominated by state-owned enterprises.  An order directing the relevant state-owned 
enterprise to give a private competitor access to these public facilities becomes more 
appropriate in instances where regulatory issues make it impossible for a privately 
owned enterprise to establish its own facility.  For example, as Whish and Bailey 
observed, “there may be only one point on the coastline of a country where a deep sea 
port can be established or planning and environmental reasons may make it impossible 
for a private entity to build a new airport or rail network”.217   
 
In South Africa, public enterprises continue to play an important role in the pursuit of the 
state’s developmental objectives.  They are expected to sacrifice profit and take a lead 
in the provision of modern infrastructure that will provide support for the growth of the 
South African economy.218  Against the background of several key infrastructures in the 
country being controlled by state-owned enterprises, section 8(b) of the Competition Act 
                                               
216  Whish and Bailey supra n 11 at 703-05. 
217  Id at 703. 
218  Thabo Mokwena, Presidential Review Committee, Restructuring of State Owned Enterprise in South 
Africa (May 2012) at 5 accessed at 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_3/discussion_papers-
edited_by_expert_writer/Draft_Restructuring%20of%20SOE%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf (date of last 
use: 6 July 2016). 
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places a special or more onerous responsibility or obligation on ‘all’ dominant firms to 
allow competitors access to, or the use of, their facilities or infrastructures, unless there 
are sound economic reasons justifying the refusal.219   
 
While section 8(b) of the Competition Act is addressed to all dominant firms in general 
and not state-owned enterprises in particular, it is clear, given the stranglehold which 
state-owned enterprises have on key infrastructure, that the most likely target of this 
provision will be state-owned enterprises.  Many of the facilities or infrastructures that 
come to mind when reference is made to the term ‘essential facility’ in South African 
competition law are owned predominantly by state-owned enterprises.  With well over 
130 companies and institutions officially classified as state-owned enterprises, the 
stranglehold which public enterprises and institutions have on the economy is 
significant. 220   State-owned companies such as Transnet, Eskom, ACSA, Telkom, 
SABC and SANRAL, to name but a few, own or control a significant chunk of facilities or 
infrastructure that is indispensable to private enterprises in their respective markets or 
industries.   
 
The special responsibility of state-owned enterprises, as the most likely target of section 
8(b), is demonstrated by the fact that a refusal to grant competitors access to an 
essential facility is treated in much stronger and perhaps harsher terms than any other 
species of refusal to deal.  For example, a refusal by a dominant firm to grant a 
                                               
219  Section 8(b) of the Competition Act.   
220  Republic of South Africa, Department of Government Communications and Information Systems, 
‘State-owned Enterprises’ accessed at 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/resourcecentre/contactdirectory/government-structures-and-parastatals 
(date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
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competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so is 
prohibited outright.221  As the Competition Tribunal found in Competition Commission v 
Telkom SA Limited,222 a refusal to supply an essential facility is prohibited outright or 
per se as there is no requirement in section 8(b) of the Competition Act to demonstrate 
anticompetitive or procompetitive effects.223  If the elements of section 8(b) are proved, 
the Tribunal held further, then anticompetitive harm is presumed.224  By contrast, other 
species of refusal to deal, for example a refusal to sell or supply scarce goods to a 
competitor, are dealt with more leniently in that in such instances the refusal to deal can 
be overlooked if the dominant firm demonstrates that there are efficiency and other pro-
competitive gains attendant upon the refusal.225   
 
Clearly the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance, when 
applied to dominant state-owned enterprises, may be more acceptable than when 
applied to private enterprises.  When applied to private enterprises, the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance may, in the context of 
essential facilities, have the effect of removing incentives for private investors or owners 
of private undertakings to invest in infrastructure, as they will be forced to share with 
their rivals.  In this regard, it is regrettable that in Phutuma Networks Pty Ltd v Telkom 
SA Limited226 the Tribunal found that even a privately owned firm, operating with no 
special state privileges in terms of any legislation or international conventions, will be 
                                               
221  Section 8(b) of the Competition Act.  See also Brassey supra n 99 at 203-04. 
222  Case No 11/CR/Feb04. 
223  Id at par 86. 
224  Id. 
225  Section 8(d)(ii) of the Competition Act.  See also Brassey supra n 99 at 203-04. 
226  Case No 37/CR/July10.  
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judged by the same criteria as a state-owned enterprise.227  This means the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance may, if their application is not 
halted, continue to bedevil private and state-owned enterprises alike.   
 
5.6 The Principle of Special Responsibility and the Doctrine of Super-
Dominance as a Corporate Social Responsibility Policy 
 
It must be accepted that from a strictly commercial and profit maximisation point of view, 
it hardly seems sensible to require dominant firms to act in a manner that shows 
sensitivity to the commercial interests of competitors.228  In this sense, the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance may appear to be contrary to 
pure competition law principles in that they impose a responsibility or duty on dominant 
undertakings to exercise a certain degree of self-restraint when competing in the 
market.229   
 
However, from a corporate social responsibility point of view, it may be essential for 
large corporations to engage in some profit sacrificing social responsibility actions.230  
These profit sacrificing actions, it is submitted, may, while having the initial appearance 
of being cost and time wasting, lead to an increase in profitability in the long term 
associated with a good corporate public image among customers and society at 
                                               
227  Id at par 24. 
228   Didem Kurtoglu and Togan Turan ‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility’ (2005) 24 
International Financial Law Review 77-9 at 77. 
229  Amato supra n 12 at 65-6. 
230  Irene-marié Esser and Adriette Dekker ‘The Dynamics of Corporate Governance in South Africa: 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment and the Enhancement of Good Corporate Governance 
Principles’ (2008) 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 157-69 at 158.  
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large.231  The use of the special responsibility of dominant firms and the doctrine of 
super-dominance as part of dominant firm’s corporate social responsibility may fit 
appropriately into the South African economic and political contexts.  Dominant firms 
are encouraged, in competition law and beyond, to help facilitate the participation of 
small and medium-sized enterprises and firms owned by previously disadvantaged 
persons in the economy, in order to achieve government’s equity goals.232   
 
Indeed, the Competition Act and other legislation, most notably the Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, 233  contain provisions designed to encourage larger 
undertakings to take into account or be more sensitive to the economic needs and 
interests of small and medium-sized enterprises and firms owned by previously 
disadvantaged persons.  In Nationwide Poles v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd 234  the Tribunal 
observed that an important function of the Competition Act is to bring about accessible 
markets in order to accommodate smaller businesses and enable them to compete 
effectively against larger and well-established incumbents.235  Accordingly, dominant 
undertakings are expected to make some sacrifices to ensure that small and medium-
sized enterprises and firms owned by previously disadvantaged persons can enjoy the 
benefits of a competitive and inclusive economy.  As the Tribunal found in Harmony 
                                               
231  Id.  
232  Id at 157.  Judith Geldenhuys ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Small and Medium Enterprises in 
South Africa’ in Guler Aras, David Crowther and Stella Vettori (eds) Corporate Social Responsibility in 
SMEs (Social Responsibility Research Network 2009) at 199. 
233  Act 53 of 2003. 
234  Supra n 109.  
235  Id at pars 81 and 89. 
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Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another,236 
dominant firms are expected to “leave a certain amount of money on the table”.237   
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
The general purpose of this Chapter has been to evaluate critically the unique nature of 
some obligations imposed on dominant firms in modern competition law.  Particular 
attention was paid to constraints on the market conduct of dominant firms occasioned 
by the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance in 
European and South African competition law.  The ultimate aim was to establish 
whether such constraints perpetuate the historical philosophy and practice of hostility 
towards dominant firms in modern competition law enforcement.   
 
I proceeded from the general point of view that abuse of dominance law, by its very 
nature, involves the selective application of competition rules to the market conduct of 
firms on the basis of their market share or market power.  This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the same market conduct is generally not actionable when performed by a firm 
whose market share or market power is below the average required for dominance.   
 
One of the key observations in this Chapter is that singling out dominant firm conduct 
for special treatment under abuse of dominance law suggests, at the very least, that 
dominant firms have an implied special responsibility or duty under the law to act or not 
                                               
236  Supra n 113.  
237  Id at par 131. 
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act in a particular manner.  In some instances, this special responsibility on dominant 
firms has also been recognised expressly in the decisions of competition authorities and 
the courts.  This has particularly been the case in European and South African 
competition law, where the competition authorities and the courts have held that 
dominant firms have a special responsibility towards the market, and that this 
responsibility increases in accordance with the superiority of the firm’s dominance.   
 
The operation of the principle of special responsibility requires dominant firms always to 
be cautious and to some extent refrain from engaging in standard market conduct, even 
if such conduct would be unobjectionable when adopted by non-dominant firms.  The 
doctrine of super-dominance strengthens the principle of special responsibility, by 
adding that the more dominant the firm the more onerous will be the obligations 
imposed on it.  The combined effect of the principle of special responsibility and the 
doctrine of super-dominance is that the ability of dominant firms to compete effectively 
on merit is severely curtailed. 
 
From a European competition law point of view, the obligations imposed on dominant 
firms by operation of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-
dominance are consistent with the ordoliberal tradition of hostility towards dominant 
undertakings that has been part of the law from its inception.  This tradition is grounded 
in the belief that the presence of a dominant firm in a market is incompatible with the 
ideal of free and effective competition.  This means that whenever dominance is found 
to exist in a market it triggers the presumption that competition in that market has been 
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weakened and that this calls for corrective antitrust action.  Constraints on the market 
conduct of dominant firms occasioned by the principle of special responsibility and the 
doctrine of super-dominance are an important part of that corrective action.   
 
From a South African competition law point of view, the operation of the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance also appears quite consistent 
with the historical and philosophical reasons for which competition law arose in the 
country.  Competition policy and law in South Africa developed in response to the 
historical trend towards industrial concentration and the creation of monopoly.  There is 
a longstanding perception in South African society that corporate giants, particularly 
those which are privately owned, are against the common interest of the majority of 
citizens.  The concentration of economic power in the hands of private corporations 
owned and controlled by a minority has been singled out as a major example of the 
prevailing inequality in wealth and income distribution in South Africa.  In this sense, 
constraints on the market conduct of dominant firms by operation of the principle of 
special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance may seem to serve an 
important political and economic purpose.   
 
The general conclusion arrived at in this Chapter is that, in their current form, the 
principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance are unhelpful and 
may need to be modified or abandoned altogether.  Their main problem is that they 
unfairly limit the ability of dominant firms to engage in standard market conduct and 
therefore to compete effectively on merit.  This is contrary to the principle of free 
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competition.238  In societies, such as South Africa, which subscribes to the principles of 
fairness and justice and guarantees the rights to freedom of trade, equality, and 
nondiscrimination to all persons, including corporate citizens, the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance raise insurmountable legal and 
constitutional problems.  In this sense, the adoption of the principle of special 
responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance in some South African competition 
law decisions may have been inappropriate.  
 
However, among the exceptional circumstances in which the obligations imposed on 
dominant firms by operation of the principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of 
super-dominance may serve an important economic purpose could be cases involving 
state-owned enterprises.  Indeed, some state-owned enterprises control indispensable 
public facilities and infrastructures, which give them the distinct advantage of being 
gatekeepers to the participation in the relevant market by new entrants and potential 
competitors.  In this context, it may seem reasonable and necessary to compel such 
state-owned enterprises to grant new entrants access to the facilities and infrastructure 
under their control, in order to promote competition.   
 
Another instance in which the special obligations imposed on dominant firms by the 
principle of special responsibility and the doctrine of super-dominance may seem 
acceptable could be where dominant firms are encouraged to embrace the obligations 
as part of their corporate social responsibility exercises.  This implies that the 
obligations would have to be embraced by dominant firms on an optional basis.  This is 
                                               
238  Burton Ong supra n 22 at 216-17. 
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because, as it stands, there is no sufficient legal basis for imposing such obligations on 
a compulsory basis.239  It would therefore be appropriate to allow dominant firms the 
freedom to make a choice as to whether and to what extent they will comply with such 
obligations.  It is likely that peer and social pressure and the desire to cultivate a good 
corporate public image may spur on some dominant firms to comply with the 
obligations, as opposed to the standard rejection with which the special responsibility of 
dominant firms is met under the current system of compulsory enforcement.  
                                               
239  O’Donoghue and Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFUE 2 ed supra n 77 at 208. 
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____________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The opposite of laissez-faire economics1 and Adam Smith’s ‘invisible-hand’ theory,2 
competition policy and law are part of the well-established orthodoxy in economic 
theory, which recognises the important role that governments have to play in 
establishing and enforcing rules regulating market conduct.3  This study accepted and 
proceeded from the same point of view, that the regulation of market conduct through 
appropriate policy and legislative measures is essential in order to ensure fair 
competition among market participants, which, in turn, could lead to efficiency and 
benefit consumers.  But is this regulation too onerous, and does it discriminate unfairly 
against certain enterprises? 
 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate whether the formulation and 
enforcement of competition rules in general, and abuse of dominance provisions in 
                                               
1  According to the Oxford English Dictionary laissez-faire is defined as a phrase expressive of the 
principle that government should not interfere with the action of individuals, especially in industrial affairs 
and trade, see Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press December 2015) accessed at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/105152?rskey=PPucpt&result=116188 (date of last use: 6 July 2016). 
2  Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Edwin Cannan (ed)) 
Volume 1 5 ed (Methuen & Co Ltd 1904) at 421.  Adam Smith’s ‘invisible-hand’ theory has come to be 
understood in economics to refer to market factors that influence the demand and supply of goods in a 
free market, where there is no regulation or restriction on the actions of traders by the government. 
3   Simon Roberts ‘The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development: The South African 
Experience’ (2004) Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, Working Paper 8 at 1.   
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particular, may impact negatively on the economic and legal rights of enterprises, and 
more specifically dominant firms, to trade freely and unhindered.   
 
6.2 Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of this study can be summarised by the following broad observations: 
The origin of competition law can be traced back to an historical philosophy of hostility 
towards monopoly and dominant undertakings across the three jurisdictions under 
review.  This philosophy of hostility towards dominant firms is, with the limited exception 
of American antitrust law,4 still reflected in current competition law and its enforcement.   
 
Some abuse of dominance provisions are too vague and open-ended to the extent that 
they fail to disclose accurately what conduct is prohibited.  This leaves competition 
authorities with an unfettered discretion, assuming almost a legislative role to 
determine, after the fact, conduct that they may deem anticompetitive and illegal.  The 
vague and open-ended nature of abuse of dominance provisions, coupled with the lack 
of universal agreement on whether certain practices are anticompetitive, may result in 
legitimate and competitive dominant firm conduct being declared illegal.5 
 
                                               
4  American antitrust law is a limited exception, as it depends on the extent to which the Supreme Court 
decision in Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP 540 US 398 (2004) at 407, 
which proposed a more tolerant approach towards dominant firms, is followed. 
5  As the US Department of Justice noted in its Single-Firm Conduct Report, “many single-firm practices 
once presumed to violate section 2 can create efficiencies and benefit consumers”, US Department of 
Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act at 1 
accessed at http://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2-
sherman-act (last date of use: 6 July 2016). 
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While competition authorities and the courts have in some instances noted the potential 
unfairness inherent in some abuse of dominance provisions and their enforcement and 
undertaken to introduce appropriate changes to their enforcement approach, there has 
been no marked change in practice.  The lack of an appropriate causation framework in 
abuse of dominance adjudication by which to determine whether the anticompetitive 
harm complained of can reliably be attributed to the conduct of the dominant firm further 
adds to an already hostile environment in which dominant firms must operate.  The fact 
that certain practices are only actionable when performed by firms enjoying a position of 
dominance, but attract no consequences when performed by non-dominant firms, 
reveals the discriminatory nature of the law.  Having regard to these observations, it can 
fairly be concluded that the treatment of dominant firms in competition law in general, 
and abuse of dominance proceedings in particular, raises profound economic and legal 
concerns.   
 
Firstly, the philosophy of hostility towards dominant undertakings may have negative 
implications for competition and economic development.  Economic theory and 
experience have shown that in certain circumstances dominant firms may hold specific 
benefits for consumers and the economy in general.  These benefits include economies 
of scale,6 international competitiveness,7 research and development,8 and efficiency.9   
                                               
6  Because most monopolies and dominant firms are able to produce a greater quantity of goods at lower 
average costs, the benefit of lower production costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices.  As Djolov observes, if a firm increases in size it may be able to benefit from economies of scale, 
which is a cost advantage due to size.  This is because when a firm becomes large it will have a lower 
cost per unit of output than a smaller firm, which should translate into lower product prices, Djolov G 
‘Competition in the South African Manufacturing Sector: An Empirical Probe’ (2015) 46 South African 
Journal of Business Management 21-30 at 24.   
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Some of the benefits that may flow from market domination have particular relevance 
for the South African economy.  Although the South African economy has over the 
years been consistently rated the most advanced in Africa, the reality is that our 
economy is not the largest, because of a relatively smaller population size compared to 
countries such as Nigeria, and many of our domestic markets can be served by one or a 
few firms operating on a globally efficient scale.10  These globally efficient domestic 
firms may provide economies of scale benefits to the local market, while also competing 
effectively in global markets.   
 
One of the stated objects of our Competition Act is ‘to expand opportunities for South 
African firms in world markets’.11  With many markets increasingly being dominated by 
multinational corporations, it may be essential for a firm to have a monopoly or a certain 
level of dominance in the domestic market in order to be globally competitive.  Indeed, 
there are many firms whose domination of the South African market has enabled them 
                                                                                                                                                       
7  A local firm may be dominant in the domestic market but face effective competition from multinational 
corporations operating globally.  With markets increasingly globalised, it may be necessary for a firm to be 
dominant in the local market in order to become competitive internationally.   
8  For example, the opportunity to enjoy monopoly benefits arising out of protection conferred by certain 
intellectual property rights would encourage more businesses to undertake research and innovate.  
Without the monopoly power that an intellectual property right such as a patent may confer, society may 
be deprived of much needed innovation essential for development.  
9  While this issue is often ignored in competition economics and law enforcement, most successful firms 
become dominant through being innovative, efficient, and dynamic.  As Djolov, supra n 6 at 23-4, 
observes: monopoly can occur when incumbents maintain or gain competitive position according to the 
innovations they bring to the market.  For example, it is well recognised that companies such as 
Microsoft, Google and Apple have become dominant in their respective markets through their successful 
innovations. 
10  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Competition Law and Policy in 
South Africa, An OECD Peer Review (2003) at 10 accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/34823812.pdf (date of last use: 6 July 2016).  
11  Section 2(d) of the Act. 
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to compete effectively in international markets.12  This is not only good for the firms 
concerned and their shareholders, but also for the global competitiveness of our 
economy and its development.   
 
Secondly, our society has an unwavering commitment to the rule of law and 
constitutionalism, in which the fundamental rights of all persons, including corporate 
citizens and dominant firms, are guaranteed.  Indeed in Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa,13  the Constitutional Court held that “many universally accepted fundamental 
rights will only be fully realised if also afforded to juristic persons”.14  The fundamental 
rights relevant to competition law include the rights to fairness, freedom of trade, 
equality, and non-discrimination.15  In AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety and 
Security16 the Court held that “it is difficult to appreciate why a corporation should not be 
entitled to enforce the Bill of Rights, in particular the equality clause, where an executive 
or administrative functionary blatantly treats it unequally from all other persons”.17  In 
Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd and Another v Competition Commission 18  the Supreme 
                                               
12  These would include South African Breweries Ltd; the four major banks (Standard Bank, ABSA, FNB, 
and Nedbank); MTN; Shoprite; MultiChoice and a number of our mining and construction companies.  
See Carl T Bogus ‘The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of Antitrust’ (2015) 
49 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1-120 at 9 and Grietjie Verhoef ‘Concentration and 
Competition: The Changing Landscape of the Banking Sector in South Africa 1970-2007’ (2009) 24 South 
African Journal of Economic History 157-97 at 184-92. 
13  1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
14  Id at par 57. 
15  J Neethling and BR Rutherford ‘The Law of Competition and the Bill of Rights’ in JA Faris Law of South 
Africa, Annual Cumulative Supplement, Second Edition, Vol 2(2) (Lexis Nexis Online 2015) at par 233 
and J Neethling Van Heerden-Neethling Unlawful Competition 2 ed (2008 Lexis Nexis) at 12-13. 
16  1994 (4) BCLR 31 (E); 1995 (1) SA 783 (E).  
17  Id at 38; 790. 
18  2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA). 
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Court of Appeal emphasised that the Competition Act must be applied in a manner that 
least impinges on the fundamental rights of affected firms.19   
 
In this light, the structure and content of some of the provisions of our Competition Act 
as well as the philosophy underpinning their enforcement may need a serious re-think.  
In the next paragraph, I suggest and recommend action that I believe will help remedy 
defects identified in the law and its enforcement.   
 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
This study has revealed that the challenges faced by dominant firms in competition law 
and abuse of dominance adjudication can be attributed to three main factors: (a) the 
philosophy underpinning competition law and its abuse of dominance provisions; (b) the 
structure and content of the abuse of dominance provisions; and (c) the manner or 
approach through which abuse of dominance provisions are enforced by competition 
authorities.  The solution to these problems may therefore lie in the following proposed 
changes:  
 
(a) the shifting of our mind-set with regard to how competition law and its 
objectives are viewed; 
(b)  reviewing the structure and content of abuse of dominance provisions; and 
                                               
19  Id at par 10. 
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(c)  developing a fair and consistent enforcement strategy, which fully 
recognises the right of dominant firms to compete vigorously like all other 
enterprises.   
 
6.3.1 Shifting the Mind-set 
 
The philosophy of hostility towards and mistrust of dominant undertakings must make 
way for one in which competition law is viewed as nothing more than a set of market 
rules designed to ensure a fair competitive process in which the most efficient and 
innovative trader is recognised and encouraged.  Competition law should, therefore, not 
be viewed as a tool to address issues of market concentration, equity, and wealth 
distribution.  This is because evidence suggests that competition law is incapable of 
effectively addressing these problems, which in some cases have increased despite or 
as a result of the application of competition rules.20  Competition law must be seen as 
primarily concerned with the promotion of efficiency and the protection of consumers.   
 
6.3.2 Reviewing the Structure and Content of Abuse of Dominance 
Provisions 
 
As stated above, some of the challenges faced by dominant firms in competition law 
and abuse of dominance adjudication can be directly attributed to the structure and 
content of the relevant rules.  It is of course neither necessary nor possible to rewrite 
every aspect of the provisions of the Act found to have been problematic in this study.  
                                               
20  Bogus supra n 12 at 85-106. 
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My proposals for legislative amendments are limited to the core abuse of dominance 
provisions, whose formulation provides the legal basis for hostility and potential 
prejudice towards dominant firms in enforcement.  Section 8 of the Competition Act, 
which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by a dominant firm, will be the focus of 
proposed amendments.  
 
Figure 1:  Underlining indicates amendments to the current provision  
Section 8 as is Section 8 as I suggest it should be 
“8. Abuse of dominance prohibited 
 
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
(a) charge an excessive price to the 
detriment of consumers; 
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to 
an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so; 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other 
than an act listed in paragraph (d), if 
the anticompetitive effect of that act 
outweighs its technological, efficiency 
or other pro-competitive gain; or 
(d) engage in any of the following 
exclusionary acts…[list omitted]” 
8. The following unilateral conduct is 
prohibited 
It is prohibited for any firm to – 
(a) charge an excessive price to the 
detriment of consumers; 
(b) discriminate between different 
purchasers or consumers, without a 
rational economic justification; 
(c) refuse to deal with or allow a 
competitor access to an essential 
facility when it is economically 
feasible to do so and to the detriment 
of consumers; 
(d) engage in any of the following 
exclusionary acts, to the detriment of 
consumers …[see original list]; or 
(e) engage in any exclusionary act, other 
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than those listed in paragraph (d), to 
the detriment of consumers, as 
determined from time to time in 
Guidelines issued by the Competition 
Commission pursuant to section 79 of 
this Act. 
 
NOTES: The new section 8, which prohibits unilateral anticompetitive conduct by any 
firm, de-emphasises the importance of dominance as a constituent element of 
infringement and focuses more on the effect of the impugned conduct on consumer 
welfare.  Under the new provision, it will therefore no longer be necessary to prove that 
the defendant is dominant.  Focus will shift significantly to the anticompetitive nature of 
the challenged conduct and its impact on consumers.  This means that the definition of 
an exclusionary act in section 1 of the Act will also need to be amended so that it can 
reflect the new policy: that exclusionary acts are prohibited only to the extent that they 
may result in consumer harm.   
 
The new section 8 will include discrimination in its framework in order to deal effectively 
with instances of trade discrimination,21 which are not adequately dealt with under the 
current section 9.22  The entire content of the current section 9 will disappear and its 
                                               
21  This is a much broader provision on discrimination, which is not limited to price discrimination but 
includes other instances of commercial discrimination, such as unfair contract terms, unequal services, 
etc. 
22  Elsewhere I have shown that price discrimination has many traits and effects similar to those of 
excessive pricing, yet it is dealt with differently and far more leniently.  See Chapter 3 at par 3.2.1.  
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substance will form part of the new section 8(b), which will be broader in scope and 
effect.   
 
For the sake of coherence, the contents of the current section 8(d) will appear in a new 
section 8(d), ahead of the current section 8(c), which will become the new section 8(e), 
in view of the fact that the application of the current section 8(c) is dependent upon the 
exhaustion of section 8(d).  The new section 8(e) will make the prohibition of 
exclusionary acts, other than those listed in section 8(d), subject to their disclosure or 
identification in guidelines that must be published by the Competition Commission in the 
Government Gazette pursuant to section 79 of the Act.  These guidelines will play an 
important role, by giving firms advance warning of the competition implications of their 
conduct and so enable them to adjust their conduct accordingly, as opposed to the 
current system where firms may literally be taken by surprise.23  Once the Commission 
has issued its guidelines identifying types of conduct likely to fall foul of the provision 
and outlining its enforcement approach, an administrative penalty for a first time offence 
may be appropriate.  
 
6.3.3 Developing a Fair and Consistent Enforcement Strategy 
 
Consistent with the shift in mind-set in terms of which competition law and its objects 
are understood and the revised content of abuse of dominance rules, competition 
                                               
23  Although other commentators hold the view that the current section 8(c) is too lenient on dominant 
firms, citing the heavy burden of proof placed on a complainant under the provision and the absence of 
an administrative penalty for a first time contravention, I hold the view that the application of the provision 
is prone to errors, which may cost firms affected by it far more than would an administrative penalty.  See 
Chapter 3 at par 3.2.2.   
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authorities must, when enforcing the Act, prioritise efficiency and consumer welfare over 
the exclusion of rivals.  They must consistently require complainants to demonstrate 
that the conduct complained of is inefficient and causes significant consumer harm, as 
opposed to harm to their own selfish business interest.  This will eliminate the 
undesirable scenarios, common in abuse of dominance litigation, where a competitor 
selfishly takes its dominant rival to the authorities to force the latter to relinquish 
legitimate business conduct or even to give it part of its business.24  They must ensure 
that they apply the law in a manner that recognises the right of all firms to engage in 
trade freely without undue restriction.   
 
6.4 Final Remarks 
 
This study has found that the formulation and enforcement of competition rules in 
general, and abuse of dominance provisions in particular, may in some instances 
impact negatively on the economic and constitutional rights of dominant firms.  
However, the study makes recommendations aimed at not only ensuring that dominant 
firms are treated fairly, but also that where their conduct is anticompetitive and causes 
harm to consumer welfare, decisive action can be taken against them by competition 
authorities.  In this sense, I trust that the study makes a meaningful contribution towards 
the fair and effective enforcement of the Competition Act.  
                                               
24  See Phutuma Networks (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd Case No 37/CR/July10.  Here a small business, 
Phutuma Networks (Pty) Ltd, initiated a complaint in the Competition Tribunal against Telkom SA Ltd, the 
basis of the complaint being that Telkom outsourced certain services to a third party, Network Telex, 
without subjecting the services to a tender process.  Despite the fact that the complainant had no proven 
track record or history in the provision of the relevant services, it was contended that not outsourcing the 
services to the complainant was contrary to the Competition Act and BEE legislation.  The Tribunal, at par 
29, correctly dismissed the case, holding that a dominant firm is under no obligation to put services to it to 
tender. 
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